This report recommends a policy framework for addressing the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
1 November 2010 Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision: Recommendations for Enhanced SupervisionIn the aftermath of the financial crisis, the FSB and the G20 Leaders have identified as a priority the need for more intense and effective supervision particularly as it relates to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The level of supervision applied by national authorities must be commensurate with the potential destabilization risk that such firms […]
27 October 2010 Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA RatingsThe FSB has drawn up the following principles to reduce reliance on CRA ratings in standards, laws and regulations.
To inform the preparation of the paper, country authorities were surveyed on their experiences with identifying systemically important institutions, markets and instruments. Feedback on an initial draft questionnaire, coordinated by the IMF, FSB and BIS, was sought from counterparts at several central banks (see Attachment). The finalized questionnaire was subsequently sent out to the central […]
The attached report and background paper respond to a request made by the G20 Leaders in April 2009 to develop guidance for national authorities to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments. The report outlines conceptual and analytical approaches to the assessment of systemic importance and discusses a possible form for general […]
29 October 2009 The Financial Crisis and Information GapsThe report identifies the main financial and economic information gaps based on the experience of the recent financial crisis and presents recommendations for closing them.
The Implementation Standards set out detailed specific proposals on compensation governance, structure and disclosure to strengthen adherence to the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices.
2 April 2009 Principles for Sound Compensation PracticesThe Principles are intended to reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking that may arise from the structure of compensation schemes.
2 April 2009 Joint FSF-BCBS Working Group on Bank Capital Issues - Reducing procyclicality arising from the bank capital frameworkThis note sets out recommendations to address the potential procyclicality of the regulatory capital framework for internationally active banks. Some of these recommendations are focused on mitigating the cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement, while maintaining an appropriate degree of risk sensitivity. Other measures are intended to introduce countercyclical elements into the framework. The recommendations […]
This note aims to provide an overall framework that could help evaluate policy options to address the procyclicality of the financial system. While the framework is general in nature, the note focuses exclusively on options for prudential and financial reporting arrangements and the associated risk management and incentives issues. It therefore excludes other possible policy […]