Derivatives Markets and Central Counterparties

The G20 Leaders agreed in 2009 on a comprehensive reform agenda for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, with the objectives of improving transparency, mitigating systemic risk, and protecting against market abuse.

To achieve these objectives, the G20 agreed that:

  • all OTC derivatives contracts should be reported to trade repositories (TRs);
  • all standardised contracts should be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs);
  • all standardised contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate; and
  • non-centrally cleared (bilateral) contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements and minimum margining requirements.

To support the implementation of these reforms, the FSB and other international standard-setting bodies have developed standards and guidance on financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and market participants. The FSB has undertaken and continues to undertake work on the resolution of FMIs, in particular CCPs. This complements the work undertaken by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on the resilience and recovery of CCPs and other FMIs.icipants. The FSB has undertaken and continues to undertake work on the resolution of FMIs, in particular CCPs. This complements the work undertaken by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on the resilience and recovery of CCPs and other FMIs.

Standards and Guidance on CCPs

CCPs that are systemically important in more than one jurisdiction (SI>1 CCPs)

The biennial review of the list of CCPs that are systemically important in more than one jurisdiction (SI>1 CCPs) is coordinated by CPMI and IOSCO. It is based on the criteria set out in the FSB 2017 Guidance.

Once a CCP has been agreed to be systemically important in more than one jurisdiction (SI>1):

  • The home resolution authority (or if no resolution authority has been designated, the lead supervisor of a CCP) should identify and contact relevant authorities regarding CMG membership within six months of the CCP being identified as SI>1 (using the FSB 2017 Guidance if membership is not stated in law/regulations).
  • The first CMG meeting should be held within 12 months of the CCP being identified as SI>1 and should include a discussion on a draft CCP-specific Cooperation Agreement (CoAg).
  • The CoAg should be finalised and signed within 18 months of the first CMG meeting.
  • Resolution planning and resolvability assessments should be launched within 12 months of the first CMG meeting.
As at October 2024 (listed in alphabetical order)
CCP Home Jurisdiction
ASX Clear (Futures)
 
Australia
BME Clearing
 
Spain (EU)
Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G)
 
Italy (EU)
Cboe Clear Europe*
 
Netherlands (EU)
CME Inc.
 
US
Eurex Clearing
 
Germany (EU)
HKFE Clearing Corporation
 
Hong Kong SAR
ICE Clear Credit
 
US
ICE Clear Europe
 
UK
LCH Ltd
 
UK
LCH SA
 
France (EU)
Nasdaq Clearing
 
Sweden (EU)
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)
 
US
SIX x-clear
 
Switzerland
* Formerly known as EuroCCP

Other Policy and Analysis on CCPs

Financial Resources and Tools for Central Counterparty Resolution

Framework outlines a set of financial resources and tools that should be readily available to a resolution authority in case of a central counterparty (CCP) resolution.

Central Counterparty Financial Resources for Recovery and Resolution

This report presents the outcome of evidence gathering and analysis on existing financial resources and tools for central counterparty (CCP) recovery and resolution.

FSB releases guidance on CCP financial resources for resolution and announces further work

FSB, CPMI and IOSCO Chairs propose further work to be undertaken in 2021 on financial resources to further strengthen CCP resilience and resolvability.

Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies

A study by standard-setters on the interdependencies between CCPs and clearing members and other financial service providers.

Chairs’ Report on the Implementation of the Joint Workplan for Strengthening the Resilience, Recovery and Resolvability of Central Counterparties

Update on the work by the FSB, CPMI, IOSCO and BCBS to strengthen the resilience, recovery and resolution of central counterparties.

2015 CCP Workplan

The 2015 CCP Workplan agreed by the FSB and SSBs to ensure effective coordination of policy work to make CCPs more resilient.