Understanding the Role of Dealer-Client Relationships in Bond Trading

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Brief Summary

- Dealer-client relationships in corporate bond trading:
  - Dealer-client relationships are highly persistent.
  - Different dealers’ relationship clients have little overlap.
  - Relationship clients are mostly asset managers.

- Relationship clients obtain better pricing (lower transaction costs):
  - Relationship-driven transaction cost benefit particularly pronounced during Covid-19 crisis.
  - Dealer-client relationships driven by \textit{profit maximization}, \textit{liquidity provision}, and \textit{matching}.
    - \textbf{Profit maximization}: Better pricing to retain high-volume clients, maximize long-run profit.
    - \textbf{Liquidity provision}: Form relationships with liquidity-providing clients.
    - \textbf{Matching}: Relationships matter more for balance sheet intensive bonds.
Relationships in OTC Trading

- **Question:** do relationships affect trading behaviors and liquidity in OTC markets?
  - Prevailing theories of OTC markets neglect relationships.
    - **Random search:** Duffie et al. (2005, 2007), Lagos and Rocheteau (2007, 2009)
    - **Directed search:** Guerrieri et al. (2010), Guerrieri and Shimer (2014), Lester et al. (2015)
    - **Network:** Atkeson et al. (2015), Malamud and Rostek (2017), Babus and Kondor (2018)
  - Empirical evidence about relationships in OTC trading.
    - **Interbank lending:** Afonso et al. (2013)
    - **Derivatives:** Hau et al. (2021)
    - **Corporate bonds:** Di Maggio et al. (2017), Hendershott et al. (2019)
  - **This paper:**
    - Granular regulatory data provide concrete evidence about dealer-client relationships in bond trading, and shed light on rich heterogeneity across clients.
    - Potential mechanisms that drive dealer-client relationships in bond trading.
Relationships in OTC Trading

- Further question: who are relationship clients?
  - Heterogeneity among investors:
    - Paper suggests that most relationship clients are asset managers, and liquidity benefit for relationship clients during Covid-19 crisis driven almost entirely by liquidity-providing clients.
    - Haddad et al. (2021), Falato et al. (2021), Ma et al. (2022) etc. suggest acute selling by asset managers such as mutual funds.
  - Who are relationship clients, particularly liquidity-providing relationship clients?
    - This paper and Di Maggio et al. (2017): define relationship clients based on trading volume.
    - Paper suggests persistent relationships. Thus, who are these relationship clients? How are they different from other clients?
  - Question helps shed light on how financial institutions are inter-connected, and how different potential mechanisms may interact → policy implications.
Who Are Relationship Clients?

- **Relationships and Dealer Profit Maximization:**
  - Paper suggests dealers offer better pricing to retain high-volume customers and maximize profits in long-run.
  - **Bundling:** how do dealers’ other business lines interact with trading? E.g., underwriting, prime brokerage and securities lending.

- **Relationships and Inventory Risk Sharing:**
  - Liquidity-providing clients share inventory risk with dealers, decreasing inventory frictions and leading to lower transaction costs.
  - Inventory frictions are high during times of stress and for balance sheet intensive bonds. Hence, liquidity benefit more pronounced during crises and for balance sheet intensive bonds.
  - Choi et al. (2021): clients more likely to provide liquidity to relationship dealers.
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Who Are Relationship Clients?

- **Relationships and Information Asymmetry:**
  - Glosten and Milgrom (1985): adverse selection when dealer trades against informed traders, leading to higher transaction costs.
  - Information content high when volatility is high (e.g., Drechsler et al. (2021)).
  - Thus, relationship is associated with lower transaction cost, more so for information-sensitive (e.g., riskier) bonds and during periods of high uncertainty.

- **Relationships and Search:**
  - Moderate valuation: Chang and Zhang (2018), Shen et al. (2020), Hugonnier et al. (2021)
  - Enjoy lower transaction costs and higher volume (relationship). Similar implications for crises.

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- **Relationships and Search:**
  - OTC search models suggest certain investors endogenously emerge as intermediaries:
    - Moderate valuation: Chang and Zhang (2018), Shen et al. (2020), Hugonnier et al. (2021)
  - Enjoy lower transaction costs and higher volume (relationship). Similar implications for crises.
Policy Implications

- **Systemic risk and financial stability:**
  - Core dealers and certain non-dealer financial institutions can have outsized impact on bond market liquidity, particularly during times of stress.
  - Resilience of OTC trading during crises hinges on liquidity-providing clients.

- **Dealer balance sheet space:**
  - Post-GFC regulations that constrain dealer balance sheet space heightens the role of relationships in OTC trading, effectively subsidizing a group of large institutions at the expense of smaller and less connected ones.

- **Market structure design:**
  - Importance of relationship hinders development of all-to-all trading.
  - All-to-all may be beneficial in times of stress if it improves meeting rates and cuts out middleman.


References III


