FSB Regional Consultative Group for Asia meets in Colombo

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Regional Consultative Group for Asia (RCG Asia) met on 22 May in Colombo, hosted by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Members discussed global and regional financial vulnerabilities; progress on the G20 Roadmap to enhance cross-border payments; and approaches to monitoring potential financial stability risks in non-bank financial intermediation.

Forum on Cross-Border Payments Data convenes for the first time

The FSB Forum on Cross-Border Payments Data convened for the first time on 20-21 May 2025 in Basel in collaboration with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Differences in laws, regulations, and practices between countries can create unnecessary frictions in cross-border payments, increasing costs and risks for businesses and individuals. Participants discussed experiences and initiatives from the public and private sector that are underway or could be undertaken to take forward the FSB recommendations to promote the harmonisation and consistent implementation of payments-related data requirements across jurisdictions.

The meeting brought together experts from the private and the public sector – including data privacy and protection authorities – to discuss how to address data-related frictions in cross-border payments. It was chaired by Gianmatteo Piazza from the Bank of Italy.

The Forum on Cross-Border Payments Data was established in March 2025 following the 2024 FSB’s Recommendations for data frameworks related to cross-border payments. It forms part of the FSB’s increasing emphasis on promoting implementation of its policy recommendations.

Guardrails for growth: ensuring financial stability through thoughtful regulation

Speech by Martin Moloney, Deputy Secretary General, Financial Stability Board at the Annual General Meeting of the International Council of Securities Associations, 20 May 2025

The views expressed in these remarks are those of the speaker in his role as FSB Deputy Secretary General and do not necessarily reflect those of the FSB or its members.

Many thanks to the International Council of Securities Associations (ICSA) for giving me the opportunity to make some remarks.

There is an important debate going on at the moment about how to better reconcile growth and regulation.1 The aspiration is to reform regulation to reduce the frictions regulation might put in the way of growth. I want to talk today about this topic from the perspective of a participant in the global standard setting process.

In a sense what we at the FSB want to say about such regulatory reform can be set out very briefly: boosting GDP growth through regulatory reform can be a worthy goal, as long as you aim for sustainable economic growth, supported by stable financial markets. Lose that focus and you risk encouraging economic growth that proves an illusion because in, let’s say, year four the benefits which have accrued from reform in years one, two and three, can be wiped out by financial instability. Whenever we go down a path of regulatory reform in the interest of growth, we are at risk of creating an unwelcome cycle of deregulation and re-regulation. We then wait a few years until the memory fades and we…..do it all again!

The reason why I want to say a bit more on this topic today is precisely to make some personal observations on how that cycle of regulatory loosening and tightening might be avoided or minimized. The FSB itself does not aspire to guide jurisdictions through a regulatory reform process, so I will step a good deal outside agreed FSB positions in the remarks I will make here today and draw on my personal experience over many years.

Let me make it clear at the outset that there are invariably better and worse ways to design regulatory frameworks and neither the legislative process nor the regulatory rule-making process have, in my opinion, shown themselves particularly adept at getting those designs right. For that reason alone, it is wise for legislators and regulators to scrutinise the design of their regulatory regimes to see if the design can be streamlined.

But there is no reason to believe that the review process is likely to be any easier than the original implementation process, for a number of reasons:-

Firstly, the goals of regulation have become complex and regulatory tools now need to be used to meet multiple goals in ways which make it very difficult to assess whether calibration of a regulatory tool is proportionate;

Secondly, industry consultative processes, while important, are at risk of defaulting towards consensus advice around the lowest common denominator and, as a result, not being good guides as to what changes industry would benefit most from;

Thirdly,  jurisdictions do not operate in isolation and they often cannot alter how they do regulation in ways that are different from approaches used in other jurisdictions without consequences.

Globalisation and Securities Regulation: 1980s-2010s

The first of these issues about combining different goals might seem a somewhat obscure point. I want to spend a lot of my time trying to suggest that, on the contrary, it is a very challenging issue.

There are two aspects to the issue as I see it. The first is that assessing whether a particular piece of regulatory guidance or requirements is doing the job is complicated by the fact that there are very different views, in most jurisdictions, as to what a proportionate standard of protection is. At one end of the spectrum there are those who observe that economic growth at its most transformative has often involved doing quite a lot of harm as part of the process of innovating and creating new economic wealth which benefits all in the end. Those who observe that as significant seem to me to have a tendency to be more accepting of investor loss, sharp practices, and externalities. Others will argue that this may have often been the case, but it doesn’t need to be the case and will prefer more strict protections. 

This difference means that all regulatory goals are contentious. That means in turn that it is never practical to ask the question in isolation whether the regulatory tool achieves the regulatory goal. When we debate the question whether a regulatory tool is well calibrated, we invariably end up reopening the question of whether the goal was the correct one in the first place.

Then, think about using a particular regulatory tool to achieve two or even three different regulatory goals. When we come to review such a piece of regulation we seem doomed to have four or six or seven different debates all mixed in together: is the regulation calibrated proportionately to achieve the first goal, is the first goal the right goal in the first place and then ask those same questions in relation to the second regulatory goal and maybe the third and then ask what is the relative weighting and importance of each of those goals.

Putting it this way is very abstract and schematic but putting it this way helps you to get a sense of how complex and uncertain the regulatory reform debate can be. Let me go back briefly over the history of securities regulation to illustrate the point a little more concretely. With limited time, I am going to be very brief. I hope this expert audience will be charitable enough to allow me to generalise over many important complexities.

The development of securities regulation since the 1990s has been striking in that it has gone hand in hand with a number of big picture developments in the financial markets sector of which I will only namecheck a few:-

  • Perhaps most significant has been the growth of asset management which really didn’t exist in its current form before the 1980s;
  • Almost as important has been the growth of new ways to invest, most notably ETFs, but also a range of complex investment options in so-called alternative assets, private equity and so on;
  • Thirdly, I would highlight the increasingly complex variety of trading strategies adopted by sophisticated professional traders who mainly arbitrage markets or take short-term directional positions; their activity binds global markets together but also increases the proportion of those in markets for whom long-term investment is not the goal;
  • Finally, I would highlight the fragmentation and increased complexity in market structures, whether by size of trade, by asset type or order type, with the impact of that on transparency and trading strategies.

I am more than conscious of how inadequate it is to list out these bullets as if they somehow captured the incredible market developments, linked to globalisation and the relatively free movement of financial capital between 1987 and, let’s say 2012.

My point is merely to remind you of the huge complexity of change in that period so that I can refer also to the massive changes in securities regulation that went with it.

Securities regulation, going all the way back to the 1930s after the original ‘Great Crash’, was always traditionally focused around two goals: protecting retail investors from their asymmetric grasp of the risks and opportunities by comparison with the intermediaries who supposedly served to help them invest, and secondly maintaining the integrity of markets.2

From the 1990s, change accelerated and regulation had to respond. If I tried to summarise with equal disregard for complex details, what the core themes of that period were in terms of securities regulation, I might suggest:-

Firstly, a focus on specifying the obligations of intermediaries to their retail clients as the asset management services bundle became increasingly complex and was being provided by an increasing range of service providers and sub-contractors, all as part of the development of asset management;

Secondly, regulation to reinforce the capacity of investors to assess the relentlessly new investment assets they were being offered, by underpinning the reliability and clarity of the information being disclosed about securities, as an ever broader range of investment options was increasingly made available by financial innovation;

Thirdly, a big push on the regulation of market integrity as markets and information channels were fragmenting, often to keep large trades protected from aggressive traders.

A key tension was always the open question as to whether regulation had kept up or was unwisely holding back innovation.

A second point of persistent tension was ‘caveat emptor’ and whether mandated disclosure was still working sufficiently well to protect investors as investment opportunities became more complex. Were tougher or different restrictions needed?

Thirdly and perhaps less the focus of active debate was whether all market participants were still sufficiently equal in the market, given how professionalised some trading became.

None of these tensions was ever going to be definitively resolved; they simply hovered over the policy debates. Policy choices were made and sometimes revised. Jurisdictions took different approaches and calibrated their regulatory frameworks in differing ways depending on the policy conclusion with regard to these issues. In some jurisdictions there was a sense that substantial losses by retail investors trying to save for a pension were not tolerable. In other jurisdictions, differing views on the need to make regulations easily enforceable or supervisable also had an influence

In broad terms, it seems to me that regulation kept up between 1987 and 2012. Just. As always, compromises were ironed out which meant that asset managers still had substantial degrees of freedom with regard to client assets, but perhaps not so much that the egregious abuses could occur legally. Professional investors – such as high frequency traders – retained significant advantages over retail investors, but perhaps not to the point where the fundamental equivalence of all investors in a well-structured market was entirely undermined. The burden of active scrutiny required of investors was certainly very high, but perhaps not so high – except in the lead up to 2008 – that it could be said that investors were being invested in assets they couldn’t understand. Most assets continued to be publicly traded in ways that provided substantial assurances against cheating. There was also sufficient alignment between the approaches in different jurisdictions that global financial institutions could develop; they suffered costs from the different technicalities of regulation in different jurisdictions, but not so much cost that they were prevented from accruing benefits from a global footprint.

When someone like Madoff came along, he had to break many laws to do what he did. There were guard rails, however contested, however difficult they proved to be to police or keep up to date. On the other hand, no magic formula ever emerged as to the right way to design securities regulation, for the simple reason that there isn’t one. The debates on these issues remain live.  Whenever regulatory reform opens up, all those tensions reappear as live issues, on which new perspectives can emerge.

Pivot to Financial Stability Regulation

But all through this period non-bank financial markets were becoming increasingly complex. And then came 2008; financial stability concerns moved centre-stage and the game changed. The markets showed us with terrifying clarity, that a financial crisis is capable of destroying confidence and economic wealth on a scale that cannot be ignored. The goals of regulation had to change.

None of the older issues went away. But the reframing of the policy perspective was drastic when financial stability became the focus. It was a little like moving from playing chess to playing three-dimensional chess.

The Governor of the Bank of England recently put it well as to what had been the case before this game changing event, in a recent speech when he characterised the period from the 1980s to 2010 as one during which financial stability was promoted through the regulation of the banking system at the same time as bond markets and other non-bank financing markets were relentlessly rising in importance.3 That had to change and it did.

After the crisis, the FSB was set up by the G20. It created a system-wide monitoring framework to track developments in NBFI, then called Shadow Banking, in response to a G20 Leaders’ request at the Seoul Summit in 2010. In 2011 at the Cannes Summit, the FSB was asked to identify the main NBFI risks. At the St Petersburg Summit in 2013 the FSB’s Shadow Banking Roadmap was welcomed. It was also 2013 when IOSCO added a goal of contributing to financial stability, in addition to its goal of protecting investors and supporting the integrity of markets. A new era of regulatory policy-making at a global level for the securities sector had now emerged.

Again, simplifying greatly, two key policy goals emerged:

  • Transform unmanageable counterparty credit risk into potentially manageable liquidity risk through margining and clearing;
  • Improve the quality of liquidity management by the imposition of regulatory requirements.

This new layer of policy goals should be thought of as sitting on top of an already crowded regulatory policy agenda for the securities sector, often using the same regulatory tools.

Many in the securities sectors felt they were being picked on disproportionately. They tended to argue that banks continued to be the correct focus of financial stability policy. Occasionally, that argument continues to be made to this day. But the case for the counter-view has been overwhelming. Events like the 2020 COVID-related market stress surely have eliminated any reasonable doubt.

Regulatory Reform and Financial Stability

If we want to understand how to do regulatory reform today, we need to reflect carefully on the significance of that pivot in financial regulation. Three points stand out to me:

Firstly, this financial stability policy making over the last 15 years has not followed the path one might have expected from earlier academic writings, which often suggested that macro and micro regulation could not significantly overlap. In fact, the regulatory proposals for liquidity management have usually been built on, rather than contradicting, established securities regulatory approaches and have usually relied on tightening an existing regulatory requirement.

Secondly, these new policy recommendations did not involve as some suggested they would have to, a choice between entity-focused and activity-focused regulation. A mix of both entity- and activity-focused regulation has proven the optimal route.

Thirdly, what has been achieved, as challenging as that has been, is arguably the low hanging fruit of prudent liquidity management. We are now moving on from liquidity to leverage, to an underlying cause.

What I hope I have drawn out clearly is how many different goals are increasingly intermingled in the design of current regulatory frameworks. That means that when you are considering lightening or doing away with a regulatory provision, you may also be looking at a provision that supports the resilience and stability of the financial system.

The Policy challenge of Pursuing Multiple Goals

Should this concern us? There was an interesting pre-2008 view that strongly emphasised the importance of having just one tool for each goal and not mixing them. It was mainly articulated by those focused on monetary policy, who perhaps did not want to be drawn into regulation.4  The deficiencies of this approach were starkly illustrated by that 2008 crisis and have led us to a strong commitment to use all available tools to target the reduction in the likelihood of financial crisis. But the argument had some merits that we should not forget.

At the heart of the problem that old argument drew attention to is that when you have to move from a simple goal and a discrete tool to having more than one policy goal for the use of a tool or set of tools, you can no longer assess success so easily (if it was ever easy!). The scope for uncertainty as to the success of regulatory policy rises and the challenges for regulatory reform intensify.

Sometimes this is more apparent than real. The difficulty is not really how to balance different policy goals during a period of intense financial stress. Financial stability, when immanently at risk, is an existential risk. It trumps almost any other policy goal, at least in the short term.  Anyone who has operated in the public sector during a serious financial crisis, as I unfortunately have, understands this. In those situations, a central bank can minimize the monetary policy spillovers and, in any event, has a clear hierarchy of goals differentiated between the urgent and the important. The far more difficult situation is the situation we are in now when we seek to reform regulation without losing any of the multiple goals that justified the current regulatory framework calibration.

Let me give a somewhat rhetorical example: Who is to assess, for example, the weight, if any, to place on the positive benefits with regard to investor protection from the imposition of counter-cyclical, macroprudential measures on banks? Such tools may happen to have the effect of disincentivising lending to gullible property investors in a period of frenzied boom.  Many an imprudent, leveraged investment might be avoided. But it is unlikely to be the intended purpose of countercyclical capital buffers to contribute to the goal of securities regulation to protect investors.

Assessing this kind of question is made all the more difficult because the benefits of regulation are very difficult to quantify. The statistical probability of financial crisis is a notional number in the first place. Probably, no one can credibly calculate a reliable version of it. As to micro-prudential regulation, many prudential regulators will complain in their cups: you don’t get credit for the issues you have successfully avoided. The same is true for assessing whether securities regulatory goals are being met.

Consulting Industry

This brings me to the second fundamental issue I see with making regulatory reform work well, namely that industry consultation has become more complex and less effective than perhaps it once was.

The lack of an authoritative data-driven answer to the question of whether regulation is working, points a light on the other way to assess the effectiveness of regulation: ask! You might think that the solution to developing a good regulatory reform agenda is to ask the industry itself. Surely, they are the best guide to their own best interests. But this is also increasingly problematic, for a number of reasons.

I will leave aside the obvious argument that the private sector is conflicted in judging the public interest and mention a few others that I have personally observed:

Firstly, think of the process whereby, a large company forms a view as to what aspects of regulation should change. The end-view will be put together, often, by a policy team far away from the front line of the business which, when it comes to cost management, is often the back office. As someone who has often been on the other side of those conversations, I have often found myself wishing to get past the policy teams to the front-line traders or the back-office administrators. When that was possible, I have often heard strikingly different accounts of the key stresses and success factors in that business. I don’t say this to disparage professional policy teams. Their work is essential. The problem is a by-product of the complexity of the firms they represent.

Then think, secondly, of a representative body boiling down the disparate views of its various member firms into one shared pitch for regulatory reform. Many in this room will have had experience of bringing together competitors to formulate a supposedly shared view, when no one will disclose key data or insights into their business. I don’t want to suggest this process always fails; that is not the case. But the risk of different companies preferring to agree on an uncontroversial rather than an impactful proposal, one that can achieve consensus rather than actually transform their business environment, seems to me quite high.

Also, thirdly, the risk of insiders focusing attention on reform agendas that leave regulatory barriers to innovation in place can also be high if they perceive a significant risk to themselves from innovation.

All this is reinforced, fourthly, by the reluctance – and sometimes unwritten convention – of representative bodies not to criticise each other. The effect of this is that when government and regulators receive weak or even bad ideas from some representative bodies, others are very reluctant to point it out.

I could go on, but I think the point is clear: turning to industry for insight into what is a good strategy for regulatory reform is essential but fraught with difficulty.

Let me just give you one practical example, without identifying details: as a regulator I was once in a situation where industry representative bodies were strongly arguing to me that the way regulations were designed was the major reason why their members were slow in investing in new technologies. Doubting it, I had an independent study done as to what was impeding investment. The reasons proved complex. The impact of legacy systems and of group budget and I.T. systems control requirements that disabled local initiative were high on the list. The riskiness of the systems development process and the bewilderingly complex marketplace, were two others. Regulation was a factor, but way down the list. The representatives of that industry had come to me in good faith arguing that regulation was the problem and they honestly believed it was the problem. And it wasn’t.

The truth seems to me to be this: even when there is evidence that regulation is not the significant problem, the industry can be tempted to overemphasise that it is for this reason: no one ever got fired for arguing that regulation was too onerous. This can lead to regulatory reform agendas creating expectations that will not be met or targeting aspects of regulation that are not the binding constraint.

I am not suggesting, by observing that, that regulation is never the problem. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that regulation is often poorly designed and has negative impacts that could be dispelled by better design.  Nor am I suggesting that one should not seek the advice of industry: actually, industry has the key information on the costs and unintended impacts of regulation that are critical to a regulatory reform agenda. But that doesn’t mean you will get that information just by asking. Informed regulatory design is hard to do.

The International Dimension

This brings me to the third challenge for regulatory reform. It is a consistent characteristic of the current era that jurisdictions have to look over their shoulders at the international environment before making domestic changes in many aspects of law and public policy.

This is also true when it comes to regulatory reform. Our Chair recently commented at Eurofi that we risk entering a regulatory race to the bottom – a race that would be quite dangerous for financial stability.5 I think that is correct.  Even if your regulatory reform agenda as a jurisdiction is focused entirely on domestic credit, the domestic pathways for innovation and the cost base for the domestic finance industry, it is near impossible to reform your regulatory framework without impact on your relative attractiveness as a jurisdiction for international finance. This is all the more true as digital financial products loosen the links between financial market intermediaries and particular jurisdictions. Even if your intention had nothing to do with a competitive regulatory race to the bottom, your actions may. The fact is that your actions can have international consequences that you cannot control.

That fact has further consequences that can’t be ignored. Those consequences can be even more profound if it is either the case that your regulatory reform is partially motivated by trying to attract in investment from international finance or if your jurisdiction has a concern for bolstering its economic security by onshoring. Even if neither of these goals is present at the political level or at the regulatory level, they may well be present among other stakeholders.

I think there are multiple ways in which this can be managed. First, stick within the globally recommended standards. This provides a relatively safe space with significant potential for reform within those limits. Secondly, never cease to apply a reputation test. How is our regulatory reform seen across borders? Thirdly, be sceptical of the easier but much less durable win from lightening solvency requirements and lending rules, rather than the more difficult tasks of tackling the regulatory process and unintended consequences of legislative drafting.  Faster and more certain authorisation processes, resolving duplicative KYC uncertainties, intensifying technological neutrality so that it is robust across the terrain of innovation, perhaps facilitating technical standard setting, aligning reporting requirements with supervisory risk assessments and providing regulatory-risk minimising safe harbour options for regulated entities. All of these difficult but achievable goals for regulatory reform are solidly within the space of legitimate pursuit of regulatory advantage, rather than trust-damaging arbitrage.

Conclusion

Let me come to the nub of my point: If political leaders set the agenda by saying they want a clearer focus on core regulatory goals and a firmer relationship between the regulatory requirements and those goals, I can see nothing wrong with that. That is surely political leaders doing what they have been elected to do. They set us hard tasks, but they have every right to. However, it is if we are required to produce a list of regulatory reforms out of a hat in short order with a timetable for prompt implementation, that we all have a problem. The likelihood is that the reforms generated by that latter rushed process will not deliver the cost savings or the innovation pathways that were hoped for or  which might facilitate resilient, expanded lending. On the contrary, those reforms are likely to prove to be a moment in a cyclical process, whereby regulation will subsequently tighten when the fear intensifies that the goals of regulation have been lost sight of.

Designing regulatory reform should involve close consultation with industry, yes. But it should not be uncritical engagement. Evidence should be collected to underpin key assumptions. Where possible academic research input should be procured. Test cases should be implemented before full roll out. Crucially: the guardrails put in place by the FSB with its various high-level recommendations – which leave broad scope for different approaches to implementation – should always be complied with. Of all the goals of regulation, the goal that it is most pointless to compromise is the goal of financial stability.

Thank you

  1. For an interesting example of a regulator opening up some of the underlying issues, see Morrison, Eric, C. O’Loughnan, K. Odedra, R. Poyser, K. Singh, & D. Stallibrass (2024), The growth gap: A literature review of regulation and growth, UK FCA, October. ↩︎
  2. Indeed, the regulation of market integrity goes back much further, all the way to the Napoleonic wars. ↩︎
  3. Bailey, Andrew (2025). “Are we underestimating changes in financial markets?” Speech given at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, London. Bank of England, February. ↩︎
  4. For a good discussion of these issues, from the perspective of monetary policy, see Dell’Ariccia, G., K. Habermeier, V. Haksar, & T. Mancini-Griffoli. (2017). “Monetary policy and financial stability.” Presented at the RBA Annual Conference – 2017. ↩︎
  5. Knot, Klass (2024), “Free Trade and Financial Stability, Containing the Effects of Geopolitical Fragmentation.” Speech given at speech today at Eurofi. De Nederlandsche Bank, February. ↩︎

Remarks on leverage in non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI)

Remarks by Martin Moloney, Deputy Secretary General of the Financial Stability Board, delivered at the 39th ISDA Annual General Meeting, Amsterdam, 14 May 2025.

The views expressed in these remarks are those of the speaker in his role as FSB Deputy Secretary General and do not necessarily reflect those of the FSB or its members.

The Moment

A few years ago, when I was in a different role, I spoke to ISDA about crypto and the need to bring it in from the cold, to mold appropriate regulation. I was hoping to focus attention at that ISDA AGM on a key choice I thought we were facing about crypto and to draw attention to the obligation on us global standard setters to be pathfinders for the way forward.
I think events continue to suggest that that was indeed a key moment and the history of crypto will now take a route into a more regulated space – arguably a more sustainable space for crypto and a safer space from a financial stability perspective. This is because the FSB and IOSCO both recognized back then that it was time to provide guidance at a global level on what good regulation of crypto should look like.
As jurisdictions around the world now develop more mature regulatory frameworks for crypto, I think we correctly marked the moment at that ISDA AGM.
Today I wanted to speak about leverage, because I think our recent leverage consultation also constitutes a similar key moment. Perhaps it is not quite as full of growth potential as discussions of crypto, but perhaps it is even more important for keeping our financial system stable.
What we have said at the FSB is that now is the time to start putting guardrails around leveraged trading. As our financial markets continue to get bigger relative to the size of the real economy and more complex, they become relentlessly less stable and there comes a point where we need to all recognize that there is a need for proportionate containment.

The FSB’s Initiative

So, what have we done? Over the year end, we conducted a consultation on very new proposals for managing the risk to financial stability from leveraged position taking in financial markets. We are now working through the 36 responses we received, many of them substantial.
You would expect no less in relation such a new initiative regarding something which is now at the heart of how financial markets work and particularly how risk management works. Leverage is widely used both to control risk and to intensify it.
I can’t tell you the outcome of our further reflections on leverage because we still have a couple of months of work to do before reaching our final recommendations. But I can give you some personal reflections on the very interesting points we received.
The nub of the problem is very simple and has been well recognized for hundreds of years: when leverage is used to construct market positions, the forced unwinding of those leveraged positions can significantly amplify the harm financial markets in free fall can do to the real economy. Over the last thirty years, as financial markets have grown in size relative to the size of the real economy, that threat looms larger and larger. What are we to do?

Consultation Reponses

i) Trade-Offs

One key point made very forcefully to us in our consultation process was a plea to recognize the tradeoffs here! Leverage is very widely used for risk management and for arbitraging away the differences between markets in a way that contributes to the very constitution of the global financial system.
It’s a point well made. This is not a costless area for policy makers to get into. For every benefit we might use policy to construct, there is also a cost.

ii) Clarify the Goal

A follow-up to that point was to say to us: define your target more clearly. We had already spoken about the need to focus on core markets, but the point made to us was that our consultation did not give clarity as to what were and what were not core markets. Nor had we excluded the option of policy initiatives with a broader application.
Notwithstanding what we had said about core markets, there was an obvious fear behind many of these comments that we would start from an approach of trying to get leverage down across markets.
I don’t know if any of you ever heard the story – which I have only read once and I’m not even sure if its true – that when the film the Wolf of Wall Street was being developed they consulted people in the financial sector and one savvy investor suggested the line for inclusion in the script: ‘Leverage is the root of all evil’.
It is true that most incidents of market stress involve deleveraging but that doesn’t mean that all leverage is bad. We never thought we were starting from that perspective, but the response we got has focused on how we get across more clearly what our starting point was.
By the way, I believe the sentence didn’t make it into the final version of the film. You certainly won’t find that kind of sentiment in our finalized views. I expect we will have something more to say on this in our final response, but it is also important, as a next step, to allow jurisdictions to reflect on what are their core markets.
I anticipate that debate will develop and we will progressively get greater clarity on what it means to aim for proportionate, targeted and jurisdictionally tailored approaches focused on core markets.

iii) How to Measure Leverage

A particularly pointed response we got was to question the use of the gross notional leverage measure, because it doesn’t differentiate between hedging and leveraged directional positions.
When I read that I had a strong sense of déjà vu. Some years ago, IOSCO – responding to an FSB recommendation – wanted to develop a way to look for build-ups of leverage. I was involved and we had lengthy discussions on what gross notional data was good for and what it was not good for. Our conclusion rested on a key observation: a hedge only works as long as it works, by which I mean as long as there is the liquidity to finance it.
Remember our focus is not on leverage, but on deleveraging. And a hedge can unwind under stressed market conditions just like a leveraged directional position. We need to know what is the total amount of leverage in a market to know how much can go wrong.
My memory is that IOSCO at that time concluded that it needed a two-stage process, stage one: find out what is the total leverage, stage two: understand where the leveraged risk sits. Gross notional was deemed good for the first, but not so useful for the second.
It seems very likely to me that the FSB will come to a similar conclusion for its purposes as IOSCO came to at that time for statistical purposes. And its easy to illustrate that: ISDA’s own Interest Rate Derivatives Trading Activity report will tell you a total number, lets say, the increase in IRD notional.1 That doesn’t explain to you what is happening in the market, but it allows you to pose an informed and pointed question for further analysis. I expect the Gross Notional measure of leverage will have a similar role in our work on leverage.
There is an assumption sometimes that if we collect a data point that that is what we will try to limit. That is not so. We recognise that the data has to be analysed to understand what is going on.

iv) Big Hedge Funds

Another argument we have been presented with is the argument that we should focus only on the large highly leveraged funds.
This argument also reminded me of an argument ESMA heard some years ago when it consulted on using its AIFMD leverage powers. Its response, if I recall correctly, was ‘no’, a build-up of leverage by a large number of small entities is also potentially threatening to financial stability. We can’t just ignore it as we would if we focused only on the large players. I hope you can see the sense of that.
In any event, our focus is not on hedge funds, its on a particular kind of trading irrespective of who does it. Many hedge funds do lots of other trading using different trading strategies and, no matter how big they are, those other trading strategies – and the hedge funds that do them – are not our concern.

v) Information

But what both these discussion points highlight is that there should be no rush to simplistic conclusions when it comes to leverage risk, there should be analysis on a market-by-market basis.
In this regard, there were three points which came up again and again in the responses we received that I think were very important and suggest ways forward:
Firstly on data: how can we focus in on what is really risky and leave the rest of the market to get on with it, unless the relevant authorities can see clearly what is happening in markets?
Secondly on public disclosure: we know that many of those engaged in leveraged relative value trades are often highly professional firms with well-developed risk management systems running both historical and hypothetical stress tests on a huge scale. They don’t want their positions to unwind, but their risk management can only be as good as the information that is publicly available to them.
Thirdly on bilateral disclosure: The Basel Committee has recently issued very comprehensive Guidelines for Counterparty Credit Risk management. It correctly emphasizes the need for lenders to assess the riskiness of the deal, riskiness of the counterparty overall and of instrument or market. This is demanding for lenders. I suspect the most pointed challenge this excellent guidance leaves prime brokers with is how to manage against horizontal hoarding without an appropriate degree of disclosure from borrowers? But how do we reconcile that with the commercial confidentiality concerns that a number of our consultation responders referred to? There has to be a way.

vi) Margins/Haircuts

What is outstanding is the issue of non-cleared margining and collateral haircuts. What should we recommend?
That is a matter for on-going consideration by our members. I am not going to pre-empt them.
What I can observe is that there is an obvious relationship between how well other measures work and the strength of the case for rules or good practices on margin and haircuts. If we had no other cards in our hand, this is where we would have to focus. In particular, I think it depends on how much we can achieve through better data and information both for authorities and market participants. The less well markets are being actively supervised or influenced by parties well aligned with delimiting the financial stability risk of leverage, the stronger the case for margin and haircut rules. That depends on data, it depends on public disclosure and bilateral disclosure.

vii) Timing

There was one last argument that we heard that has some merit which was: ‘wait for the numerous initiatives already underway to have their full effect before taking more action’. Here respondents were referring mainly to US treasury market clearing and the Basel guidance. This is an important point and it seems to me to have some force. But I would point out that even when these recommendations are agreed there is a next phase in the process whereby jurisdictions need to work out what is right for them. That will necessarily take time. I think that means that the timing issue will work out OK.

Conclusion

For me, the leverage issue is a critical one. If we can get to the point of allowing leverage to provide its benefits to markets within guardrails that mean the financial system remains safe enough, even as it continues to grow in size, we will have done financial markets a great service. We will have done more that respond to the Great Financial Crisis, although we certainly have done that. We will have done more than learn the lessons of the March-April 2020 events in markets, although we have certainly also done that. We will have taken a huge step forward in empowering markets to finance public policy and private entrepreneurship resiliently for the period ahead. I have some confidence that ISDA will play its part in that, because ISDA always has.

  1. ISDA (2025), Interest Rate Derivatives Trading Activity Reported in EU, UK and US Markets: Full Year 2024 and the Fourth Quarter of 2024, March. ↩︎

FSB Regional Consultative Group for Europe meets in Wroclaw

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Regional Consultative Group for Europe (RCG Europe) met on 8 and 9 May in Wroclaw. The meeting was hosted by the National Bank of Poland.

Members discussed global financial vulnerabilities; progress on the G20 Roadmap on cross-border payments; and developments in – and approaches to monitoring potential financial stability risks – in the non-bank financial intermediation sector.

The meeting also included a roundtable on the financial stability implications of tokenisation, where participants from industry, academia and the central banking community discussed developments in tokenisation technologies and risks that tokenisation, in particular based on distributed ledger technology (DLT), might present for the financial system.

Remarks by Martin Moloney at the IIF Digital Assets Roundtable

Remarks by Martin Moloney, Deputy Secretary General, Financial Stability Board, at the International Institute of Finance Digital Assets Roundtable, Washington DC, 25 April 2025.

The views expressed in these remarks are those of the speaker in his role as FSB Deputy Secretary General and do not necessarily reflect those of the FSB or its members.

Thank you for convening this important discussion on digital assets.

While I accept the merit of speaking of digital assets collectively, I see the path forward for crypto-assets and tokenised assets as involving such profoundly different challenges that I hope you don’t mind if I speak about each in turn. The fact that both use DLT technology and promise the benefits of smart contracts seems to me to hide how radically different their challenges are.

Tokenised Assets

When it comes to tokenisation of assets already trading and settling by traditional means, it seems to me, that the core issue in the path forward is a coordination problem within the financial sector and not any of the potential financial stability concerns that we have previously flagged. How does the industry take steps forward which at each stage of the evolution create the optimal balance between using common standards, providing utility-type services and reaping the benefits of competitive innovation?

As we sit here, it remains unclear to me that the optimal path forward is emerging out of the competitive process, one that would involve short-term benefits for innovators and long-term scalability. I would be interested to hear from others who think the path forward is clear and – with all due respect to everyone involved in the conversation – I’m more interested to hear the views of those who are not talking up their own products. Sorry to be blunt.

What seems to me critical is to identify a profitable revenue model for early movers that does not depend on a scenario of a rapid positive, expanding spiral of impact prefaced on a wide number of market participants moving nimbly to achieve the potential cost savings. That model has credibility issues.

That said, regulation should not be the binding constraint. We have published a report which identifies certain risks if tokenisation is not done prudently; but they raise no fundamental issue for now. If, for example, those initiating the development of tokenised products build into their product design the generation of suitable – I would suggest unlagged – data to pass on to authorities and if tried and tested legal frameworks are used to achieve payment finality etc, I cannot see authorities having any significant concern.

If a revenue model cannot spontaneously emerge, I recognise that advocates may turn to the state in its various forms either, for example, to take the lead by tokenising treasuries or by putting in place CBDCs so that the problem of financing the early phases of development can, effectively, benefit from a state subsidy. These kinds of initiatives are outside our terms of reference in the FSB, but I see no fundamental financial stability issue with them.

The other question I do not know the answer to is whether, by developing standards for digital registration or some other initiatives, there might be some sort of middle course in terms of state involvement. Either way, I do not see that regulation and financial stability are or should be the binding constraint.

Crypto-assets

The situation with so-called native digital assets, crypto, is very different. Crypto-assets have, in their own slightly bizarre way, solved the question of how to grow in stages.

Regulation is now a crucial, potentially binding, constraint. The ongoing evolution of regulatory frameworks, including the EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) and U.S. reforms under legislative debate, highlights the growing recognition, already realised by some global standard setters some years ago, that the regulatory issue is pressing.

In October, we will deliver a thematic peer review to the G20 on the implementation of the FSB’s global regulatory framework for crypto-asset activities. This review will assess progress by FSB members and select non-members in developing regulatory frameworks for crypto-assets and stablecoins, addressing regulatory data gaps, and cooperating across borders.

The increasing interlinkages between crypto-assets and traditional financial systems require careful oversight to prevent risks to financial stability. As digital forms of money and assets interact with digitally native instruments, ensuring these systems are resiliently interoperable is critical.

Stablecoins

Stablecoins remain a key focus. They are incredibly dangerous; but note that the FSB has never proposed to prohibit them. The FSB’s Global Stablecoin Recommendations call for robust legal claims, effective stabilisation mechanisms, and prudential requirements to mitigate risks such as runs on the issuer and asset fire sales.

Cross-border cooperation and oversight are essential to address their global implications.

Cross-border cooperation is a significant challenge. Enhanced international cooperation is necessary to sufficiently harmonise regulatory standards and address operational complexities, since crypto native companies operate across borders to a greater extent than similarly sized or nascent traditional financial services firms. These are inherently global products. They have no home. Our constantly self-limiting approach to international coordination will always be challenged by them. We need to respond vigorously.

The scenario in which one or more imprudently designed stablecoins trade and grow across borders to infect major global financial systems with unbearable risk is a clear danger. We know how to regulate them to allow them to grow safely. We have set that out. There merely has to be the will to keep the system safe.

Let me close my opening remarks with that thought.

FSB Chair calls for continued vigilance on financial sector vulnerabilities

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Ref: 9/2025

  • In his letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, FSB Chair Klaas Knot notes that recent financial market turmoil underscores the importance of robust surveillance, proactive policymaking, and international coordination.
  • Letter highlights the role played by non-bank entities in periods of recent market turmoil and the need to enhance regulation and monitoring of this critical sector.
  • Letter emphasises the need for continued reform implementation and international cooperation to ensure a resilient financial system.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published a letter from its Chair, Klaas Knot, to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors ahead of their meeting on 23-24 April.

The letter, Mr Knot’s final one as FSB Chair, comes at a time of heightened financial market volatility and geopolitical risks. Reflecting on recent episodes of financial market turmoil, Mr Knot emphasises the importance of vigilance and international cooperation to address emerging risks and ensure the continued resilience of the financial system.

The letter highlights the role played by non-bank financial entities in recent periods of market turmoil, outlining the FSB’s work to strengthen the resilience of non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI). The FSB is finalising recommendations to address financial stability risks arising from leverage in NBFI that will be delivered to the G20 in July, marking a significant step in bolstering the sector’s resilience.

The letter also notes the FSB’s work to address cyber risks, which have culminated with this month’s release of the FSB’s Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE); and work to enhance cross-border payments, where efforts are focused on intensifying the FSB’s engagement with the private sector and regulators to encourage implementation of the G20 Roadmap. The letter reflects on the FSB’s unique role in fostering international cooperation to address financial stability challenges and calls on authorities to remain committed to implementing the agreed international reforms in order to preserve financial stability in an evolving risk environment and avoid fragmentation.

Notes to editors

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Klaas Knot, President of De Nederlandsche Bank. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

FSB Chair’s letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: April 2025

| PDF full text (117 KB)

The global risk outlook has become more challenging amid increased trade and economic policy

uncertainty.

This letter was submitted to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) ahead of the G20’s meeting on 23-24 April.

As his term as FSB Chair nears its conclusion on 1 July 2025, Klaas Knot reflects on the progress made in addressing global challenges to financial stability and outlines priorities for the future. The letter notes the challenging global risk outlook, with increased trade and economic policy uncertainty reflected in large price swings and heightened volatility in global financial markets. The letter calls on market participants and financial supervisors and regulators to remain vigilant.

Recent episodes of financial market turmoil, rapid technological advancements, and the growing threat of climate change, all underscore the need for vigilance and international cooperation.

The FSB has played a critical role in enhancing the resilience of the financial system.

The letter emphasises the importance of implementing reforms and highlights the need for sustained global coordination to address emerging risks and ensure a resilient financial system.

Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE): Taxonomy package

On 15 April 2025 the FSb published a Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE), designed to streamline cyber incident reporting. To facilitate adoption of FIRE globally, the following technical supporting standards are also published and available for downloading along with the FIRE reporting requirements:

DPM Data Dictionary

This is the data dictionary, in DPM 1.0., providing the structured representation of the data required for FIRE reporting.

Data Point Model (DPM) is a data centric method for organising business terms and concepts hierarchically. It presents data in various reporting scenarios derived from the underlying legal requirements in a business friendly and non-technical manner. DPM bridges the communications gap between business and IT by providing a necessary common understanding. Business concepts are specified in the DPM according to formal rules required by IT specialists, while remaining manageable by policy experts and other data users.

The DPM method provides a precise, complete and unambiguous definition of terms and concepts. This enables building logical structures of information requirements (such as messages, tables, data sets or cubes) based on underlying business dictionaries that can be understood by both business and technical users. Developed through cooperation between European stakeholders, DPM is now contained in ISO 5116 and is used by various national and international regulators.


Download: FIRE DPM v1.0 (zip file | 428 KB)

Validation rules

Validation rules are tests to be applied to reported data to check its consistency.

If the result of a validation rule to a set of data is true, the data reported is consistent according to that rule. If the result is false, the reported information presents an inconsistency that should be checked or corrected.


Download: FIRE validation rules v1.0 (xlsx file | 25 KB)

XBRL taxonomy

FIRE report with XBRL tagging to support the report submission.

eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) is a standard for digital reporting of financial, performance, risk and compliance information. It is a freely licensed, open standard available to all.

The provided XBRL taxonomy is an example. If implemented by a national authority, this taxonomy would facilitate reporting by entities in formats such as XBRL-XML or xBRL-CSV. Some jurisdictions already have existing XBRL-based reporting mechanisms, while others may choose to use different methods for implementation.

There are a variety of XBRL tools – both open source and enterprise-wide – available for institutions to facilitate the validation and creation of XBRL reports.

In its simplest form, an Excel plug-in could provide the FIRE template, and after updating, it could run the validation rule along with the generation of the submission-ready XBRL file. Institutions can explore various software solutions that meet their specific needs, including open-source options, to effectively manage their XBRL reporting requirements.

More information about XBRL and supporting software is available on the XBRL International website.


Download:

The FSB will maintain this taxonomy package and may publish new versions of it, for example, if new DPM and/or XBRL functionalities become available.

FSB finalises the common Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE)

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Ref: 8/2025

  • FIRE is a standardised yet adaptable format to enhance the efficiency and consistency of cyber and operational incident reporting.
  • Developed in collaboration with private sector experts, FIRE reduces the reporting burden for firms operating across multiple jurisdictions and improves communication with and among authorities.
  • FIRE supports a phased implementation and is designed to be interoperable with current systems, encouraging widespread adoption.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has today published its finalised Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE), a global initiative aimed at streamlining cyber and operational incident reporting. By introducing a standardised format, FIRE addresses the fragmentation in reporting requirements, alleviating the burden on firms that operate across multiple jurisdictions.

At a time of heightened cyber risks and increasing reliance on technology and third-party services, the ability to respond swiftly and effectively to operational incidents – particularly cyber incidents – has become more critical than ever. FIRE facilitates timely action and fosters improved communication and coordination among authorities across borders.

Developed in close partnership with the private sector, FIRE encompasses a wide range of operational and cyber incidents. Its potential applicability extends to third-party service providers and firms beyond the financial sector. Its focus on promoting convergence and flexibility in incident reporting has garnered strong support, underscoring its practical value and relevance to stakeholders.

For jurisdictions without a standardised reporting framework, FIRE offers a robust foundation upon which they can build. For those with existing frameworks, it supports a phased implementation approach and is designed to be interoperable with current systems, ensuring a smooth transition and encouraging broad adoption.

Klaas Knot, President of De Nederlandsche Bank and Chair of the FSB, said: “FIRE demonstrates how international regulatory cooperation can deliver benefits for all stakeholders. It also highlights the value of public-private partnerships in tackling shared challenges, such as those related to cyber and operational resilience.”

Notes to editors

The finalised FIRE framework reflects public feedback received on the consultative version issued in October 2024, as well as the results of a robustness test that the FSB conducted using sanitised data from industry stakeholders.

FIRE builds on the FSB Recommendations to Achieve Greater Convergence in Cyber Incident Reporting, published in 2023. The 2023 Recommendations included an updated cyber lexicon and a concept for developing a common format for incident reporting exchange (FIRE) as a way to achieve greater convergence in cyber incident reporting.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Klaas Knot, President of De Nederlandsche Bank. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.