FSB reports continued growth in nonbank financial intermediation in 2024 to $258 trillion

15 December 2025

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Ref: 25/2025

  • The nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector grew at double the pace of the banking sector in 2024.
  • Investment funds, trust companies, hedge funds, and money market funds all recorded significant growth.
  • Report highlights severe limitations in the availability of regulatory data for private credit.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published its annual Global Monitoring Report on Nonbank Financial Intermediation.

The report describes broad trends in nonbank financial intermediation in 2024 across 29 jurisdictions that account for over 90% of global GDP. The main findings from this year’s monitoring exercise include:

  • In 2024, the NBFI sector grew 9.4%, double the pace of the banking sector (4.7%), increasing its share of total global financial assets to 51% ($256.8 trillion), similar to pre-pandemic levels. This growth reflected buoyant risk appetite amidst increasing asset prices and lower policy rates.
  • All NBFI subsectors grew in 2024. Other financial intermediaries – which includes money market funds, hedge funds, other investment funds, trust companies, and structured finance vehicles – was the fastest growing sub-sector, growing by 11% over the year, to $169.4 trillion. Pension fund and insurance corporation assets grew 7% and 6%, respectively.
  • The narrow measure of the NBFI sector – which consists of entities that authorities have assessed as being involved in credit intermediation activities that may pose bank-like financial stability risks – increased 12% to $76.3 trillion. Most vulnerability metrics for entities classified into the narrow measure – measuring credit intermediation, maturity transformation, liquidity transformation, and leverage – remained broadly stable. Fixed income and mixed funds showed high degrees of liquidity transformation, while finance companies, broker-dealers, and structured finance vehicles displayed high levels of leverage.

The Global Monitoring Report also highlights severe limitations in the availability of data for private credit in statistical and regulatory reports. The assessment of private assets’ potential impact on financial stability will be an important part of the overall FSB’s surveillance work in the year ahead. For this report, using proxies and market intelligence, jurisdictions identified a diverse set of non-bank entities engaging in private finance, including private credit funds, but also trust companies, finance companies, structured finance vehicles, insurance corporations, and pension funds.  

Notes to editors

The FSB created a system-wide monitoring framework to track developments in NBFI in response to a G20 Leaders’ request at the Seoul Summit in 2010. The objective of the monitoring exercise is to identify the build-up of vulnerabilities in NBFI and initiate corrective actions where necessary.

Complementing this monitoring, the FSB has been coordinating the development of policies, together with its member standard-setting bodies and international organisations, to mitigate potential vulnerabilities associated with NBFI. Progress under the FSB work programme to enhance resilience in NBFI is detailed in the FSB’s July 2025 report.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

Global Monitoring Report on Nonbank Financial Intermediation 2025

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In 2024, the NBFI sector continued to expand (9.4%), growing at double the pace of the banking sector, with assets that represented 51.0% of total global financial assets. This is the second highest percentage share recorded – similar to pre-pandemic levels.

The comprehensive monitoring of global trends, vulnerabilities, and innovations of the nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector is a key part of the FSB’s ongoing efforts to enhance financial system resilience.

This report describes broad trends in financial intermediation across 29 jurisdictions that account for over 90% of global GDP, before narrowing its focus to the subset of NBFI activities that may be more likely to give rise to vulnerabilities. To complement the monitoring of vulnerabilities, the report also presents information on the availability of policy tools, this year for securitisation activities.

More granular data on other financial institutions’ use of wholesale funding and for finance companies’ loan assets, were collected for the first time in this report.

This year’s report includes a case study on bank-NBFI interconnectedness, which highlights three main forms of linkages:

  • funding and deposit relationships, where non-banks place deposits with banks;
  • lending, repo and other credit exposures from banks to non-banks; and
  • holdings of bank-issued securities by investment funds, insurers and pension funds.

The case study includes quantitative analysis of bank-NBFI interconnectedness by instrument type, and portfolio overlap.

The report also highlights data challenges related to private finance and credit in statistical and regulatory reporting.

2025 List of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)

27 November 2025 | PDF full text (168 KB)

  1. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), in consultation with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and national authorities, has identified the 2025 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).1 The list uses end-2024 data,2 and is based on a methodology agreed upon in July 2018 and implemented for the first time in the end-2021 G-SIB assessment.3
  2. The list for 2025 includes 29 G-SIBs, the same banks as in the 2024 list but with different allocation of the banks to buckets (see Annex). The changes in the allocation of the banks to buckets (see below for details), largely reflect the effects of changes in the underlying activity of banks, with the complexity category being the largest contributor to score movements. The higher loss absorbency requirement established with this list will be effective beginning 1 January 2027 if there is a bucket increase.4
  3. FSB member authorities apply the following requirements to G-SIBs:
  • Higher capital buffer: Since the November 2012 update, the G-SIBs have been allocated to buckets corresponding to higher capital buffers that they are required to hold by national authorities in accordance with international standards.5 The capital buffer requirements for the G-SIBs identified in the annual update each November will apply to them as from January fourteen months later.6 The assignment of G-SIBs to the buckets, in the list published today, therefore determines the higher capital buffer requirements that will apply to each G-SIB from 1 January 2027.
  • Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC): G-SIBs are required to meet the TLAC standard, alongside the regulatory capital requirements set out in the Basel III framework. The TLAC standard began being phased-in from 1 January 2019.7
  • Resolvability: These requirements include group-wide resolution planning and regular resolvability assessments. The resolvability of each G-SIB is reviewed in the FSB Resolvability Assessment Process (RAP) by senior regulators within the firms’ Crisis Management Groups.8
  • Higher supervisory expectations: These requirements include supervisory expectations for risk management functions, risk data aggregation capabilities, risk governance and internal controls.9
  1. The BCBS publishes the annually updated denominators used to calculate banks’ scores and the thresholds used to allocate the banks to buckets and provides the links to the public disclosures of the full sample of banks assessed, as determined by the sample criteria set out in the BCBS G-SIB framework. The BCBS also publishes the thirteen high-level indicators of the banks in the assessment sample used in the G-SIB scoring exercise for 2025.10
  2. A new list of G-SIBs will next be published in November 2026.
G-SIBs 2012-2025
  1. In November 2011 the FSB published an integrated set of policy measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). In that publication, the FSB identified as global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) an initial group of G-SIBs, using a methodology developed by the BCBS. The November 2011 report noted that the group of G-SIBs would be updated annually based on new data and published by the FSB each November. ↩︎
  2. The majority of banks reported data as of 31 December 2024. Exceptions include most banks from Australia (of which four reported data as of 30 September 2024) and all banks from Canada (31 October 2024), India (31 March 2025) and Japan (31 March 2025). ↩︎
  3. See BCBS (2018), Global systemically important banks: revised assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement, July. The G-SIB assessment methodology is set out in chapter SCO40 of the Basel Framework. ↩︎
  4. In case of a bucket decrease, the lower level of loss absorbency required will be effective immediately, unless national authorities exert discretion to delay the release of the higher loss absorbency requirement (see RBC40.6 of the Basel Framework). ↩︎
  5. In some jurisdictions, G-SIBs may be required to set aside additional capital buffers under the relevant higher loss absorbency requirements for domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs).  ↩︎
  6. G-SIB buffers are part of the buffers in the Basel III capital framework, complementing the Basel III minimum capital requirements. The Basel III monitoring results published by the BCBS provide evidence on the aggregate capital ratios under the Basel III frameworks, as well as the additional loss absorbency requirements for G-SIBs. ↩︎
  7. See FSB (2015), Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Principles and Term Sheet, November. The BCBS published the final standard on the regulatory capital treatment of banks’ investments in instruments that comprise TLAC for G-SIBs on 12 October 2016. In March 2017 (updated in December 2018), the BCBS published a consolidated and enhanced framework of Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, including new disclosure requirements in respect of TLAC.  ↩︎
  8. The timeline for the implementation of resolution planning requirements for newly designated G-SIBs was also set out in the FSB (2013), 2013 Update of group of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), November: Annex II. ↩︎
  9. The timeline for G-SIBs to meet this requirement was also set out in the FSB 2013 Update, ibid. ↩︎
  10. See BCBS,Global systemically important banks: Assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement. ↩︎

FSB publishes 2025 G-SIB list

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Ref: 24/2025

  • 29 banks remain in the FSB’s annual list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
  • Compared with the list of G-SIBs published in 2024, three banks have moved between categories (i.e. buckets): Bank of America and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have moved to a higher bucket, corresponding to a higher capital requirement, while Deutsche Bank has moved to lower bucket, corresponding to a lower capital requirement. 
  • The changes in the allocation to buckets largely reflect the effects of changes in the complexity of banks’ underlying activities.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published the 2025 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) using end-2024 data and applying the assessment methodology designed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).

The number of banks identified as G-SIBs remains at 29. There were no additions or removals from the list. However, compared with the list of G-SIBs published in 2024, Bank of America and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China have moved from bucket 2 to bucket 3 (corresponding to a higher capital requirement), while Deutsche Bank has moved from bucket 2 to bucket 1 (corresponding to a lower capital requirement). 

FSB member authorities apply the following requirements to G-SIBs:

  • Higher capital buffer: The G-SIBs are allocated to buckets corresponding to higher capital buffers that they are required to hold by national authorities in accordance with international standards. The capital buffer requirements established by the 2025 list will be effective beginning 1 January 2027.   
  • Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC): G-SIBs are required to meet the TLAC standard, alongside the regulatory capital requirements set out in the Basel III framework.
  • Resolvability: These requirements include group-wide resolution planning and regular resolvability assessments. The resolvability of each G-SIB is reviewed in the FSB Resolvability Assessment Process (RAP) by senior regulators within the firms’ Crisis Management Groups. 
  • Higher supervisory expectations: These include supervisory expectations for risk management functions, risk data aggregation capabilities, risk governance and internal controls. 

The BCBS today published material related to the identification of G-SIBs, including updated denominators used to calculate banks’ scores; the thresholds used to allocate the banks to buckets; and the values of the thirteen high-level indicators of all banks in the assessment sample used in the G-SIB scoring exercise. The BCBS also provides the links to the public disclosures of all banks in the full sample of banks assessed. The BCBS interactive G-SIB dashboard has also been updated to reflect the latest results.

A new list of G-SIBs will be published in November 2026.

Notes to editors

The requirements for G-SIBs summarised above are “higher” in the sense that they are additional to the minimum standards that apply to all internationally active banks under the Basel Framework. G-SIBs are allocated into buckets based on their systemic importance. The higher the bucket, the greater the additional capital requirement. The bucket approach is defined in paragraphs SCO40.20 to SCO40.22 of the Basel Framework.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

FSB releases updated insurer list, proposes new guidance, and affirms use of IAIS Holistic Framework

25 November 2025

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Ref: 23/2025

  • FSB publishes list of insurers subject to resolution planning standards with seventeen insurers, up from thirteen insurers in 2024.
  • The FSB is also consulting on guidance on the scope of insurers that should be subject to recovery and resolution planning (RRP) requirements, to promote consistency in application across FSB member jurisdictions.  
  • The FSB reaffirms its decision to use the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) Holistic Framework assessments instead of an annual identification of global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs).

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published a list of 17 insurers subject to resolution planning standards consistent with the FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (Key Attributes).

Alongside this, the FSB launched a consultation on draft guidance outlining key criteria for authorities to consider when determining whether an insurer should be subject to RRP requirements. The draft guidance calls for authorities to evaluate an insurer’s nature, scale, complexity, substitutability, cross-border activities, and interconnectedness. It also highlights specific scenarios in which RRP requirements should always apply, such as when an insurer provides critical functions that cannot be easily substituted or when its failure could significantly impact financial stability or the real economy.

The Draft Guidance does not reintroduce the previous process for identifying G-SIIs. Instead, it focuses exclusively on determining which insurers should be subject to RRP requirements under the Key Attributes, with these decisions made at the national level. Being on the list does not imply that an insurer is systemically important.

The FSB has also published a statement reaffirming its decision to rely on the IAIS Holistic Framework assessments rather than reintroducing the annual identification of G-SIIs.

Notes to editors

In 2011, the FSB introduced policy measures to address systemic and moral hazard risks from systemically important financial institutions. In 2013, it identified an initial list of G-SIIs and applicable policy measures, in consultation with the IAIS and national authorities. In December 2022, the FSB announced that it would discontinue the annual identification of global systemically important insurers, deciding instead to utilise assessments available through the IAIS Holistic Framework to inform its considerations of systemic risk in the insurance sector and to publish annually a list of insurers subject to resolution planning standards aligned with the FSB Key Attributes. This first list was published in December 2024.

The FSB continues to consult with the IAIS on resolvability monitoring and public reporting for the insurance sector. Today, the IAIS launched consultation on guidance (“application papers”) on recovery and resolution. Further details of the IAIS Holistic Framework and the IAIS’ public consultation can be found on the IAIS website here and here.

The IAIS is a global standard-setting body whose objectives are to promote effective and globally consistent supervision of the insurance industry to develop and maintain fair, safe and stable insurance markets for the benefit and protection of policyholders and to contribute to the maintenance of global financial stability. Its membership includes insurance supervisors from more than 200 jurisdictions.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

Scope of Insurers Subject to the Recovery and Resolution Planning Requirements in the FSB Key Attributes: Consultation report

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Summary of document history

Summary of document history

The Key Attributes establish recovery and resolution planning (RRP) requirements as a fundamental component of effective resolution regimes for financial institutions.

The RRP requirements in the Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes apply to “all insurers that could be systemically significant or critical upon failure, and at a minimum to all global systemically important insurers” and “any other firm that its home authority assesses could have an impact on financial stability in the event of its failure.”

The Draft Guidance in this consultation report seeks to support authorities in mitigating potential disruptions to the financial system and the real economy that could result from the stress or failure of certain insurers. It offers a structured approach for authorities to assess which insurers should be subject to RRP requirements.

The Draft Guidance identifies specific circumstances in which RRP requirements should always apply and outlines six key criteria that authorities should consider when evaluating whether an insurer should be subject to RRP requirements:

  • Nature
  • Scale
  • Complexity
  • Substitutability
  • Cross-border activities
  • Interconnectedness
Questions for consultation

In general

  1. Are the Draft Guidance and comments on the Draft Guidance clear? Where would commenters seek further discussion?

Paragraph 3: Assessment criteria

  1. How well-suited are the criteria in the Draft Guidance (nature, scale, complexity, substitutability, cross-border activities, interconnectedness) to determining which insurers should be subject to RRP requirements?
  2. What other criteria, if any, should be in the Draft Guidance for determining which insurers should be subject to RRP requirements? Discuss why any additional criteria should be added and the advantages and disadvantages of doing so.
  3. What other indicators could be provided as examples of ways that authorities could assess the criteria in the Draft Guidance?
  4. How could the comments to the Draft Guidance better explain the difference between any of the six criteria?
  5. How could the comments on the Draft Guidance be made clearer to explain how the six criteria should be applied, while still allowing authorities the flexibility to consider the criteria in a manner that aligns with the specific characteristics of their jurisdictions?

Paragraph 4: Specific circumstances that should necessitate RRP requirements

  1. Should RRP requirements apply in the two sets of circumstances identified in paragraph 4 of the Draft Guidance, notwithstanding any other facts or circumstances?
  2. What other circumstances should call for the application of RRP requirements to an insurer, notwithstanding any other facts or circumstances?
  3. What are possible quantitative or qualitative thresholds concerning the six criteria or some combination of the six criteria that should necessitate RRP requirements, notwithstanding any other facts or circumstances? For example, should the Draft Guidance call for RRP requirements whenever the cross-border activities of an insurer exceed a certain threshold?

Proposed revision to FSB guidance on critical functions

  1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of revising the FSB’s guidance on the definition of a critical function for insurers by changing the phrase “the sudden failure to provide the function would be likely to have a material impact on the financial system and the real economy” to “the sudden failure to provide the function would be likely to have a material impact on the financial system or the real economy”?

The FSB reaffirms its decision to use IAIS Holistic Framework assessments instead of an annual identification of global systemically important insurers

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The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today issued the following public communication, which replaces the public communication issued on the same topic in 2022.

  1. The FSB, in consultation with the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), reviewed its experience utilising IAIS assessments from the IAIS Holistic Framework for Systemic Risk in the Insurance Sector (Holistic Framework). Based on this review, the FSB reaffirms its 2022 decision to discontinue the annual identification of global systemically important insurers (G-SIIs) and to instead use IAIS Holistic Framework assessments.1 The annual update provided by the IAIS, described below, will also continue to inform the FSB’s ongoing work to evaluate vulnerabilities in the financial system.
  2. The IAIS provides the FSB with an annual report of the outcomes of the Global Monitoring Exercise, which is one pillar of the Holistic Framework. The annual update includes the IAIS assessment of systemic risk in the global insurance sector arising from sector-wide trends with regard to specific activities and exposures, the possible concentration of systemic risks at an individual insurer level, and the supervisory response to any identified risks. To this end, the IAIS will continue its data collection from individual insurers, complemented by data collection from supervisors, to support its assessments. The IAIS will continue to inform the FSB of changes made to the analyses used for the IAIS’s annual update to the FSB, including to the Global Monitoring Exercise and its methodology.
  3. Using the annual update provided by the IAIS, the FSB may, in consultation with the IAIS and national authorities, publicly express its views on whether any individual insurer is systemically important in the global context and the appropriate application of the Holistic Framework supervisory policy measures that the FSB considers necessary to address such systemic importance. The FSB may also ask the IAIS to undertake further analysis for this purpose.
  4. The FSB will continue to publish in its Annual Resolution Report and on the FSB’s website a list of insurers that–according to member authorities’ assessment and self-reporting–are subject to resolution planning and resolvability assessments consistent with the FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (KAs). The FSB may publicly express its views on the appropriateness and sufficiency of the set of reported insurers, based on whether an insurer could be systemically significant or critical if it fails. The FSB has published for consultation guidance to help authorities determine which insurers are subject to recovery and resolution planning requirements in the KAs. The guidance is expected to be finalised in 2026. The IAIS will continue to contribute to the FSB’s resolvability monitoring process and the FSB’s annual public reporting.
  1. In 2022, the FSB called on a review of this decision to be undertaken in 2025, when it first announced it would discontinue the G-SII process. [←]

FSB encourages the Netherlands to continue strengthening cyber resilience in its financial sector

21 November 2025

Press enquiries:
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Ref: 22/2025

  • Peer review finds Dutch authorities have been long committed to enhancing the financial sector’s cyber resilience and developed several leading practices.
  • Dutch authorities and government agencies demonstrate high levels of cooperation and information sharing with each other and with the industry.
  • The FSB recommends that Dutch authorities regularly review information sharing mechanisms, promote expanded cyber resilience testing and establish a national analysis of third-party risks.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published its second Peer Review of the Netherlands, examining the country’s efforts to enhance cyber resilience in the financial sector and mitigate financial stability risks arising from operational incidents and cyber-attacks.

The Netherlands has made significant progress in enhancing cyber resilience within its financial sector, reflecting its strong commitment over many years. It has developed several market leading practices such as the Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red-teaming (TIBER) and Advanced Red Teaming (ART) frameworks. Industry actively contributes to the comprehensive gathering and sharing of threat intelligence, and a national-level crisis-management structure brings together financial authorities to ensure coordination and collaboration during major operational disruptions. 

Despite the maturity of the Netherlands’ cyber resilience practices, the interconnectedness of the financial system and the continued evolution of cyber threats calls for a continued focus and further enhancements. The FSB recommends that:

“Cyber incidents can pose systemic risks, disrupting critical financial services and eroding market confidence,” said Jane Magill, Chair of the Netherlands peer review. “Detailed examination of a jurisdiction’s approach provides benefits to all jurisdictions that are constantly looking to enhance their response to this risk.”

Notes to editors

Recognising the potential systemic risks posed by cyber incidents and the reliance on third-party providers, in 2023 the FSB published a Toolkit for enhancing third-party risk management and oversight, as well as recommendations to support harmonised incident reporting and information sharing among authorities. To build a practical understanding of implementation of these recommendations and other regulatory efforts to enhance cyber resilience, the FSB has conducted peer reviews of the Netherlands (published today) and Spain and their efforts to enhance the cyber resilience of their financial systems.’

FSB member jurisdictions have committed to undergo periodic peer reviews to evaluate their adherence to international financial standards. To fulfil this responsibility, the FSB has established a regular programme of country and thematic peer reviews of its member jurisdictions. As part of this commitment, the Netherlands volunteered to undergo a peer review in 2025. A schedule of country peer reviews, as well as all completed peer review reports, are available on the FSB website.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

Peer Review of the Netherlands

| PDF full text (595 KB)

Despite the maturity of the Netherlands’ cyber resilience practices, the interconnectedness of the financial system and the continued evolution of cyber threats calls for a continued focus and further enhancements.

The Netherlands has made significant progress in enhancing cyber resilience within its financial sector, reflecting its strong commitment over many years. It has developed several market leading practices such as the Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red-teaming (TIBER) and Advanced Red Teaming (ART) frameworks. Dutch authorities and government agencies demonstrate high levels of cooperation and information sharing with each other and with the industry. Industry actively contributes to the comprehensive gathering and sharing of threat intelligence, and a national-level crisis-management structure brings together financial authorities to ensure coordination and collaboration during major operational disruptions.

Despite the maturity of the Netherlands’ cyber resilience practices, the interconnectedness of the financial system and the continued evolution of cyber threats calls for a continued focus and further enhancements. The FSB recommends that:

  • Dutch authorities regularly review the purpose and membership of the groups established for information sharing with the industry to ensure they remain efficient and effective, and explore ways to enable rapid information sharing during a crisis;
  • De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) continues to support the take-up of ART testing by developing strategies to ensure more financial entities are sufficiently mature to conduct a form of cyber resilience / red teaming testing such as ART;
  • Dutch authorities continue efforts to establish national analysis of existing registers of information to identify critical third-party providers in the Netherlands, assess concentration risks and define a strategy to address domestically critical third parties.

FSB Chair’s letter to G20 Leaders: November 2025

20 November 2025 | PDF full text (116 KB)

The FSB is operating in a world of considerable challenge, both in terms of seeking stronger economic growth and responding to a high pace of change in the world of finance.

This letter was submitted to G20 Leaders ahead of their Summit on 22-23 November 2025.

Acknowledging the challenging economic outlook, FSB Chair Andrew Bailey calls for global efforts to modernise and strengthen financial regulation without compromising financial stability and reaffirms the FSB’s commitment to support G20 member countries in these efforts.

The letter highlights the growing role of nonbank financial intermediaries, including private credit markets, the slow pace of progress in efforts to enhance cross-border payments and the evolution of the digital assets landscape. The letter outlines the work the FSB is doing to strengthen implementation of global regulatory reforms and to understand and respond to changes in the financial system, in particular, private credit markets and stablecoins.