I1: Hedge funds - Registration, appropriate disclosures and oversight of hedge funds

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*We also firmly recommitted to work in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory manner to strengthen regulation and supervision on hedge funds. (Seoul)*

*Hedge funds or their managers will be registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for assessment of the systemic risks they pose individually or collectively. Where appropriate registration should be subject to a minimum size. They will be subject to oversight to ensure that they have adequate risk management. (London)*

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2016 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2021 survey.
I2: Hedge funds - Establishment of international information sharing framework

G20/FSB Recommendations

We ask the FSB to develop mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing between relevant authorities in order to ensure effective oversight is maintained when a fund is located in a different jurisdiction from the manager. We will, cooperating through the FSB, develop measures that implement these principles by the end of 2009. (London)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the progress made in implementing recommendation 6 in IOSCO’s Report on Hedge Fund Oversight (Jun 2009) on sharing information to facilitate the oversight of globally active fund managers.

In addition, jurisdictions should state whether they are:

- Signatory to the IOSCO MMoU in relation to cooperation in enforcement
- Signatory to bilateral agreements for supervisory cooperation that cover hedge funds and are aligned to the 2010 IOSCO Principles Regarding Cross-border Supervisory Cooperation.

Jurisdictions can also refer to Principle 28 of the 2017 IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, and take into account the outcomes of any recent FSAP/ROSC assessment against those Principles.

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<td>Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey</td>
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### Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

As mandated by Article 69 of the AIFMD, the Commission is carrying out a review on the application and the scope of the Directive. The process has been initiated by commissioning an external contractor (KPMG) to carry out a general survey and an evidence-based study on the functioning of the AIFMD. The final report by KPMG was published in the beginning of 2019. The Commission plans to complete its Report on the functioning of the AIFMD for the European Parliament and the Council as required by Article 69(4) of the AIFMD.

### Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents


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### I3: Hedge funds - Enhancing counterparty risk management

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*Supervisors should require that institutions which have hedge funds as their counterparties have effective risk management, including mechanisms to monitor the funds’ leverage and set limits for single counterparty exposures.*  
*(London)*

*Supervisors will strengthen their existing guidance on the management of exposures to leveraged counterparties.*  
*(Rec. II.17, FSF 2008)*

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2018 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2021 survey.

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### II4: Securitisation - Strengthening of regulatory and capital framework for monolines

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*Insurance supervisors should strengthen the regulatory and capital framework for monoline insurers in relation to structured credit.*  
*(Rec II.8, FSF 2008)*

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2016 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2021 survey.
II5: Securitisation - Strengthening supervisory, best practices for investment in structured products

G20/FSB Recommendations

Regulators of institutional investors should strengthen the requirements or best practices for firms’ processes for investment in structured products. (Rec II.18, FSF 2008)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the due diligence policies, procedures and practices applicable for investment managers when investing in structured finance instruments and other policy measures taken for strengthening best practices for investment in structured finance products.

Jurisdictions may reference IOSCO’s report on Good Practices in Relation to Investment Managers’ Due Diligence When Investing in Structured Finance Instruments (Jul 2009).

Jurisdictions may also refer to the Joint Forum report on Credit Risk Transfer- Developments from 2005-2007 (Jul 2008).

Progress to date: Implementation completed

Progress to date: If you have selected “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment” - please provide a brief justification

Progress to date: please provide a date for your “implementation ongoing” status

Progress to date: If you have selected “Implementation completed” - please provide date of implementation

2016 and 2019 (see below for details)

Progress to date: issue is being addressed through
Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
Regulation / Guidelines - Yes
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No

Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

Sectoral regulation (CRR/AIFMD/Solvency II/CRA III) is already implemented/directly applicable at the national level. Strengthening reforms under new Securitisation Regulation which entered into force in January 2010, will apply to all securitisations and include due diligence, risk retention and transparency rules together with the criteria for Simple, Transparent and Standardised (“STS”) securitisations. STS criteria are in line with the BCBS-IOSCO principles adopted in July 2015. Introduction of STS label identifying best practice. The capital treatment of securitisations for banks, investment firms and insurers has been amended to make it more risk-sensitive and able to reflect properly the specific features of STS securitisations. The same applies to banks and investment firms as regards the prudential treatment for liquidity purposes which is included in a Delegated Act that has been amended on 30 October 2018. In this regard, in December 2018, the EBA issued Guidelines on the STS criteria for non-ABCP securitisation (EBA/GL/2018/09) and Guidelines on the STS criteria for ABCP securitisation (EBA/GL/2018/08), the main objective of which is to provide a consistent interpretation of the STS criteria, ensuring a common understanding by originators, original lenders, sponsors, securitisation special purpose entities, investors, competent authorities and third parties.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

In early 2022, the European Commission will present to the European Parliament and Council a report reviewing the legal framework for securitisation.
II6: Securitisation - Enhanced disclosure of securitised products

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*Securities market regulators should work with market participants to expand information on securitised products and their underlying assets.* (Rec. III.10-III.13, FSF 2008)

**Remarks**

Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures and other initiatives taken in relation to enhancing disclosure of securitised products, including working with industry and other authorities to continue to standardise disclosure templates and considering measures to improve the type of information that investors receive.


**Progress to date:**

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<td>2016 and 2019 (see below for details)</td>
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**Progress to date:** issue is being addressed through

- Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
- Regulation / Guidelines - No
- Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No

**Progress to date:** short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

- Sectoral regulation (CRR/AIFMD/Solvency II/CRA III) is already implemented at the national level. Strengthening reforms under the new Securitisation Regulation: strengthened disclosure requirements for issuers of securitisation. Introduction of STS label identifying best practice.

**Progress to date:** if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

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### III7: Enhancing supervision - Consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of SIFIs

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*All firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards.* (Pittsburgh)

**Remarks**

Jurisdictions should indicate: (1) whether they have identified domestic SIFIs and, if so, in which sectors (banks, insurers, other etc.); (2) whether the names of the identified SIFIs have been publicly disclosed; and (3) the types of policy measures taken for implementing consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of the identified SIFIs.

Jurisdictions should not provide details on policy measures that pertain to higher loss absorbency requirements for G/D-SIBs, since these are monitored separately by the BCBS.

See, for reference, the following documents:

**BCBS**

- *Framework for G-SIBs (Jul 2018)*
- *Framework for D-SIBs (Oct 2012)*

**IAIS**

- *Holistic Framework for the Assessment and Mitigation of Systemic Risk in the Insurance Sector (Nov 2019)*
- *Application Paper on Liquidity Risk Management (Jun 2020)*
- *Draft Application Paper on Macroprudential Supervision (Mar 2021)*

**FSB**

- *Evaluation of the effects of too-big-to-fail reforms (Mar 2021)*
- *Framework for addressing SIFIs (Nov 2011)*

**Progress to date:**

- Implementation completed

**Progress to date:** If you have selected "Not applicable" or "Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment" - please provide a brief justification

**Progress to date:** please provide a date for your "implementation ongoing" status

**Progress to date:** If you have selected "Implementation completed" - please provide date of implementation

2016 (identification of G-SIIs and D-SIIs by EU Member States)
Progress to date: issue is being addressed through
Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
Regulation / Guidelines - Yes
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No

Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions
The methodology to identify Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), initially developed in 2011, was reviewed by the BCBS in 2013 and in 2018. The framework for domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) was developed by the BCBS in 2012. Both frameworks for G-SIBs and D-SIBs have been included in EU legislation (Art. 131 CRD IV - Directive 2013/36/EU as amended by CRD V – Directive 2019/878/EU). The EBA has published binding technical standards (implementing technical standards, regulatory technical standards) to identify and assess G-SIs and guidelines to identify O-SIs by EU Member States, which have been updated in 2021 to reflect the changes in the BCBS methodology agreed in 2018. The EU framework ensures a consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of the identified EU G-SIBs and D-SIBs. Further guidance has been provided by the ESRB (ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential Policy in the Banking Sector). By the end of 2016 all EU MS have identified G-SIs and O-SIs. G-SIs and O-SIs and their additional capital requirements are notified by the EU Member States and published by the EBA and ESRB. The list of O-SIs is updated yearly. As of 2016, the ECB has implemented a floor methodology for setting O-SII capital buffers that each identified O-SII is required to maintain. This methodology forms part of the analysis which the ECB conducts when assessing the O-SII buffers set by national authorities in the SSM area.

The FSB decided to suspend the identification and publication of GSIIs the time the IAIS develops its new macroprudential framework. In November 2018 the IAIS published a consultation paper on its proposal to mitigate systemic risk named Holistic Approach (mix between Entity-based approach and Activity based approach). The new framework has been adopted in November 2019, for a first application in 2020. The IAIS Holistic Framework includes mandatory measures such as stress testing, disclosure on liquidity and recovery plan. Following a call for advice from the European Commission in the context of the Solvency 2 review, EIOPA issued technical advice in form of an Opinion including on a new macroprudential dimension that encompasses instruments included in the IAIS Holistic Framework. The Commission is preparing for Q3 2021 legislative proposals that would introduce such a macro-prudential dimension into the Solvency 2 regulatory framework.

Update and next steps: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation
The EBA has finalised the review of its binding technical standards, reflecting the changes in the methodology agreed by the BCBS in 2018 and the amendments to the CRDIV contained in Art 131 of CRDV.

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents
https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/opinion-2020-review-of-solvency-ii_en

III8: Enhancing supervision - Establishing supervisory colleges and conducting risk assessments

G20/FSB Recommendations

To establish the remaining supervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms by June 2009.
(London)

We agreed to conduct rigorous risk assessment on these firms [G-SIFIs] through international supervisory colleges. (Seoul)

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2017 IMN survey. The BCBS and IAIS will be monitoring implementation progress in this area with respect to banks and insurers respectively.
III9: Enhancing supervision - Supervisory exchange of information and coordination

G20/FSB Recommendations

*To quicken supervisory responsiveness to developments that have a common effect across a number of institutions, supervisory exchange of information and coordination in the development of best practice benchmarks should be improved at both national and international levels.* (Rec V.7, FSF 2008)

*Enhance the effectiveness of core supervisory colleges.* (FSB 2012)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should include any feedback received from recent FSAPs/ROSC assessments on the September 2012 BCP 3 (Cooperation and collaboration) and BCP 14 (Home-host relationships). Jurisdictions should also indicate any steps taken since the last assessment in this area, particularly in response to relevant FSAP/ROSC recommendations.

Jurisdictions should describe any recent or planned regulatory, supervisory or legislative changes that contribute to the sharing of supervisory information (e.g. within supervisory colleges or via bilateral or multilateral MoUs).

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Progress to date: please provide a date for your “implementation ongoing” status

Progress to date: If you have selected “Implementation completed” - please provide date of implementation

02.12.2016

Progress to date: issue is being addressed through

Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
Regulation / Guidelines - Yes
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No
Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

The EU has put in place a comprehensive set of rules concerning the exchange of information and coordination among competent authorities. Directive 2013/36/EU provides for exchange of information obligations among authorities involved in the supervision of institutions operating in more than one Member State (art. 50 and 53-62) and authorities concerned by the establishment of a branch of a credit institution (art. 35-38). These provisions are further specified by secondary legislation. Two pieces of legislation were notified on the information to be notified when exercising the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services (Regulation (EU) No 1151/2014 and No 926/2014). Two regulations specify the information to be exchanged by competent authorities supervising institutions operating in more than one Member State through branches or exercising the freedom to provide services, have also been adopted (Reg. (EU) No 524/2014 and No 620/2014). In addition, Directive 2013/36/EU specifies rules governing the exchange of information, planning and coordination of supervisory activities between the various national authorities involved in the supervision of banking groups carrying out activities within the EU. This Directive also provides provisions for information exchanges between EU banking supervisors and other authorities, persons or bodies within and outside the EU. The specific content and procedures for this exchange of information are set out in Delegated Regulation 2016/98 and in Implementing Regulation 2016/99. Furthermore, the ESAs continue developing the single rulebook applicable to all 28 Member States so as to ensure that supervisory practices are consistent across the whole Union. Finally, the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is directly supervising the largest (so-called “significant”) banks in the euro area and in non-euro area EU countries that decided to join SSM through “close cooperation”, supplements the monetary union by further strengthening supervisory consistency across the euro area. The SSM is fully in place from 4 November 2014. For EU banking groups, the home/host supervisor coordination procedures and colleges of supervisors continue to exist as they were previously, except for parts of the group which are located in the euro area and which are significant institutions. For these banks, the ECB is the sole member of the college and a consolidating supervisor if the group is headquartered in the euro area. In case of banking groups located outside the SSM the ECB has the role of the “host supervisor” for all the euro area jurisdictions. This has led to elimination of supervisory colleges for significant groups with activities within the euro area and to a single, and thus more efficient, representation of the euro area supervision of the EU and global banking groups. The SSM is in the process of concluding multiple MoU with third country supervisory authorities which concerns supervisory cooperation and information exchange both within and outside the context of colleges. For less significant banking groups the national competent authorities remain fully fledged members of the college as either “consolidating supervisor” or the host supervisor. The EBA participates in supervisory college meetings and provides regular assessments of the functioning of supervisory colleges. As regards the insurance sector, Solvency II provisions on supervisory colleges apply since 1 January 2016 (see answer to Q8), and EIOPA adopted detailed guidelines on information exchanges in supervisory colleges. EIOPA takes part in supervisory colleges, and is more generally helping supervisory convergence in the EU. In the case of financial conglomerate Directive 2002/87 (FiCoD) provides that the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate and the competent authority appointed as the coordinator for that financial conglomerate shall cooperate closely with each other (see Joint Guidelines on the convergence of supervisory practices relating to the consistency of supervisory coordination arrangements for financial conglomerates - JC/GL/2014/01). Without prejudice to their respective responsibilities as defined under sectoral rules, these authorities, whether or not established in the same Member State, shall provide one another with any information which is essential or relevant for the exercise of the other authorities’ supervisory tasks under the sectoral rules and the FiCoD. In parallel, EIOPA reinforced its supervisory practices by publishing guidelines on the exchange of information on colleges published in September 2015 and on the supervision of branches of third-country insurance undertakings initially published in 2015 and updated in July 2018.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents

### III10: Enhancing supervision - Strengthening resources and effective supervision

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*We agreed that supervisors should have strong and unambiguous mandates, sufficient independence to act, appropriate resources, and a full suite of tools and powers to proactively identify and address risks, including regular stress testing and early intervention. (Seoul)*

*Supervisors should see that they have the requisite resources and expertise to oversee the risks associated with financial innovation and to ensure that firms they supervise have the capacity to understand and manage the risks. (FSF 2008)*

*Supervisory authorities should continually re-assess their resource needs; for example, interacting with and assessing Boards require particular skills, experience and adequate level of seniority. (Rec. 3, FSB 2012)*

**Remarks**

Jurisdictions should indicate any steps taken on recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 (i.e. supervisory strategy, engagement with banks, improvements in banks’ IT and MIS, data requests, and talent management strategy respectively) in the FSB [thematic peer review report on supervisory frameworks and approaches to SIBs (May 2015)](https://www.fsb.org/).  

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<td>Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions</td>
<td>The EU has put in place a comprehensive set of rules concerning effective supervision. Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) requires the Member States to ensure that the supervisory authorities have all the necessary expertise, resources, operational capacity, powers and independence to carry out their tasks (Article 4(4) CRD IV). It further lists the general powers and measures that supervisors shall have (Art. 102-104), including the power to impose penalties (Art. 18 and 64) and the procedure to follow to carry out banks’ supervision (Art. 97-98). Among the powers entrusted to supervisors, there is the obligation to carry out stress testing at least annually (Art. 100). Primary legislation has been complemented principally by the EBA guidelines on supervisory review and evaluation process, applicable since January 2016, and its revised guidelines applicable since January 2019. The founding regulation of the European Banking Authority mandates the EBA “to monitor new and existing financial activities” and “to adopt guidelines and recommendations with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of markets and convergence in regulatory practice”. The EBA has launched several initiatives on FinTech and is reflecting on which, if any, regulatory and/or supervisory actions are needed to ensure that the regulatory framework capture properly the risks carried by the use of technology in the banking sector.</td>
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**Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date**

In 2019, the EBA’s work will focus on a number of key priorities in FinTech. This includes assessing the risks and opportunities for financial institutions from FinTech, the impact of FinTech on the business models of institutions (such as on the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms), and examining regulatory obstacles for innovative technologies and business models.

**Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents**


**IV11: Macroprudential frameworks and tools - Establishing oversight regulatory framework**

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*Amend our regulatory systems to ensure authorities are able to identify and take account of macroprudential risks across the financial system including in the case of regulated banks, shadow banks and private pools of capital to limit the build up of systemic risk.* (London)

*Ensure that national regulators possess the powers for gathering relevant information on all material financial institutions, markets and instruments in order to assess the potential for failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic risk. This will be done in close coordination at international level in order to achieve as much consistency as possible across jurisdictions.* (London)

**Remarks**

Please describe major changes in the institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy (structures, mandates, powers, reporting etc.) that have taken place in your jurisdiction since the global financial crisis.

Please indicate whether an assessment has been conducted with respect to the adequacy of powers to collect and share relevant information among national authorities on financial institutions, markets and instruments to assess the potential for systemic risk. If so, please describe identified gaps in the powers to collect information, and whether any follow-up actions have been taken.

**Progress to date:**

- Implementation completed
- Progress to date: If you have selected "Not applicable" or "Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment" - please provide a brief justification
- Progress to date: please provide a date for your "implementation ongoing" status
- Progress to date: If you have selected "Implementation completed" - please provide date of implementation 01.01.2014
- Progress to date: issue is being addressed through
  - Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
  - Regulation / Guidelines - No
  - Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No
The EU macro-prudential framework has been established gradually, via the adoption of different pieces of legislation: the ESRB founding Regulations -in force since December 2010- (Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010), the CRD IV/CRR macro-prudential rules and tools -in force since January 2014- and the SSM Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions) which entrusts specific macro-prudential competences to the ECB/SSM. The latter piece of legislation is in force since November 2014. Following the ESRB Regulation, the responsibility of macro-prudential oversight has been entrusted to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). In pursuing its macro-prudential mandate, the ESRB performs a number of key activities, namely risk monitoring, risk assessment and, ultimately, if deemed appropriate, it adopts warnings and recommendations. Going forward, with the establishment of the Banking Union as of 1 November 2014 the ECB as single supervisor also has some macro-prudential competences within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM Regulation entrusts the ECB with specific macro-prudential competences to be applied within the Banking Union using the macro-prudential instruments enshrined in EU law (i.e. CRD IV/CRR macro-prudential tools). The ECB Framework Regulation further clarifies how these powers are to be implemented. The ESRB Recommendation (ESRB/2011/3) on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities initiated the setting-up of national macro-prudential authorities. Furthermore, the regulations on capital requirements (CRD IV/CRR) that entered into force on 31 December 2013 required the Member States to designate the national macro-prudential authorities responsible for the macro-prudential instruments introduced through this legislation. The amendments to the CRD IV/CRR that entered into force on 27 June 2019 include a number of targeted improvements to the macro-prudential provisions, notably increased flexibility in the use of existing macro-prudential instruments while eliminating the macro-prudential use of Pillar 2, and streamlined activation and reciprocation procedures for macro-prudential instruments establishing the ESRB as the notification hub for macro-prudential measures.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Amendments to the ESRB establishing regulation published on 18 December 2019 and applicable as of 1 January 2020.

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents

IV13: Macroprudential frameworks and tools - Enhancing monitoring and use of macroprudential instruments

G20/FSB Recommendations

Authorities should use quantitative indicators and/or constraints on leverage and margins as macroprudential tools for supervisory purposes. Authorities should use quantitative indicators of leverage as guides for policy, both at the institution-specific and at the macro-prudential (system-wide) level. (Rec. 3.1, FSF 2009)

We are developing macro-prudential policy frameworks and tools to limit the build-up of risks in the financial sector, building on the ongoing work of the FSB-BIS-IMF on this subject. (Cannes)

Authorities should monitor substantial changes in asset prices and their implications for the macro economy and the financial system. (Washington)

Remarks

Please describe at a high level (including by making reference to financial stability or other reports, where available) the types of methodologies, indicators and tools used to assess systemic risks.

Please indicate the use of tools for macroprudential purposes over the past year, including: the objective for their use; the process to select, calibrate and apply them; and the approaches used to assess their effectiveness.

See, for reference, the following documents:

- FSB-IMF-BIS progress report to the G20 on Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks (Oct 2011)
- CGFS report on Operationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments (Dec 2012)
- IMF staff papers on Macroprudential policy, an organizing framework (Mar 2011), Key Aspects of Macroprudential policy (Jun 2013), and Staff Guidance on Macroprudential Policy (Dec 2014)
- CGFS report on Experiences with the ex ante appraisal of macroprudential instruments (Jul 2016)
- CGFS report on Objective-setting and communication of macroprudential policies (Nov 2016)
- IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey database

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Regulation / Guidelines - Yes
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No

Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions
The adopted ESRB Recommendation ((ESRB/2013/1), OJ 2013/C 170/01) on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policies proposed a list of intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policies and a corresponding list of instruments that can be used by macro-prudential authorities to meet the intermediate objectives. The Recommendation gives an indicative list of instruments that national macro-prudential authorities can use to fulfil their mandate. Also with the EU prudential rules for banks (CRDIV/CRR) that entered into force on 1 January 2014, the macro-prudential authorities in the EU can apply a new set of policy instruments to address financial stability risks more effectively. These legislative texts provide for a broad range of compulsory and voluntary instruments, primarily targeting capital. Member States are increasingly choosing to apply macro-prudential instruments in their jurisdictions, with many of these instruments being reciprocated by jurisdictions with material exposures to it to ensure they can take full effect. CRDIV/CRR, adopted in 2019, contain targeted changes to the macro-prudential toolset for the banking sector. Furthermore, the ESRB has been given a central role in the transmission of information on macroprudential measures ('notification hub'); relevant authorities have to notify the ESRB (and other stakeholders) of the macroprudential measures that are planned or have been implemented. To assist the use of macro-prudential instruments, the ESRB has prepared the following set of documents: the ESRB Flagship Report that provides a first overview of the new macro-prudential policy framework in the EU; the ESRB Handbook which provides more detailed assistance to macro-prudential authorities on how to use the new instruments; Decision 2015/4 which sets out the process and coordination framework for preparing ESRB opinions or issuing recommendations on macro-prudential measures, notified to the ESRB by relevant authorities, in line with the CRD/CRR; recommendations on guidance for setting countercyclical buffer rates and on recognising and setting countercyclical buffer rates for exposures to third countries; a recommendation on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures. In addition, within its remit of systemic risk monitoring, the ESRB has issued, among others, a recommendation on liquidity and leverage risks in investment funds (ESRB/2017/6); a report on the macroprudential use of margins and haircuts; public warnings to 8 EU Member States on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector (2016); and public warnings and recommendations to 11 EU Member States on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector (2019). The ESRB regularly reports on macroprudential developments in the EU in its annual Review on Macroprudential Policy in the EU and in its Annual Report.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents
V13: Improving credit rating agencies (CRAs) oversight- Enhancing regulation and supervision of CRAs

G20/FSB Recommendations

All CRAs whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes should be subject to a regulatory oversight regime that includes registration. The regulatory oversight regime should be established by end 2009 and should be consistent with the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals. (London)

National authorities will enforce compliance and require changes to a rating agency’s practices and procedures for managing conflicts of interest and assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process.

CRAs should differentiate ratings for structured products and provide full disclosure of their ratings track record and the information and assumptions that underpin the ratings process.

The oversight framework should be consistent across jurisdictions with appropriate sharing of information between national authorities, including through IOSCO. (London)

Regulators should work together towards appropriate, globally compatible solutions (to conflicting compliance obligations for CRAs) as early as possible in 2010. (FSB 2009)

We encourage further steps to enhance transparency and competition among credit rating agencies. (St Petersburg)

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2018 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2019 survey.
V14: Improving credit rating agencies (CRAs) oversight - Reducing the reliance on ratings

G20/FSB Recommendations

We also endorsed the FSB’s principles on reducing reliance on external credit ratings. Standard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks should not rely mechanistically on external credit ratings. (Seoul)

Authorities should check that the roles that they have assigned to ratings in regulations and supervisory rules are consistent with the objectives of having investors make independent judgment of risks and perform their own due diligence, and that they do not induce uncritical reliance on credit ratings as a substitute for that independent evaluation. (Rec IV. 8, FSF 2008)

We reaffirm our commitment to reduce authorities’ and financial institutions’ reliance on external credit ratings, and call on standard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks to implement the agreed FSB principles and end practices that rely mechanistically on these ratings. (Cannes)

We call for accelerated progress by national authorities and standard setting bodies in ending the mechanistic reliance on credit ratings and encourage steps that would enhance transparency of and competition among credit rating agencies. (Los Cabos)

We call on national authorities and standard setting bodies to accelerate progress in reducing reliance on credit rating agencies, in accordance with the FSB roadmap. (St Petersburg)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the steps they are taking to address the recommendations of the May 2014 FSB thematic peer review report on the implementation of the FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings, including by implementing their agreed action plans. Any revised action plans should be sent to the FSB Secretariat so that it can be posted on the FSB website.

Jurisdictions may refer to the following documents:

- FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Oct 2010)
- FSB Roadmap for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Nov 2012)
- IAIS ICP guidance 16.9 and 17.8.25
- IOSCO Good Practices on Reducing Reliance on CRAs in Asset Management (Jun 2015)
- IOSCO Sound Practices at Large Intermediaries Relating to the Assessment of Creditworthiness and the Use of External Credit Ratings (Dec 2015).

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21.05.2013
Progress to date: issue is being addressed through

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Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

The progress made by the EU in reducing reliance on ratings in accordance with the 2012 FSB Roadmap is summarised in the EU Action Plan to reduce reliance on ratings which was published on 12 May 2014. The overall framework in the EU to reduce reliance on CRAs has a multilayer approach, covering EU regulation on CRAs, sectoral legislation in financial services, actions by European supervisory authorities (European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and by national competent sectoral authorities. In accordance with the requirements of Article 39b of the CRA3 Regulation, the European Commission adopted in October 2016 a report taking stock of the current situation in the credit rating market and assessing the impact and effectiveness of key provisions of the CRA Regulation on reducing over-reliance on credit ratings including on potential alternatives to external credit ratings. The report encouraged supervisors to continue promoting mitigation of mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by ensuring that market participants use additional tools (such as those suggested in the Report) as a complement to external ratings, in order to make their own assessment of credit risk and avoid sole and mechanistic reliance on ratings. The report noted however that there are currently no feasible alternatives that could fully replace external credit ratings.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

The Commission will continue to monitor the impact of the CRA III Regulation requirements in cooperation with ESMA, with a view to mitigating any risks of excessive reliance on credit ratings in financial services legislation.

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents

VI15: Enhancing accounting standards - Consistent application of high-quality accounting standards

G20/FSB Recommendations

Regulators, supervisors, and accounting standard setters, as appropriate, should work with each other and the private sector on an ongoing basis to ensure consistent application and enforcement of high-quality accounting standards. (Washington)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the accounting standards that they follow and whether (and on what basis) they are of a high and internationally acceptable quality (e.g. equivalent to IFRSs as published by the IASB), and provide accurate and relevant information on financial position and performance. They should also explain the system they have for enforcement of consistent application of those standards.

Jurisdictions may want to refer to their jurisdictional profile prepared by the IFRS Foundation, which can be accessed at: [https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/](https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/).

As part of their response on this recommendation, jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken for appropriate application of recognition, fair value measurement and disclosure requirements.

In addition, jurisdictions should set out any steps they intend to take (if appropriate) to foster transparent and consistent implementation of the new accounting requirements for the measurement of expected credit losses on financial assets that are being introduced by the IASB and FASB.

See, for reference, the following BCBS documents:

- [Supervisory guidance for assessing banks’ financial instrument fair value practices (Apr 2009)](#)
- [Guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit losses (Dec 2015)](#)
- [Regulatory treatment of accounting provisions - interim approach and transitional arrangements (March 2017)](#)

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The EU adopted in 2002 a regulation to adopt IFRS (i.e. the IAS Regulation). Since January 2005, the IFRS are mandatory for the consolidated accounts of listed companies. Enforcement of IFRS is done by the national market authority and coordinated by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In that context in March 2019 ESMA published a Report on Enforcement and Regulatory Activities of Accounting Enforcers in 2018. Over 10 years after the adoption of the IAS Regulation, the European Commission has assessed the effects of the use of IFRS in the EU against its original aims. Its report on the evaluation to the European Parliament was published on 18 June 2015. In 2018, European Commission launched a fitness check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies, dealing inter alia with an assessment of the IAS regulation.

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

New standards, amendments or interpretation provided by the IASB will continue to go through due process of endorsement before becoming law in the EU.

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents

http://www.efrag.org/Endorsement
VII16: Enhancing risk management - Enhancing guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practice

G20/FSB Recommendations

Regulators should develop enhanced guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, in line with international best practices, and should encourage financial firms to re-examine their internal controls and implement strengthened policies for sound risk management. (Washington)

National supervisors should closely check banks’ implementation of the updated guidance on the management and supervision of liquidity as part of their regular supervision. If banks’ implementation of the guidance is inadequate, supervisors will take more prescriptive action to improve practices. (Rec. II.10, FSF 2008)

Regulators and supervisors in emerging markets will enhance their supervision of banks’ operation in foreign currency funding markets. (FSB 2009)

We commit to conduct robust, transparent stress tests as needed. (Pittsburgh)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the measures taken in the following areas:

- guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, including BCBS good practice documents (Corporate governance principles for banks, External audit of banks, and the Internal audit function in banks);
- measures to monitor and ensure banks’ implementation of the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (Sep 2008);
- measures to supervise banks’ operations in foreign currency funding markets;
- extent to which they undertake stress tests and publish their results.

Jurisdictions should not provide any updates on the implementation of Basel III liquidity requirements (and other recent standards such as capital requirements for CCPs), since these are monitored separately by the BCBS.

1 Only the emerging market jurisdictions that are members of the FSB should respond to this specific recommendation.

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<td>Other actions (such as supervisory actions)</td>
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Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

In December 2013, EBA adopted guidelines on Pillar 2 capital measures for lending in foreign currencies. These guidelines address the recommendation made by the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board), following its 2011 Report on lending in foreign currencies. These guidelines specify the method to be used by supervisory authorities where FX lending risk is deemed to be material and where capital measures are deemed to be an appropriate method of treating this risk. In line with the previous stress test exercises in 2014, 2016 and 2018, EBA published in June 2019, for consultation, a draft stress test methodology and respective templates to be used in the 2020 exercise. The 2020 EU-wide stress test exercise will be launched in January 2020 and results will be published by July 2020. In December 2014, EBA published guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) (EBA/GL/2014/13). These guidelines aim to provide supervisory authorities with a common European framework for SREP and risk assessment under Pillar 2. They explain how to assess the various risks to which banks are exposed, including FX lending and liquidity risks, as well the governance and internal control framework of banks for identifying, managing, and monitoring risks. These guidelines entered into force in January 2016. To complement them, EBA has also published in November 2016 guidelines on the collection of information related to the internal liquidity adequacy assessment process (ILAAP). These guidelines aim at harmonising what information has to be collected in order for supervisors to assess the reliability of the ILAAP and the internal liquidity estimates of the institutions. They entered into force in January 2017. Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) implements into EU law the Basel Committee’s corporate governance principles for banks, including in particular aspects concerning boards’ responsibilities, qualifications, structure and composition, senior management, risk management, compensation and disclosure. As regards the bank’s compensation structure, the CRD IV is complemented by Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) No 604/2014 and (EU) No 527/2014, which set out criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on an bank’s risk profile and specifies the classes of instruments that adequately reflect the credit quality of an institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable compensation. In September 2017, the EBA published its revised guidelines on internal governance (EBA/GL/2017/11). The guidelines’ objective is to further harmonise bank’s internal governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms within the EU. The guidelines provide requirements aimed at ensuring the sound management of risks across all three lines of defence (the independent risk management and compliance function) and the third line of defence (the internal audit function). They also provide further principles concerning issues such as organisational framework on a group context, internal control functions or the role of supervisors. Also in September 2017, the EBA and ESMA issued joint guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders (EBA/GL/2017/12). These guidelines set out the measures for the assessment of the suitability of members of the boards, including the CEO. The guidelines also foresee the assessment of the bank’s key function holders (i.e. the CFO and the heads of internal control functions) who have a significant influence over the direction of the business. Both sets of guidelines will enter into force on 30 June 2018 and are applied by EU Member States on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Finally, in February 2019, the EBA issued Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements (EBA/GL/2019/02), which set out provisions for financial institutions’ governance frameworks with regard to their outsourcing arrangements and the related supervisory expectations and processes, and has integrated the former recommendation on outsourcing to cloud service providers, published in December 2017 (EBA/REC/2017/03). The financial institution’s management body should ensure that sufficient resources are available to appropriately support and ensure the overseeing of all risks and the management of the outsourcing arrangements.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date
Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents

VII17: Enhancing risk management - Enhanced risk disclosures by financial institutions

G20/FSB Recommendations

Financial institutions should provide enhanced risk disclosures in their reporting and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, consistent with international best practice, as appropriate. (Washington)

We encourage further efforts by the public and private sector to enhance financial institutions’ disclosures of the risks they face, including the ongoing work of the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force. (St. Petersburg)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the status of implementation of the disclosures requirements of IFRSs (in particular IFRS 7 and 13) or equivalent. Jurisdictions may also use as reference the recommendations of the October 2012 report by the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force on Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks and Implementation Progress Report by the EDTF (Dec 2015), and set out any steps they have taken to foster adoption of the EDTF Principles and Recommendations.

In addition, in light of the new IASB and FASB accounting requirements for expected credit loss recognition, jurisdictions should set out any steps they intend to take (if appropriate) to foster disclosures needed to fairly depict a bank’s exposure to credit risk, including its expected credit loss estimates, and to provide relevant information on a bank’s underwriting practices. Jurisdictions may use as reference the recommendations in the report by the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force on the Impact of Expected Credit Loss Approaches on Bank Risk Disclosures (Nov 2015), as well as the recommendations in Principle 8 of the BCBS Guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit losses (Dec 2015).

In their responses, jurisdictions should not provide information on the implementation of Basel III Pillar 3 requirements, since this is monitored separately by the BCBS.

Progress to date:
Implementation completed

Progress to date: If you have selected "Not applicable" or "Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment" - please provide a brief justification

Progress to date: please provide a date for your "implementation ongoing" status

Progress to date: If you have selected "Implementation completed" - please provide date of implementation
2017

Progress to date: issue is being addressed through
Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
Regulation / Guidelines - Yes
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions
In the European Union listed banks are required to use IFRS for their consolidated accounts, by virtue of the IAS Regulation and the subsequent adoption of individual IFRS standards. The most relevant standards for risk disclosure are IAS 32, IFRS 7 and IFRS 13 all adopted in the EU. IFRS 9 was endorsed by the EU through Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/2067 and has entered into force on 1 January 2018.
Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents


EBA guidelines on credit institutions’ credit risk management practices and accounting for expected credit losses

EBA Guidelines on credit institutions’ credit risk management practices and accounting for expected credit losses (EBA/GL/2017/06):

VIII18: Strengthening deposit insurance - Strengthening of national deposit insurance arrangements

G20/FSB Recommendations

National deposit insurance arrangements should be reviewed against the agreed international principles, and authorities should strengthen arrangements where needed. (Rec. VI.9, FSF 2008)

Remarks

Jurisdictions that have not yet adopted an explicit national deposit insurance system should describe their plans to introduce such a system.

All other jurisdictions should describe any significant design changes in their national deposit insurance system since the issuance of the revised IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (November 2014).

In addition, jurisdictions should indicate if they have carried out a self-assessment of compliance (based on IADI’s 2016 Handbook) with the revised Core Principles:

- If so, jurisdictions should highlight the main gaps identified and the steps proposed to address these gaps;
- If not, jurisdictions should indicate any plans to undertake a self-assessment exercise.

Progress to date:
Implementation completed

Progress to date: If you have selected “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment” - please provide a brief justification

Progress to date: please provide a date for your “implementation ongoing” status

Progress to date: If you have selected “Implementation completed” - please provide date of implementation
03.07.2015

Progress to date: issue is being addressed through
Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
Regulation / Guidelines - No
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No
Progress to date: short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

The Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSD) maintains the harmonised level of coverage (€ 100 000) and harmonises the scope of coverage (i.e. specify depositors and products being eligible or ineligible for DGS protection), gradually reduces the pay-out deadline from 20 to 7 working days (by 2024), strengthens the financing of DGS by introducing a principle of ex-ante financing with a specified target fund level (0.8% of covered deposits to be reached until 2024), allows for the partial use of DGS funds for early intervention, failure prevention, and bank resolution, as well as the transfer of deposits in liquidation, introduces an obligation to apply risk-based contributions in Member States, improves depositor information, and enhances cross-border cooperation between EU schemes. All Member States have fully transposed the DGSD into their national laws. To further support the application of the DGSD the European Banking Authority (EBA) published a number of guidelines over the past three years (guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to DGS, on payment commitments, on stress tests of DGS and on cooperation agreements between DGS).

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey

Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Ongoing discussion in the High-level Working Group of the Member States on a roadmap for beginning political negotiations on EDIS. Ongoing work of the Commission’s services on the review of the DGSD.

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents


IX19: Safeguarding financial markets integrity and efficiency - Enhancing integrity and efficiency

G20/FSB Recommendations

We must ensure that markets serve efficient allocation of investments and savings in our economies and do not pose risks to financial stability. To this end, we commit to implement initial recommendations by IOSCO on market integrity and efficiency, including measures to address the risks posed by high frequency trading and dark liquidity, and call for further work by mid-2012. (Cannes)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate whether high frequency trading and dark pools exist in their national markets.

Jurisdictions should indicate the progress made in implementing the recommendations:

- on the impact of technological change in the IOSCO Report on Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency (Oct 2011).
- on market structure made in the IOSCO Report on Regulatory issues raised by changes in market structure (Dec 2013).

Progress to date:

Implementation completed
The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR, entered into application on 3 July 2016) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (commonly referred to as the MiFID II framework, in application since 3 January 2018) have strongly enhanced the transparency and integrity of European financial markets, including for derivatives, commodity derivatives and OTC transactions. MiFID II also contains measures specifically targeted at investment firms that engage in algorithmic trading and algorithmic trading techniques. In addition, to foster market efficiency and reduce market fragmentation, the EU has taken a few equivalence decisions (e.g. with regard to trading venues in Singapore offering derivatives under the trading obligation).
IX20: Safeguarding financial markets integrity and efficiency - Regulation of commodity markets

G20/FSB Recommendations

We need to ensure enhanced market transparency, both on cash and financial commodity markets, including OTC, and achieve appropriate regulation and supervision of participants in these markets. Market regulators and authorities should be granted effective intervention powers to address disorderly markets and prevent market abuses. In particular, market regulators should have, and use formal position management powers, including the power to set ex-ante position limits, particularly in the delivery month where appropriate, among other powers of intervention. We call on IOSCO to report on the implementation of its recommendations by the end of 2012. (Cannes)

We also call on Finance ministers to monitor on a regular basis the proper implementation of IOSCO’s principles for the regulation and supervision on commodity derivatives markets and encourage broader publishing and unrestricted access to aggregated open interest data. (St. Petersburg)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate whether commodity markets of any type exist in their national markets.

Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken to implement the principles found in IOSCO’s report on Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivatives Markets (Sep 2011).

Jurisdictions, in responding to this recommendation, may also make use of the responses contained in the update to the survey published by IOSCO in September 2014 on the principles for the regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets.

| Progress to date: | Implementation completed |
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| 03.01.2018 |
| Progress to date: issue is being addressed through |
| Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes |
| Regulation / Guidelines - Yes |
| Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No |
On 1 December 2016, the European Commission adopted two Delegated Regulations as part of the MiFID II rulebook, based on the draft regulatory technical standards (‘RTS’) of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In particular, the RTS define parameters for competent authorities to determine “position limits”, i.e. the maximum amount of commodity derivatives that can be held by a single trader, and which represent a tool to help to limit commodity speculation, support orderly pricing and prevent market abuse. The rules establish a “baseline” and maximum bands of deviation on either side of the baseline, to be set by the competent regulators in line with observed price volatility in the underlying commodity markets. The standard also contains several chapters to cater for the “illiquid” derivative contracts, i.e. where open interest levels are low or where there a few market participants. Moreover, the new standards contain an explicit reference to how volatility should be considered by NCAs. In particular, authorities should seek to minimise volatility or at least review their limits more often in cases of excessive volatility. The new rules also ensure that large non-financial firms trading a large amount of commodity derivatives are regulated under MiFID II (through the “ancillary activity test”). This “ancillary test” represents a ratio between (i) the capital that would need to be allocated under CRR for the firm to engage in speculative derivatives trading versus (ii) the capital employed to conduct a firm’s main business. The market abuse regime strengthens the existing market abuse framework applying to commodities.

The Commission sent a mandate to ESMA to deliver a review report on the commodity derivatives position limits and management review under MiFID. This report shall be delivered in March 2020.

G20/FSB Recommendations

We support the establishment of the FSB’s Official Sector Steering Group to coordinate work on the necessary reforms of financial benchmarks. We endorse IOSCO’s Principles for Financial Benchmarks and look forward to reform as necessary of the benchmarks used internationally in the banking industry and financial markets, consistent with the IOSCO Principles. (St. Petersburg)

Collection of information on this recommendation will continue to be deferred given the ongoing reporting of progress in this area by the FSB Official Sector Steering Group, and ongoing IOSCO work to review the implementation of the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks.
X22: Enhancing financial consumer protection - Enhancing financial consumer protection

G20/FSB Recommendations

We agree that integration of financial consumer protection policies into regulatory and supervisory frameworks contributes to strengthening financial stability, endorse the FSB report on consumer finance protection and the high level principles on financial consumer protection prepared by the OECD together with the FSB. We will pursue the full application of these principles in our jurisdictions. (Cannes)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should describe progress toward implementation of the OECD’s G-20 high-level principles on financial consumer protection (Oct 2011).

Jurisdictions may refer to OECD’s September 2013 and September 2014 reports on effective approaches to support the implementation of the High-level Principles, as well as the G20/OECD Policy Guidance on Financial Consumer Protection in the Digital Age, which provides additional effective approaches for operating in a digital environment. The effective approaches are of interest across all financial services sectors – banking and credit; securities; insurance and pensions – and consideration should be given to their cross-sectoral character when considering implementation. In the case of private pensions, additional guidance can be found in the Good Practices on the Role of Pension Supervisory Authorities in Consumer Protection Related to Private Pension Systems.

Jurisdictions should, where necessary, indicate any changes or additions that have been introduced as a way to support the implementation of the High-level Principles, to address particular national terminology, situations or determinations.

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23/2/2018 (IDD), 21/3/2016 (MCD), 3 January 2018 (MiFID II), 01/01/2018 (PRIIPs)

Progress to date: issue is being addressed through
Primary / Secondary legislation - Yes
Regulation / Guidelines - Yes
Other actions (such as supervisory actions) - No
The Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) covers inter alia direct sales by insurers and intermediaries and aims at enhancing the internal market in insurance distribution and providing for a more effective protection of consumers when purchasing insurance products.

The Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) improves the information given to the consumer at pre-contractual stage by the means of a European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS) with detailed information on the characteristics of the mortgage loan offer, including specific warnings in the case of variable rate loans and foreign currency loans; the MCD also provides for a list of standard information at the advertising stage. The MCD obliges creditors to conduct a thorough, documented creditworthiness assessment based on defined criteria. The MCD obliges Member States to adopt measures to encourage creditors to exercise reasonable forbearance before foreclosure proceedings are initiated against consumers that have fallen into arrears, with further details provided in two sets of Guidelines developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and its national competent authorities. The MCD also sets important principles to guarantee that creditors and credit intermediaries act in the consumer’s interests, imposes high-level standards regarding their remuneration structure and requires specific disclosures to the consumer as regards the nature of the links between creditors and credit intermediaries. The MCD requires Member States to designate the national competent authorities and grant them investigating and enforcement powers and adequate resources. Moreover, the MCD grants consumers a generalized right to repay early under certain conditions and establishes with few exceptions a product tying ban. Insurance ancillary products can be taken out from an alternative supplier provided the level of protection is equivalent. Consumers who took out a foreign currency mortgage benefit either from the right to convert under certain conditions or alternative arrangements to limit the exchange fluctuation risks.

MiFID II which has been applicable since 3 January 2018 introduces better organisational and business conduct requirements for investment firms, such as client asset protection, stricter conflict of interest rules, remuneration policy and product governance requirements. It also sets additional requirements with regard to information to clients about costs and financial instruments. Furthermore, limitations are imposed on the receipt of inducements with more stringent rules for independent advisors and portfolio managers.

The Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 2014/92/EU of 23 July 2014 concerns three areas: - Comparability of payment account fees: the aim is to make it easier for consumers to compare the fees charged by banks and other payment service providers in the EU on payment accounts; - Switching between payment accounts: the aim is to establish a simple and quick procedure for changing from one payment account to another, with a different bank or financial institution at national level and to help consumers who close their bank account in one Member State and open another account in a different country. - Access to payment accounts: the aim is to allow all EU consumers, irrespective of their country of residence in the EU, to open a basic payment account that allows them to perform essential operations (like receiving their salary or pension, transferring funds to another account, withdrawing cash or using debit cards) unless he/she already holds an account in this Member State. The Directive requires Member States to designate the national competent authorities and grant them investigating and enforcement powers and adequate resources. PAD also introduces an obligation for competent authorities of different Member States to cooperate with each other. The revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2) EU/2015/2366, which has been applicable since 13 January 2018, aims at improving the existing rules and also takes new digital payment services into account. The directive includes provisions to make it easier and safer to use payment services; better protect consumers against fraud, abuse, and payment problems; promote innovative mobile and internet payment services; and strengthens consumer rights. PSD2 also strengthens the role of the European Banking Authority (EBA) to coordinate with the 28 national supervisory authorities and draft twelve technical standards and guidelines in support of the Directive.

Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products (PRIIPs): the PRIIPs Regulation aims to improve investor protection by introducing the obligation for PRIIPs manufacturers to provide a clear, short and standardised key information document (KID), and to publish it on its website. The KID is to offer a standardised presentation that clearly spells out main features, risks and expected returns as well as costs associated with a broad range of investment products available to retail investors, such as insurance-based investment products, structured investment products and collective investment schemes. The recent Regulation 1238/2019 on the Pan-European Personal Pension (PEPP) product introduces high standards of consumer protection: in particular, full mandatory advice and enhanced transparency for savers (through a standardised Key Information Document (PEPP KID) supplied before the purchase and a pension benefits statement (PBS) supplied annually during the product lifetime). PEPP savers will also benefit of a simple and affordable default option (the Basic PEPP) with costs capped at 1% of the capital/per year and of multiple flexibility features (right to switch provider (at capped costs) and to change investment option every five years, flexibility regarding the type of out-payments). The PEPP will be also a modern product that can be distributed and purchased online.

Progress to date: if this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation.

Update and next steps: highlight main developments since 2019 survey.
Update and next steps: planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

IDD: Transposition into national law: 1 July 2018. All Member States, except one have notified full transposition. Application of national provisions from 1 October 2018, at the latest. The Commission has adopted and published the level 2 measures. EIOPA provides ongoing implementation support by means of guidelines and Q&As.

MCD: Adopted in 2014. All Member States have now transposed the MCD. The European Commission published in May 2021 a report on the effectiveness and appropriateness of the MCD provisions, based on an evaluation study. The European Commission intends to start the MCD revision in September/October 2021 with the publication of an open public consultation and inception impact assessment.

MiFID II: The Commission has adopted and published the level 2 measures. ESMA provides ongoing implementation support by means of guidelines and Q&As, including measures adopted with regard to product intervention.

PAD: PAD was adopted in 2014. Deadline for transposition by Member States was 18 September 2016. As of July 2019, PAD has been transposed by all Member States. The European Commission has adopted and published regulatory technical standards and implementing technical standards regarding the standardised terminology of services and common format and symbol of the fee information document (FID) and statement of fees (SOF). A contract for a study to provide input for review of the Directive, in compliance with Article 28 was awarded in 2019, with a view to assess the effectiveness of provisions on transparency, switching and access to payment accounts. The study has been finalised and will be published in Q3 2021.

PSD2: The deadline for transposition into national law was January 13, 2018. All member states have transposed the directive. PEPP Regulation: published in the OJEU on 25 July 2019, will enter into application on 22 March 2022 (i.e. 12 months after the publication of the delegated acts in the OJEU (article 74 of the PEPP Regulation). The PEPP Regulation contains a mandate for 3 Commission delegated acts, 7 regulatory technical standards (RTS) and 2 implementing technical standards (ITS). The Commission has adopted and published these level 2 measures.

The Commission amended MiFID in the Capital Markets Recovery Package (CMRP) in 2020 as a response to the Covid-19 crisis to reduce red tape, facilitate the provision of investment services and the performance of investment activities, while still fully protecting investors.

The recently adopted Directive on credit servicers and credit purchasers of NPLs has strengthened the consumer protection in the MCD (and CCD) by enhancing disclosure of NPL portfolios and strengthen the forbearance requirements in favour of consumers.

The PRIIPs Regulation gives retail investors clear and comparable information on key features of various retail investment products, but industry has pointed out misleading disclosures and criticized the cross-sectoral approach. For this reason, on 3 February 2021, the three European Supervisory Authorities submitted draft PRIIPs Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) to the Commission aiming at addressing issues identified following the implementation of the PRIIPs KID in 2018, including on the presentation of cost information, the treatment of multi-option products, and auto-callable bonds.

Relevant web-links: please provide web-links to relevant documents


MCD: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e4a1db26-2f94-11eb-b27b-01aa75ed71a1 (MCD evaluation study)
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021DC0229&qid=1599516053067 (European Commission’s report on the effectiveness and appropriateness of the MCD)

List of abbreviations used

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