2019 IMN Survey of National/Regional Progress in the Implementation of G20/FSB Recommendations

National authorities from FSB member jurisdictions should complete the survey and submit it to the FSB Secretariat (imn@fsb.org) by Friday, 12 July (representing the most recent status at that time). The Secretariat is available to answer any questions or clarifications that may be needed on the survey. Please also provide your contact details for the person(s) completing the survey and an index of abbreviations used in the response.

National authorities are expected to submit the information to the FSB Secretariat using the Adobe Acrobat version of the survey. The Microsoft Word version of the survey is also being circulated to facilitate the preparation/collection of survey responses by relevant authorities within each jurisdiction.

Jurisdictions that previously reported implementation as completed in a particular recommendation are not required to include information about progress to date, main developments since last year’s survey or future plans. Revisions to previously included text or descriptions of relevant developments and new reforms to enhance the existing framework in that area can be made as needed, but this is optional and should not lead to a downgrade from implementation completed to ongoing, unless these reverse previously implemented reforms. Jurisdictions that do not report implementation as completed are required to include full information both in the “Progress to date” and “Update and next steps” tables.

As with previous IMN surveys, the contents of this survey for each national jurisdiction will be published on the FSB’s website. Such publication is planned at around the time of the October 2019 G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting. The FSB Secretariat will contact member jurisdictions in advance to check for any updates or amendments to submitted responses before they are published.
G20/FSB Recommendations

We also firmly recommitted to work in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory manner to strengthen regulation and supervision on hedge funds.

(Seoul)

Hedge funds or their managers will be registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for assessment of the systemic risks they pose individually or collectively. Where appropriate registration should be subject to a minimum size.

They will be subject to oversight to ensure that they have adequate risk management.

(London)

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2016 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2019 survey.
G20/FSB Recommendations

We ask the FSB to develop mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing between relevant authorities in order to ensure effective oversight is maintained when a fund is located in a different jurisdiction from the manager. We will, cooperating through the FSB, develop measures that implement these principles by the end of 2009. (London)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the progress made in implementing recommendation 6 in IOSCO’s Report on Hedge Fund Oversight (Jun 2009) on sharing information to facilitate the oversight of globally active fund managers.

In addition, jurisdictions should state whether they are:

- Signatory to the IOSCO MMoU in relation to cooperation in enforcement
- Signatory to bilateral agreements for supervisory cooperation that cover hedge funds and are aligned to the 2010 IOSCO Principles Regarding Cross-border Supervisory Cooperation.

Jurisdictions can also refer to Principle 28 of the 2017 IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, and take into account the outcomes of any recent FSAP/ROSC assessment against those Principles.

Progress to date

☐ Not applicable
☐ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
☐ Implementation ongoing
☐ Implementation completed as of 21 July 2012/11 April

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged...” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

☐ Draft in preparation, expected publication by
☐ Draft published as of
☐ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on
☐ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since

2
2. Establishment of international information sharing framework

Progress to date

Issue is being addressed through

☑ Primary / Secondary legislation
☑ Regulation / Guidelines
☐ Other actions (such as supervisory actions)

Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions


If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation.
## I. Hedge funds

### 2. Establishment of international information sharing framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Update and next steps</th>
<th>Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date</th>
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<tr>
<td>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</td>
<td>As mandated by Article 69 of the AIFMD, the Commission is carrying out a review on the application and the scope of the Directive. The process has been initiated by commissioning an external contractor (KPMG) to carry out a general survey and an evidence-based study on the functioning of the AIFMD. The final report by KPMG was published in the beginning of 2019. The Commission plans to complete its Report on the functioning of the AIFMD for the European Parliament and the Council as required by Article 69(4) of the AIFMD by end-2019.</td>
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### Relevant web-links

### G20/FSB Recommendations

Supervisors should require that institutions which have hedge funds as their counterparties have effective risk management, including mechanisms to monitor the funds’ leverage and set limits for single counterparty exposures. (London) Supervisors will strengthen their existing guidance on the management of exposures to leveraged counterparties. (Rec. II.17, FSB 2008)

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Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2018 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2019 survey.
4. Strengthening of regulatory and capital framework for monolines

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

*Insurance supervisors should strengthen the regulatory and capital framework for monoline insurers in relation to structured credit.* (Rec II.8, FSB 2008)

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Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2016 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2019 survey.
II. Securitisation

5. Strengthening of supervisory requirements or best practices for investment in structured products

G20/FSB Recommendations

Regulators of institutional investors should strengthen the requirements or best practices for firms’ processes for investment in structured products. (Rec II.18, FSB 2008)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the due diligence policies, procedures and practices applicable for investment managers when investing in structured finance instruments and other policy measures taken for strengthening best practices for investment in structured finance products.

Jurisdictions may reference IOSCO’s report on Good Practices in Relation to Investment Managers’ Due Diligence When Investing in Structured Finance Instruments (Jul 2009).

Jurisdictions may also refer to the Joint Forum report on Credit Risk Transfer- Developments from 2005-2007 (Jul 2008).

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<td>• Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment</td>
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<td>• Implementation ongoing</td>
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<td>• Implementation completed as of 2016</td>
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- Draft in preparation, expected publication by [ ]
- Draft published as of [ ]
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on [ ]
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## II. Securitisation

### 5. Strengthening of supervisory requirements or best practices for investment in structured products

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<td><strong>Issue is being addressed through</strong></td>
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<td>✔ Other actions (such as supervisory actions)</td>
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### Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

Sectoral regulation (CRR/AIFMD/Solvency II/CRA III) is already implemented/directly applicable at the national level. Strengthening reforms under new Securitisation Regulation which was adopted on 30 September 2015, and which entered into force in January 2018, will apply to all securitisations and include due diligence, risk retention and transparency rules together with the criteria for Simple, Transparent and Standardised (“STS”) securitisations. STS criteria are in line with the BCBS-IOSCO principles adopted in July 2015. Introduction of STS label identifying best practice. The capital treatment of securitisations for banks, investment firms and insurers has been amended to make it more risk-sensitive and able to reflect properly the specific features of STS securitisations. The same applies to banks and investment firms as regards the prudential treatment for liquidity purposes which is included in a Delegated Act that has been amended on 30 October 2018. In this regard, in December 2018, the EBA issued Guidelines on the STS criteria for non-ABCP securitisation (EBA/GL/2018/09) and Guidelines on the STS criteria for ABCP securitisation (EBA/GL/2018/08), the main objective of which is to provide a consistent interpretation of the STS criteria, ensuring a common understanding by originators, original lenders, sponsors, securitisation special purpose entities, investors, competent authorities and third parties.

If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide **reasons for delayed implementation**.
## II. Securitisation

### 5. Strengthening of supervisory requirements or best practices for investment in structured products

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<td><strong>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Securitisation Regulation entered into application in January 2019. The European Commission is in the process of further elaborating the framework via regulatory and implementing technical standards.</td>
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<th>Relevant web-links</th>
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<td><strong>Web-links to relevant documents</strong></td>
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</table>
6. Enhanced disclosure of securitised products

G20/FSB Recommendations
Securities market regulators should work with market participants to expand information on securitised products and their underlying assets. (Rec. III.10-III.13, FSB 2008)

Remarks
Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures and other initiatives taken in relation to enhancing disclosure of securitised products, including working with industry and other authorities to continue to standardise disclosure templates and considering measures to improve the type of information that investors receive.


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## II. Securitisation

### 6. Enhanced disclosure of securitised products

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**Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions**

Sectoral regulation (CRR/AIFMD/Solvency II/CRA III) is already implemented/directly applicable at the national level. Strengthening reforms under the new Securitisation Regulation: strengthened disclosure requirements for issuers of securitisation. Introduction of STS label identifying best practice.

If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation.
### 6. Enhanced disclosure of securitised products

#### Update and next steps

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<tr>
<td>The Securitisation Regulation entered into application in January 2019. The European Commission is in the process of further elaborating the framework via regulatory and implementing technical standards.</td>
<td>In early 2020, the European Commission will present to the European Parliament a report on the creation of a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised balance-sheet synthetic securitisation. The report shall be based on a report on the feasibility of such framework by the European Banking Authority.</td>
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#### Relevant web-links

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G20/FSB Recommendations
All firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards. (Pittsburgh)

Remarks
Jurisdictions should indicate: (1) whether they have identified domestic SIFIs and, if so, in which sectors (banks, insurers, other etc.); (2) whether the names of the identified SIFIs have been publicly disclosed; and (3) the types of policy measures taken for implementing consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of the identified SIFIs.

Jurisdictions should not provide details on policy measures that pertain to higher loss absorbency requirements for G/D-SIBs, since these are monitored separately by the BCBS.

See, for reference, the following documents:
BCBS
- Framework for G-SIBs (Jul 2018)
- Framework for D-SIBs (Oct 2012)
IAIS
- Global Systemically Important Insurers: Policy Measures (Jul 2013) and revised assessment methodology (updated in June 2016)
- IAIS SRMP guidance - FINAL (Dec 2013)
- Guidance on Liquidity management and planning (Oct 2014)
FSB
- Framework for addressing SIFIs (Nov 2011)

Progress to date
- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 2016 (identification of)

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

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III. Enhancing supervision
7. Consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of SIFIs
III. Enhancing supervision

7. Consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of SIFIs

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Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

The methodology to identify Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), initially developed in 2011, was reviewed by the BCBS in 2013 and in 2018. The framework for domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) was developed by the BCBS in 2012. Both frameworks for G-SIBs and D-SIBs have been included in EU legislation (Art. 131 CRD IV - Directive 2013/36/EU). The EBA has published binding technical standards (implementing technical standards, regulatory technical standards) to identify and assess G-SIIs and guidelines to identify O-SIIs by EU Member States. The EBA has started to review its binding technical standards to reflect the changes in the BCBS methodology agreed in 2018. The EU framework ensures a consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of the identified EU G-SIBs and D-SIBs. Further guidance has been provided by the ESRB (ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-Prudential policy in the Banking Sector). By the end of 2016 all EU MS have identified G-SIIs and O-SIIs. G-SIIs and O-SIIs and their additional capital requirements are notified by the EU Member States and published by the EBA and ESRB. The list of O-SIIs is updated yearly. As of 2016, the ECB has implemented a floor methodology for setting O-SII capital buffers that each identified O-SII is required to maintain. This methodology forms part of the analysis which the ECB conducts when assessing the O-SII buffers set by national authorities in the SSM area.

The FSB decided to suspend the identification and publication of GSIs the time the IAIS develops its new macroprudential framework. In November 2018 the IAIS published a consultation paper on its proposal to mitigate systemic risk named Holistic Approach (mix between Entity based approach and Activity based approach). The new framework is planned to be adopted in November 2019, for a first application in 2020. The IAIS Holistic Framework plans to include mandatory measures such as stress testing, disclosure on liquidity and recovery plan. In its call for advice to EIOPA in the context of the Solvency 2 review, the Commission introduced a macroprudential dimension that encompasses instruments likely to be included in the IAIS Holistic Framework.
### III. Enhancing supervision

#### 7. Consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of SIFIs

**Update and next steps**

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<td>CRD5, a review of Directive 2013/36/EU within the broader “banking package”, has been adopted by co-legislators in 2019 and contains selected amendments to the G-SIB and D-SIB EU framework, notably: (i) increased flexibility in the use of the Other Systemically important Institutions buffer, (ii) a clearer delineation of the scope of the Systemic Risk Buffer and Other Systemically Important Institutions Buffer, and (iii) changes to the G-SII buffer requirements and G-SII score methodology.</td>
<td>The EBA has started to review its binding technical standards to reflect the changes in the methodology agreed by the BCBS in 2018 and the amendments to the CRD4 contained in Art 131 of CRD5.</td>
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**Relevant web-links**

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<td><a href="https://www.csrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/140303_csrb_handbook_mp_en.pdf?e6285a744617a7698c6951318069f231">Link 1</a></td>
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<td><a href="http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/other-systemically-important-institutions-o-siis/2016">Link 5</a></td>
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<td><a href="https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/reports/esrb_3273aae4bd95_report190430_reviewofmacroprudentialpolicy.pdf?29f3196fe6f34fe397f67ce80fa3590" title="special feature C">Link 7</a></td>
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### III. Enhancing supervision

#### 8. Establishing supervisory colleges and conducting risk assessments

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

To establish the remaining supervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms by June 2009. (London)

We agreed to conduct rigorous risk assessment on these firms [G-SIFIs] through international supervisory colleges. (Seoul)

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Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2017 IMN survey. The BCBS and IAIS will be monitoring implementation progress in this area with respect to banks and insurers respectively.
G20/FSB Recommendations

To quicken supervisory responsiveness to developments that have a common effect across a number of institutions, supervisory exchange of information and coordination in the development of best practice benchmarks should be improved at both national and international levels. (Rec V.7, FSB 2008)

Enhance the effectiveness of core supervisory colleges. (FSB 2012)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should include any feedback received from recent FSAPs/ROSC assessments on the September 2012 BCP 3 (Cooperation and collaboration) and BCP 14 (Home-host relationships). Jurisdictions should also indicate any steps taken since the last assessment in this area, particularly in response to relevant FSAP/ROSC recommendations.

Jurisdictions should describe any recent or planned regulatory, supervisory or legislative changes that contribute to the sharing of supervisory information (e.g. within supervisory colleges or via bilateral or multilateral MoUs).

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing

Implementation completed as of 02.12.2016

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged...” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

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European Union

02.12.2016
The EU has put in place a comprehensive set of rules concerning the exchange of information and coordination among competent authorities. Directive 2013/36/EU provides for exchange of information obligations among authorities involved in the supervision of institutions operating in more than one Member State (art. 50 and 53-62) and authorities concerned by the establishment of a branch of a credit institution (art. 35-38). These provisions are further specified by secondary legislation. Two pieces of legislation were issued on the information to be notified when exercising the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services (Regulation (EU) No 1151/2014 and No 926/2014). Two regulations specify the information to be exchanged by competent authorities supervising institutions operating in more than one Member State through branches or exercising the freedom to provide services, have also been adopted (Reg. (EU) No 524/2014 and No 620/2014). In addition, Directive 2013/36/EU specifies rules governing the exchange of information, planning and coordination of supervisory activities between the various national authorities involved in the supervision of banking groups carrying out activities within the EU. This Directive also provides provisions for information exchanges between EU banking supervisors and other authorities, persons or bodies within and outside the EU. The specific content and procedures for this exchange of information are set out in Delegated Regulation 2016/98 and in Implementing Regulation 2016/99. Furthermore, the ESAs continue developing the single rulebook applicable to all 28 Member States so as to ensure that supervisory practices are consistent across the whole Union. Finally, the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is directly supervising the largest (so-called ‘significant’) banks in the euro area and in non-euro area EU countries that decided to join SSM through “close cooperation”, supplements the monetary union by further strengthening supervisory consistency across the euro area. The SSM is fully in place from 4 November 2014. For EU banking groups, the home/host supervisor coordination procedures and colleges of supervisors continue to exist as they were previously, except for parts of the group which are located in the euro area and which are significant institutions. For these banks, the ECB is the sole member of the college and a consolidating supervisor if the group is headquartered in the euro area. In case of banking groups located outside the SSM the ECB has the role of the “host supervisor” for all the euro area jurisdictions. This has led to elimination of supervisory colleges for significant groups with activities within the euro area and to a single, and thus more efficient, representation of the euro area supervision of the EU and global banking groups. The SSM is in the process of concluding multiple MoU with third country supervisory authorities which concerns supervisory cooperation and information exchange both within and outside the context of colleges. For less significant banking groups the national competent authorities remain fully fledged members of the college as either “consolidating supervisor” or the host supervisor. The EBA participates in supervisory college meetings and provides regular assessments of the functioning of supervisory colleges. As regards the insurance sector, Solvency II provisions on supervisory colleges apply since 1 January 2016 (see answer to Q8), and EIOPA adopted detailed guidelines on information exchanges in supervisory colleges. EIOPA takes part in supervisory colleges, and is more generally helping supervisory convergence in the EU. In the case of financial conglomerate Directive 2002/87 (FiCoD) provides that the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of regulated entities in a financial conglomerate and the competent authority appointed as the coordinator for that financial conglomerate shall cooperate closely with
### III. Enhancing supervision

#### 9. Supervisory exchange of information and coordination

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| Relevant web-links | |
| Web-links to relevant documents | |
| On the exchanges of information for supervisory purposes: | |
## III. Enhancing supervision

### 10. Strengthening resources and effective supervision

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

We agreed that supervisors should have strong and unambiguous mandates, sufficient independence to act, appropriate resources, and a full suite of tools and powers to proactively identify and address risks, including regular stress testing and early intervention. (Seoul)

Supervisors should see that they have the requisite resources and expertise to oversee the risks associated with financial innovation and to ensure that firms they supervise have the capacity to understand and manage the risks. (FSF 2008)

Supervisory authorities should continually re-assess their resource needs; for example, interacting with and assessing Boards require particular skills, experience and adequate level of seniority. (Rec. 3, FSB 2012)

**Remarks**

Jurisdictions should indicate any steps taken on recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 (i.e. supervisory strategy, engagement with banks, improvements in banks’ IT and MIS, data requests, and talent management strategy respectively) in the FSB thematic peer review report on supervisory frameworks and approaches to SIBs (*May 2015*).

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<td>Implementation ongoing</td>
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<td>Implementation completed as of <em>01.01.2014</em></td>
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The EU has put in place a comprehensive set of rules concerning effective supervision. Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV) requires the Member States to ensure that the supervisory authorities have all the necessary expertise, resources, operational capacity, powers and independence to carry out their tasks (Article 4(4) CRD IV). It further lists the general powers and measures that supervisors shall have (Art. 102-104), including the power to impose penalties (Art. 18 and 64) and the procedure to follow to carry out banks’ supervision (Art. 97-98). Among the powers entrusted to supervisors, there is the obligation to carry out stress testing at least annually (Art. 100). Primary legislation has been complemented principally by the EBA guidelines on supervisory review and evaluation process, applicable since January 2016, and its revised guidelines applicable since January 2019. The founding regulation of the European Banking Authority mandates the EBA “to monitor new and existing financial activities” and “to adopt guidelines and recommendations with a view to promoting the safety and soundness of markets and convergence in regulatory practice”. The EBA has launched several initiatives on FinTech and is reflecting on which, if any, regulatory and/or supervisory actions are needed to ensure that the regulatory framework capture properly the risks carried by the use of technology in the banking sector.
### III. Enhancing supervision

#### 10. Strengthening resources and effective supervision

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<td><strong>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</strong></td>
<td><strong>In 2019, the EBA’s work will focus on a number of key priorities in FinTech. This includes assessing the risks and opportunities for financial institutions from FinTech, the impact of FinTech on the business models of institutions (such as on the resolution of credit institutions and investment firms), and examining regulatory obstacles for innovative technologies and business models.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No major development since last year. On FinTech, the EBA is gathering information and reflecting on how best to address risks carried by the use of technology in the banking sector. As regards insurance, Solvency II fully applies since 1 January 2016. In particular, Articles 27 and following of Directive 2009/138/EC set minimum requirements for domestic supervisory authorities in the EU. This Directive also sets different levels of supervisory intervention where the capital requirements are not met (Articles 137 and following). The EBA guidelines on supervisory review and evaluation process incorporate the latest developments in supervisory best practices, and expand or add certain topics, such as supervisory stress testing, IT and IRRBB risks. The revised Guidelines apply from 1 January 2019 onwards.</td>
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### Relevant web-links

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<th>Web-links to relevant documents</th>
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11. Establishing regulatory framework for macro-prudential oversight

G20/FSB Recommendations

Amend our regulatory systems to ensure authorities are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential risks across the financial system including in the case of regulated banks, shadow banks and private pools of capital to limit the build up of systemic risk. (London)

Ensure that national regulators possess the powers for gathering relevant information on all material financial institutions, markets and instruments in order to assess the potential for failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic risk. This will be done in close coordination at international level in order to achieve as much consistency as possible across jurisdictions. (London)

Remarks

Please describe major changes in the institutional arrangements for macroprudential policy (structures, mandates, powers, reporting etc.) that have taken place in your jurisdiction since the global financial crisis.

Please indicate whether an assessment has been conducted with respect to the adequacy of powers to collect and share relevant information among national authorities on financial institutions, markets and instruments to assess the potential for systemic risk. If so, please describe identified gaps in the powers to collect information, and whether any follow-up actions have been taken.

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing

Implementation completed as of 2014

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged...” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by
- Draft published as of
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since
The EU macro-prudential framework has been established gradually, via the adoption of successive important legislations: the ESRB founding Regulations -in force since December 2010- (Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010), the CRD IV/CRR macro-prudential rules and tools -in force since January 2014- and the SSM Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions) which entrusts specific macro-prudential competences to the ECB/SSM. The latter piece of legislation is in force since November 2014. Following the ESRB Regulation, the responsibility of macro-prudential oversight has been entrusted to the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). In pursuing its macro-prudential mandate, the ESRB performs a number of key activities, namely risk monitoring, risk assessment and, ultimately, if deemed appropriate, it adopts warnings and recommendations. Going forward, with the establishment of the Banking Union as of 1 November 2014 the ECB as single supervisor also has some macro-prudential competences within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM Regulation entrusts the ECB with specific macro-prudential competences to be applied within the Banking Union using the macro-prudential instruments enshrined in EU law (i.e. CRD IV/CRR macro-prudential tools). The ECB Framework Regulation further clarifies how these powers are to be implemented. The ESRB Recommendation (ESRB/2011/3) on the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities initiated the setting-up of national macro-prudential authorities. Furthermore, the regulations on capital requirements (CRD IV/CRR) that entered into force on 31 December 2013 required the Member States to designate the national macro-prudential authorities responsible for the macro-prudential instruments introduced through this legislation.
### 11. Establishing regulatory framework for macro-prudential oversight

#### Update and next steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</th>
<th>Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date</th>
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<tr>
<td>The revision of the ESRB founding regulation has been finalised in 2019. The amendment of the ESRB Regulation includes several targeted changes: On the governance of the ESRB 1) the ECB President will become the permanent chair of the ESRB; 2) the role of the Head of the ESRB Secretariat will be strengthened by reinforcing the selection procedure for the post and clarifying its role; 3) the roles of the ESRB Vice-Chairs will be strengthened. Vice-Chairs and Head of Secretariat may play a bigger role in the external representation of the ESRB and thus raising its visibility. On the ESRB membership side: 1) the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB) will become members of the ESRB General Board without voting rights. 2) Member States are granted framed flexibility as regards the nomination of the national member on the ESRB General Board with voting rights. Member States will have the choice to nominate a high-level representative from a national designated authority (an authority specifically designated for the application of macro-prudential instruments included in EU law) – if the national central bank is not a national designated authority. National Central Banks will always remain General Board members (either as voting or non-voting members). CRR2/CRD5 has been adopted in 2019. It contains targeted changes and improvements to the EU macroprudential toolset in banking. There is ongoing macroprudential activity by Member States (see the ESRB “Review of macroprudential policy in the EU in 2018”).</td>
<td>Publication of the amendments to the ESRB establishing regulation before end-2019 and application as of 1 January 2020.</td>
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#### Relevant web-links

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G20/FSB Recommendations

Authorities should use quantitative indicators and/or constraints on leverage and margins as macro-prudential tools for supervisory purposes. Authorities should use quantitative indicators of leverage as guides for policy, both at the institution-specific and at the macro-prudential (system-wide) level. (Rec. 3.1, FSB 2009)

We are developing macro-prudential policy frameworks and tools to limit the build-up of risks in the financial sector, building on the ongoing work of the FSB-BIS-IMF on this subject. (Cannes)

Authorities should monitor substantial changes in asset prices and their implications for the macro economy and the financial system. (Washington)

Remarks

Please describe at a high level (including by making reference to financial stability or other reports, where available) the types of methodologies, indicators and tools used to assess systemic risks.

Please indicate the use of tools for macroprudential purposes over the past year, including: the objective for their use; the process to select, calibrate and apply them; and the approaches used to assess their effectiveness.

See, for reference, the following documents:

- FSB-IMF-BIS progress report to the G20 on Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks (Oct 2011)
- CGFS report on Operationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments (Dec 2012)
- IMF staff papers on Macroprudential policy, an organizing framework (Mar 2011), Key Aspects of Macroprudential policy (Jun 2013), and Staff Guidance on Macroprudential Policy (Dec 2014)
- CGFS report on Experiences with the ex ante appraisal of macroprudential instruments (Jul 2016)
- CGFS report on Objective-setting and communication of macroprudential policies (Nov 2016)

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 01.01.2014

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged...” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by
- Draft published as of
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12. Enhancing system-wide monitoring and the use of macro-prudential instruments

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<td>- Primary / Secondary legislation</td>
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<td>- Regulation / Guidelines</td>
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<td>- Other actions (such as supervisory actions)</td>
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**Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions**

The adopted ESRB Recommendation ((ESRB/2013/1), OJ 2013/C 170/01) on intermediate objectives and instruments of macro-prudential policies proposed a list of intermediate objectives of macro-prudential policies and a corresponding list of instruments that can be used by macro-prudential authorities to meet the intermediate objectives. The Recommendation gives an indicative list of instruments that national macro-prudential authorities can use to fulfil their mandate. Also with the EU prudential rules for banks (CRDIV/CRR) that entered into force on 1 January 2014, the macro-prudential authorities in the EU can apply a new set of policy instruments to address financial stability risks more effectively. These legislative texts provide for a broad range of compulsory and voluntary instruments, primarily targeting capital. Member States are increasingly choosing to apply macro-prudential instruments in their jurisdictions, with many of these instruments being reciprocated by jurisdictions with material exposures to it to ensure they can take full effect. CRR2/CRD5, adopted in 2019, contain targeted changes to the macroprudential toolset for the banking sector. To assist the use of macro-prudential instruments, the ESRB has prepared the following set of documents: the ESRB Flagship Report that provides a first overview of the new macro-prudential policy framework in the EU; the ESRB Handbook which provides more detailed assistance to macro-prudential authorities on how to use the new instruments; Decision 2015/4 which sets out the process and coordination framework for preparing ESRB opinions or issuing recommendations on macro-prudential measures, notified to the ESRB by relevant authorities, in line with the CRD/CRR; recommendations on guidance for setting countercyclical buffer rates and on recognising and setting countercyclical buffer rates for exposures to third countries; a recommendation on the assessment of cross-border effects of and voluntary reciprocity for macroprudential policy measures. The ESRB updated the ESRB Handbook in 2019, taking into consideration the changes to the macroprudential toolset contained in CRR2/CRD5.

In addition, within its remit of systemic risk monitoring, the ESRB has issued, among others, a recommendation on liquidity and leverage risks in investment funds (ESRB/2017/6); a report on the macroprudential use of margins and haircuts; public warnings to 8 EU Member States on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector (2016); and public warnings and recommendations to 11 EU Member States on medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector (2019).

The ESRB regularly reports on macroprudential developments in the EU in its annual Review on Macroprudential Policy in the EU and in its Annual Report.
12. Enhancing system-wide monitoring and the use of macro-prudential instruments

**Update and next steps**

**Highlight main developments since last year’s survey**

Ongoing macro-prudential activity by Member States. Updated ESRB Handbook in early 2018. CRR2/CRD5 has been adopted by EU co-legislators in 2019. It contains targeted changes and improvements to the EU macroprudential toolset in banking, notably: (i) increased flexibility in the use of macroprudential instruments, notably the Systemic Risk buffer and Other Systemically important Institutions buffer, (ii) the elimination of the macroprudential use of Pillar 2, (iii) a clearer delineation of the scope of the Systemic Risk Buffer and Other Systemically important Institutions buffer, (iv) the clarification of the roles and responsibilities of authorities when applying measures to real estate exposures on the basis of Articles 124 and 164 of the CRR, (v) streamlined activation and reciprocation procedures of macroprudential instruments, and (vi) changes to the G-SII buffer requirements and G-SII score methodology.

After an in-depth assessment, the ESRB has issued warnings and recommendations to 11 European Economic Area countries as regards medium-term vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sector.

**Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date**

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**Relevant web-links**

**Web-links to relevant documents**

13. Enhancing regulation and supervision of CRAs

G20/FSB Recommendations

All CRAs whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes should be subject to a regulatory oversight regime that includes registration. The regulatory oversight regime should be established by end 2009 and should be consistent with the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals. (London)

National authorities will enforce compliance and require changes to a rating agency’s practices and procedures for managing conflicts of interest and assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process.

CRAs should differentiate ratings for structured products and provide full disclosure of their ratings track record and the information and assumptions that underpin the ratings process.

The oversight framework should be consistent across jurisdictions with appropriate sharing of information between national authorities, including through IOSCO. (London)

Regulators should work together towards appropriate, globally compatible solutions (to conflicting compliance obligations for CRAs) as early as possible in 2010. (FSB 2009)

We encourage further steps to enhance transparency and competition among credit rating agencies. (St Petersburg)

Implementation of this recommendation was reported to be completed by all FSB jurisdictions in the 2018 IMN survey. Given this, the reporting of progress with respect to this recommendation will not be collected in the 2019 survey.
G20/FSB Recommendations

We also endorsed the FSB’s principles on reducing reliance on external credit ratings. Standard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks should not rely mechanistically on external credit ratings. (Seoul)

Authorities should check that the roles that they have assigned to ratings in regulations and supervisory rules are consistent with the objectives of having investors make independent judgment of risks and perform their own due diligence, and that they do not induce uncritical reliance on credit ratings as a substitute for that independent evaluation. (Rec IV, 8, FSF 2008)

We reaffirm our commitment to reduce authorities’ and financial institutions’ reliance on external credit ratings, and call on standard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks to implement the agreed FSB principles and end practices that rely mechanistically on these ratings. (Cannes)

We call for accelerated progress by national authorities and standard setting bodies in ending the mechanistic reliance on credit ratings and encourage steps that would enhance transparency of and competition among credit rating agencies. (Los Cabos)

We call on national authorities and standard setting bodies to accelerate progress in reducing reliance on credit rating agencies, in accordance with the FSB roadmap. (St Petersburg)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the steps they are taking to address the recommendations of the May 2014 FSB thematic peer review report on the implementation of the FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings, including by implementing their agreed action plans. Any revised action plans should be sent to the FSB Secretariat so that it can be posted on the FSB website.

Jurisdictions may refer to the following documents:

- FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Oct 2010)
- FSB Roadmap for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Nov 2012)
- IAIS ICP guidance 16.9 and 17.8.25
- IOSCO Good Practices on Reducing Reliance on CRAs in Asset Management (Jun 2015)
- IOSCO Sound Practices at Large Intermediaries Relating to the Assessment of Creditworthiness and the Use of External Credit Ratings (Dec 2015).

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 31.05.2013

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by [ ]
- Draft published as of [ ]
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on [ ]
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since [ ]
### 14. Reducing the reliance on ratings

#### Progress to date

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<th>Issue is being addressed through</th>
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<td>✔ Primary / Secondary legislation</td>
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#### Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

The progress made by the EU in reducing reliance on ratings in accordance with the 2012 FSB Roadmap is summarised in the EU Action Plan to reduce reliance on ratings which was published on 12 May 2014. The overall framework in the EU to reduce reliance on CRAs has a multilayer approach, covering EU regulation on CRAs, sectoral legislation in financial services, actions by European supervisory authorities (European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), European Banking Authority (EBA) and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and by national competent sectoral authorities. In accordance with the requirements of Article 39b of the CRA3 Regulation, the European Commission adopted in October 2016 a report taking stock of the current situation in the credit rating market and assessing the impact and effectiveness of key provisions of the CRA Regulation on reducing over-reliance on credit ratings including on potential alternatives to external credit ratings. The report encouraged supervisors to continue promoting mitigation of mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by ensuring that market participants use additional tools (such as those suggested in the Report) as a complement to external ratings, in order to make their own assessment of credit risk and avoid sole and mechanistic reliance on ratings. The report noted however that there are currently no feasible alternatives that could fully replace external credit ratings.

If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide **reasons for delayed implementation**
## 14. Reducing the reliance on ratings

### Update and next steps

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</th>
<th>Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date</th>
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<td></td>
<td>The Commission will continue to monitor the impact of the CRA III Regulation requirements in cooperation with ESMA, with a view to mitigating any risks of excessive reliance on credit ratings in financial services legislation.</td>
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### Relevant web-links

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<th>Web-links to relevant documents</th>
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15. Consistent application of high-quality accounting standards

G20/FSB Recommendations

Regulatory, supervisors, and accounting standard setters, as appropriate, should work with each other and the private sector on an ongoing basis to ensure consistent application and enforcement of high-quality accounting standards. (Washington)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the accounting standards that they follow and whether (and on what basis) they are of a high and internationally acceptable quality (e.g. equivalent to IFRSs as published by the IASB), and provide accurate and relevant information on financial position and performance. They should also explain the system they have for enforcement of consistent application of those standards.

Jurisdictions may want to refer to their jurisdictional profile prepared by the IFRS Foundation, which can be accessed at: http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Pages/Analysis-of-the-G20-IFRS-profiles.aspx.

As part of their response on this recommendation, jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken for appropriate application of fair value recognition, measurement and disclosure.

In addition, jurisdictions should set out any steps they intend to take (if appropriate) to foster transparent and consistent implementation of the new accounting requirements for the measurement of expected credit losses on financial assets that are being introduced by the IASB and FASB.

See, for reference, the following BCBS documents:

- Supervisory guidance for assessing banks’ financial instrument fair value practices (Apr 2009)
- Guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit losses (Dec 2015)
- Regulatory treatment of accounting provisions - interim approach and transitional arrangements (March 2017)

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 01.01.2005

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by
- Draft published as of
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since

33
The EU adopted in 2002 a regulation to adopt IFRS (i.e. the IAS Regulation). Since January 2005, the IFRS are mandatory for the consolidated accounts of listed companies. Enforcement of IFRS is done by the national market authority and coordinated by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In that context in March 2019 ESMA published a Report on Enforcement and Regulatory Activities of Accounting Enforcers in 2018. Over 10 years after the adoption of the IAS Regulation, the European Commission has assessed the effects of the use of IFRS in the EU against its original aims. Its report on the evaluation to the European Parliament was published on 18 June 2015. In 2018, European Commission launched a fitness check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies, dealing inter alia with an assessment of the IAS regulation.
## 15. Consistent application of high-quality accounting standards

### Update and next steps

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<th>Highlight <strong>main developments since last year’s survey</strong></th>
<th>Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date</th>
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<td>The EU endorsed in 2018 several IFRICs and (amendments to IAS and IFRS) so that the body of EU endorsed standards is fully aligned with the standards issued by the IASB. The IASB did not issue major standards in 2018. The endorsement of the major standard IFRS 17 insurance contracts issued in May 2017 is ongoing. On expected credit loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9 the EBA issued in December 2018 a first post-implementation report on the impact of IFRS 9. The EBA will carry out further work on IFRS 9 modelling aspects to better understand the practices followed by banks and assess which aspects might merit further investigation. ESMA’s enforcement activities for 2019 will focus on consistency in the application and enforcement of the new standards which came into force in 2018 (IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers and IFRS 9 Financial Instruments) and on the disclosure of the expected impact of implementation of IFRS 16 Leases. Also, in October 2018, EIOPA published its analysis of IFRS 17 insurance contracts.</td>
<td>New standards, amendments or interpretation provided by the IASB will continue to go through due process of endorsement before becoming law in the EU.</td>
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### Relevant web-links

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<td><a href="http://www.efrag.org/Endorsement">http://www.efrag.org/Endorsement</a></td>
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G20/FSB Recommendations

Regulators should develop enhanced guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, in line with international best practices, and should encourage financial firms to re-examine their internal controls and implement strengthened policies for sound risk management. (Washington)

National supervisors should closely check banks’ implementation of the updated guidance on the management and supervision of liquidity as part of their regular supervision. If banks’ implementation of the guidance is inadequate, supervisors will take more prescriptive action to improve practices. (Rec. II.10, FSF 2008)

Regulators and supervisors in emerging markets will enhance their supervision of banks’ operation in foreign currency funding markets. (FSB 2009)

We commit to conduct robust, transparent stress tests as needed. (Pittsburgh)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should indicate the measures taken in the following areas:

- guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, including BCBS good practice documents (Corporate governance principles for banks, External audit of banks, and the Internal audit function in banks);
- measures to monitor and ensure banks’ implementation of the BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (Sep 2008);
- measures to supervise banks’ operations in foreign currency funding markets;¹ and
- extent to which they undertake stress tests and publish their results.

Jurisdictions should not provide any updates on the implementation of Basel III liquidity requirements (and other recent standards such as capital requirements for CCPs), since these are monitored separately by the BCBS.

¹ Only the emerging market jurisdictions that are members of the FSB should respond to this specific recommendation.

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 01.01.2017

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged...” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by
- Draft published as of
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since
16. Enhancing guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, including on liquidity and foreign currency funding risks

Progress to date

Issue is being addressed through

☑ Primary / Secondary legislation
☑ Regulation / Guidelines
☐ Other actions (such as supervisory actions)

Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

In December 2013, EBA adopted guidelines on Pillar 2 capital measures for lending in foreign currencies. These guidelines address the recommendation made by the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board), following its 2011 Report on lending in foreign currencies. These guidelines specify the method to be used by supervisory authorities where FX lending risk is deemed to be material and where capital measures are deemed to be an appropriate method of treating this risk. In line with the previous stress test exercises in 2014, 2016 and 2018, EBA published in June 2019, for consultation, a draft stress test methodology and respective templates to be used in the 2020 exercise. The 2020 EU-wide stress test exercise will be launched in January 2020 and results will be published by July 2020. In December 2014, EBA published guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) (EBA/GL/2014/13). These guidelines aim to provide supervisory authorities with a common European framework for SREP and risk assessment under Pillar 2. They explain how to assess the various risks to which banks are exposed, including FX lending and liquidity risks, as well the governance and internal control framework of banks for identifying, managing, monitoring risks. These guidelines entered into force in January 2016. In September 2017, EBA published its revised guidelines on internal governance (EBA/GL/2017/11). The guidelines’ objective is to further harmonise banks’ internal governance arrangements, processes and mechanisms within the EU. The guidelines provide requirements aimed at ensuring the sound management of risks across all three lines of defence (the independent risk management and compliance function) and the third line of defence (the internal audit function). They also provide further principles concerning issues such as organisational framework on a group context, internal control functions or the role of supervisors. Also in September 2017, the EBA and ESMA issued joint guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders (EBA/GL/2017/12). These guidelines set out the measures for the assessment of the suitability of members of the boards, including the CEO. The guidelines also foresee the assessment of the bank’s key function holders (i.e. the CFO and the heads of internal control functions) who have a significant influence over the direction of the business. Both sets of guidelines will enter into force on 30 June 2018 and are applied by EU Member States on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. Finally, in February 2019, the EBA issued Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements (EBA/GL/2019/02), which set out provisions for
16. Enhancing guidance to strengthen banks’ risk management practices, including on liquidity and foreign currency funding risks

Update and next steps

Highlight main developments since last year’s survey

New stress test methodology and stress test results published in 2018 and new draft stress test methodology published for consultation in 2019 (see details above); amendments to the Commission Implementing Regulation on additional liquidity monitoring metrics (publication in 2017).

Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

Relevant web-links

Web-links to relevant documents

Regulation No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CRR): http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN
17. Enhanced risk disclosures by financial institutions

**G20/FSB Recommendations**

Financial institutions should provide enhanced risk disclosures in their reporting and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, consistent with international best practice, as appropriate. (Washington)

We encourage further efforts by the public and private sector to enhance financial institutions’ disclosures of the risks they face, including the ongoing work of the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force. (St. Petersburg)

**Remarks**

Jurisdictions should indicate the status of implementation of the disclosures requirements of IFRSs (in particular IFRS 7 and 13) or equivalent. Jurisdictions may also use as reference the recommendations of the October 2012 report by the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force on Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks and Implementation Progress Report by the EDTF (Dec 2015), and set out any steps they have taken to foster adoption of the EDTF Principles and Recommendations.

In addition, in light of the new IASB and FASB accounting requirements for expected credit loss recognition, jurisdictions should set out any steps they intend to take (if appropriate) to foster disclosures needed to fairly depict a bank’s exposure to credit risk, including its expected credit loss estimates, and to provide relevant information on a bank’s underwriting practices. Jurisdictions may use as reference the recommendations in the report by the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force on the Impact of Expected Credit Loss Approaches on Bank Risk Disclosures (Nov 2015), as well as the recommendations in Principle 8 of the BCBS Guidance on credit risk and accounting for expected credit losses (Dec 2015).

In their responses, jurisdictions should not provide information on the implementation of Basel III Pillar 3 requirements, since this is monitored separately by the BCBS.

**Progress to date**

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 2017

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

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17. Enhanced risk disclosures by financial institutions

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**Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions**

In the European Union listed banks are required to use IFRS for their consolidated accounts, by virtue of the IAS Regulation and the subsequent adoption of individual IFRS standards. The most relevant standards for risk disclosure are IAS 32, IFRS 7 and IFRS 13 all adopted in the EU. IFRS 9 was endorsed by the EU through Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/2067 and has entered into force on 1 January 2018.

If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide **reasons for delayed implementation**.
17. Enhanced risk disclosures by financial institutions

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<tr>
<td>In addition to 2017 EBA guidelines with a “comply or explain” status on expected credit loss (ECL) provisioning under IFRS 9, the EBA issued in January 2018 final Guidelines on disclosure requirements of IFRS 9 transitional arrangements.</td>
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**Relevant web-links**

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</table>
G20/FSB Recommendations

National deposit insurance arrangements should be reviewed against the agreed international principles, and authorities should strengthen arrangements where needed. (Rec. V.9, FSF 2008)

Remarks

Jurisdictions that have not yet adopted an explicit national deposit insurance system should describe their plans to introduce such a system.

All other jurisdictions should describe any significant design changes in their national deposit insurance system since the issuance of the revised IADI Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (November 2014).

In addition, jurisdictions should indicate if they have carried out a self-assessment of compliance (based on IADI’s 2016 Handbook) with the revised Core Principles:

- If so, jurisdictions should highlight the main gaps identified and the steps proposed to address these gaps;
- If not, jurisdictions should indicate any plans to undertake a self-assessment exercise.

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 03.07.2015

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by [ ]
- Draft published as of [ ]
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on [ ]
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since [ ]
### 18. Strengthening of national deposit insurance arrangements

**Progress to date**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue is being addressed through</th>
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<tr>
<td>✔ Primary / Secondary legislation</td>
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**Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions**

The Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSD) maintains the harmonised level of coverage (€ 100 000) and harmonises the scope of coverage (i.e. specify depositors and products being eligible or ineligible for DGS protection), gradually reduces the pay-out deadline from 20 to 7 working days (by 2024), strengthens the financing of DGS by introducing a principle of ex-ante financing with a specified target fund level (0.8% of covered deposits to be reached until 2024), allows for the partial use of DGS funds for early intervention, failure prevention, and bank resolution, as well as the transfer of deposits in liquidation, introduces an obligation to apply risk-based contributions in Member States, improves depositor information, and enhances cross-border cooperation between EU schemes. All Member States have fully transposed the DGSD into their national laws. To further support the application of the DGSD the European Banking Authority (EBA) published a number of guidelines over the past three years (guidelines on methods for calculating contributions to DGS, on payment commitments, on stress tests of DGS and on cooperation agreements between DGS).
### Update and next steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On 24 November 2015 the Commission proposed to set up a “European Deposit Insurance Scheme” (EDIS) as the third pillar of a fully-fledged banking union, alongside the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The EDIS proposal forms part of a wider package including a number of risk reduction measures, designed to further strengthening the Banking Union. The EDIS proposal builds on the system of national DGS regulated by the DGS. This system already ensures that all deposits up to €100,000 are protected through national DGS all over the EU. EDIS would provide a stronger and more uniform degree of insurance cover in the euro area. This would reduce the vulnerability of national DGS to large local shocks, ensuring that the level of depositor confidence in a bank would not depend on the bank’s location and weakening the link between banks and their national sovereigns. According to the proposal, EDIS would develop in different stages and its support would progressively increase over time. At the final stage of the set-up, the protection of bank deposits would be fully financed by EDIS, supported by a close cooperation with national DGS. EDIS would be mandatory for euro area Member States and open to non-euro area Members States willing to join the Banking Union. A full EDIS is envisaged in 2024. To encourage progress in the negotiations, the Commission proposed in its Communication on completing the Banking Union of 11 October 2017 to introduce EDIS more gradually compared with the original proposal of November 2015. In a first phase, EDIS would only provide liquidity support which would need to be repaid by national DGSs. In a second phase EDIS would start sharing losses. The transition to this second phase would be contingent on a set of conditions, including an asset quality review (AQR). The proposed ideas try to address concerns raised in the European Parliament and the Council, in particular with respect to existing legacy risks on banks’ balance sheets. The endgame should be a fully-fledged EDIS with both 100% liquidity and loss coverage as proposed in the original EDIS proposal of November 2015. The Euro Summit of 29 June 2018 concluded that “adhering to all elements of the 2016 roadmap in the appropriate sequence, work should start on a roadmap for the completion of the Banking Union and a second phase of EDIS in 2022.”</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing discussion in the High-level Working Group of the Member States on a roadmap for beginning political negotiations on EDIS. Ongoing work of the Commission’s services on the review of the DGSD.</td>
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### Relevant web-links

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Web-links to relevant documents</th>
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</table>
19. Enhancing market integrity and efficiency

G20/FSB Recommendations
We must ensure that markets serve efficient allocation of investments and savings in our economies and do not pose risks to financial stability. To this end, we commit to implement initial recommendations by IOSCO on market integrity and efficiency, including measures to address the risks posed by high frequency trading and dark liquidity, and call for further work by mid-2012. (Cannes)

Remarks
Jurisdictions should indicate whether high frequency trading and dark pools exist in their national markets.

Jurisdictions should indicate the progress made in implementing the recommendations:

- on the impact of technological change in the IOSCO Report on Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency (Oct 2011).
- on market structure made in the IOSCO Report on Regulatory issues raised by changes in market structure (Dec 2013).

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<th>Progress to date</th>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>☐ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment</td>
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<tr>
<td>☑ Implementation ongoing</td>
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If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify:

- Draft in preparation, expected publication by [date]
- Draft published as of [date]
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on [date]
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since [date]

European Union
03.01.2018
The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR, entered into application on 3 July 2016) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive and Regulation (commonly referred to as the MiFID II framework, in application since 3 January 2018) have strongly enhanced the transparency and integrity of European financial markets, including for derivatives, commodity derivatives and OTC transactions. MiFID II also contains measures specifically targeted at investment firms that engage in algorithmic trading and algorithmic trading techniques.

In addition, to foster market efficiency and reduce market fragmentation, the EU has taken a few equivalence decisions (e.g. with regard to trading venues in Singapore offering derivatives under the trading obligation).
19. Enhancing market integrity and efficiency

**Update and next steps**

**Highlight main developments since last year’s survey**
Adoption of the outstanding secondary legislation including implementing measures under MAR and MiFID II/MiFIR. ESMA provides ongoing support for implementation of MAR and MiFID/MiFIR through supervisory guidance in form of guidelines and Q&As as well as opinions (position limits and ancillary services). Successful entry into application on January 2018 without a disruptive impact of financial markets.

**Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date**
The European Commission sent on 20 March 2019 a formal request to ESMA for technical advice on the review of the MAR with a deadline to provide their advice before the end of 2019. The Commission also sent a mandate in June 2019 to ESMA to draft a report for the MiFID/MiFIR review provisions as referred to in the legislation.

**Relevant web-links**

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<th>Web-links to relevant documents</th>
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20. Regulation and supervision of commodity markets

G20/FSB Recommendations
We need to ensure enhanced market transparency, both on cash and financial commodity markets, including OTC, and achieve appropriate regulation and supervision of participants in these markets. Market regulators and authorities should be granted effective intervention powers to address disorderly markets and prevent market abuses. In particular, market regulators should have, and use formal position management powers, including the power to set ex-ante position limits, particularly in the delivery month where appropriate, among other powers of intervention. We call on IOSCO to report on the implementation of its recommendations by the end of 2012. (Cannes)

We also call on Finance ministers to monitor on a regular basis the proper implementation of IOSCO’s principles for the regulation and supervision on commodity derivatives markets and encourage broader publishing and unrestricted access to aggregated open interest data. (St. Petersburg)

Remarks
Jurisdictions should indicate whether commodity markets of any type exist in their national markets.

Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken to implement the principles found in IOSCO’s report on Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of Commodity Derivatives Markets (Sep 2011).

Jurisdictions, in responding to this recommendation, may also make use of the responses contained in the update to the survey published by IOSCO in September 2014 on the principles for the regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets.

Progress to date
- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 03.01.2018

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged…” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify
- Draft in preparation, expected publication by
- Draft published as of
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since
On 1 December 2016, the European Commission adopted two Delegated Regulations as part of the MiFID II rulebook, based on the draft regulatory technical standards (‘RTS’) of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In particular, the RTS define parameters for competent authorities to determine “position limits”, i.e. the maximum amount of commodity derivatives that can be held by a single trader, and which represent a tool to help to limit commodity speculation, support orderly pricing and prevent market abuse. The rules establish a “baseline” and maximum bands of deviation on either side of the baseline, to be set by the competent regulators in line with observed price volatility in the underlying commodity markets. The standard also contains several chapters to cater for the “illiquid” derivative contracts, i.e. where open interest levels are low or where there a few market participants. Moreover, the new standards contain an explicit reference to how volatility should be considered by NCAs. In particular, authorities should seek to minimise volatility or at least review their limits more often in cases of excessive volatility. The new rules also ensure that large non-financial firms trading a large amount of commodity derivatives are regulated under MiFID II (through the “ancillary activity test”). This “ancillary test” represents a ratio between (i) the capital that would need to be allocated under CRR for the firm to engage in speculative derivatives trading versus (ii) the capital employed to conduct a firm’s main business. The market abuse regime strengthens the existing market abuse framework applying to commodities.
**20. Regulation and supervision of commodity markets**

### Update and next steps

<table>
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<th>Highlight main developments since last year’s survey</th>
<th>Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date</th>
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<td>MiFID2 entered into force on 3rd January 2018 and the delegated acts setting the rules for the implementation of the new framework are being applied since then. These include the following elements: 1.. The methodology allowing national competent authorities to set limits on the positions that any person can hold at any time on a commodity derivative; 2.. The methodology allowing non-financial entities to calculate the size of their non-hedging activities to notify to their competent authorities that these are ancillary to their main activity (or, in the contrary, to ask for a license as investment firm); 3.. The reporting standards for the publication of “Commitment of Traders” reports by operators of trading venues.</td>
<td>The Commission sent a mandate to ESMA to deliver a review report on the commodity derivatives position limits and management review under MiFID. This report shall be delivered in March 2020.</td>
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### Relevant web-links

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<tr>
<th>Web-links to relevant documents</th>
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21. Reform of financial benchmarks

G20/FSB Recommendations

We support the establishment of the FSB’s Official Sector Steering Group to coordinate work on the necessary reforms of financial benchmarks. We endorse IOSCO’s Principles for Financial Benchmarks and look forward to reform as necessary of the benchmarks used internationally in the banking industry and financial markets, consistent with the IOSCO Principles. (St. Petersburg)

Collection of information on this recommendation will continue to be deferred given the ongoing reporting of progress in this area by the FSB Official Sector Steering Group, and ongoing IOSCO work to review the implementation of the IOSCO Principles for Financial Benchmarks.
G20/FSB Recommendations

We agree that integration of financial consumer protection policies into regulatory and supervisory frameworks contributes to strengthening financial stability, endorse the FSB report on consumer finance protection and the high level principles on financial consumer protection prepared by the OECD together with the FSB. We will pursue the full application of these principles in our jurisdictions. (Cannes)

Remarks

Jurisdictions should describe progress toward implementation of the OECD’s G-20 high-level principles on financial consumer protection (Oct 2011).

Jurisdictions may refer to OECD’s September 2013 and September 2014 reports on effective approaches to support the implementation of the High-level Principles as well as the G20/OECD Policy Guidance on Financial Consumer Protection in the Digital Age, which provides additional effective approaches for operating in a digital environment. The effective approaches are of interest across all financial services sectors – banking and credit; securities; insurance and pensions – and consideration should be given to their cross-sectoral character when considering implementation. In the case of private pensions, additional guidance can be found in the Good Practices on the Role of Pension Supervisory Authorities in Consumer Protection Related to Private Pension Systems.

Jurisdictions should, where necessary, indicate any changes or additions that have been introduced as a way to support the implementation of the High-level Principles, to address particular national terminology, situations or determinations.

Progress to date

- Not applicable
- Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment
- Implementation ongoing
- Implementation completed as of 23/2/2018 (IDD), 21

If “Not applicable” or “Applicable but no action envisaged...” has been selected, please provide a brief justification

If “Implementation ongoing” has been selected, please specify
- Draft in preparation, expected publication by
- Draft published as of
- Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on
- Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since

52
## 22. Enhancing financial consumer protection

### Progress to date

| Issue is being addressed through | ✓ Primary / Secondary legislation | ✓ Regulation / Guidelines | ✓ Other actions (such as supervisory actions) |

### Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline/other actions

The Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) covers inter alia direct sales by insurers and intermediaries and aims at enhancing the internal market in insurance distribution and providing for a more effective protection of consumers when purchasing insurance products. The Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) improves the information given to the consumer at pre-contractual stage by the means of a standardised sheet with user-friendly, detailed information on the characteristics of the loan on offer, including specific warnings in the case of variable rate loans and foreign currency loans; it also provides for a list of standard information at the advertising stage. The MCD obliges creditors to conduct a thorough, documented creditworthiness assessment based on defined criteria and to exercise reasonable forbearance before foreclosure proceedings are initiated against borrowers that have fallen into arrears, with further details provided in two sets of Guidelines developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and its 28 national authorities. The Directive also sets important principles to guarantee that creditors and credit intermediaries act in the consumer’s interests, imposes high-level standards regarding their remuneration structure and requires specific disclosures to the consumer as regards the nature of the links between creditors and credit intermediaries. The Directive requires Member States to designate the national competent authorities and grant them investigating and enforcement powers and adequate resources. Moreover, the Directive grants consumers a generalized right to repay early under certain conditions and establishes with few exceptions a product tying ban. Insurance ancillary products can be taken out from an alternative supplier provided the level of protection is equivalent. Borrowers who took out a foreign currency mortgage benefit either from the right to convert under certain conditions or alternative arrangements to limit the exchange fluctuation risks. MiFID II which has been applicable since 3 January 2018 introduces better organisational and business conduct requirements for investment firms, such as client asset protection, stricter conflict of interest rules, remuneration policy and product governance requirements. It also sets additional requirements with regard to information to clients about costs and financial instruments. Furthermore, limitations are imposed on the receipt of inducements with more stringent rules for independent advisors and portfolio managers. The Payment Accounts Directive (PAD) 2014/92/EU of 23 July 2014 concerns three areas: - Comparability of payment account fees: the aim is to make it easier for consumers to compare the fees charged by banks and other payment service providers in the EU on payment accounts; - Switching between payment accounts: the aim is to establish a simple and quick procedure for changing from one payment account to another, with a different bank or financial institution at national level and to help consumers who close their bank account in one Member State and open another account in a different country. - Access to payment accounts: the aim is to allow all EU consumers, irrespective of their country of residence in the EU, to open a basic payment account that allows them to perform essential operations (like receiving their salary or pension, transferring funds to another account, withdrawing cash or using debit cards) unless he/she already holds an account in this Member State. The Directive requires Member States to designate the national competent authorities and grant them investigating and enforcement powers and adequate resources. PAD also introduces an obligation for competent authorities of different Member States to cooperate with each other. The revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2) EU/2015/2366, which has been applicable since 13 January 2018, aims at improving the existing rules and also takes new digital payment services into account. The directive includes provisions to

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If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide **reasons for delayed implementation**.
22. Enhancing financial consumer protection

Update and next steps

Highlight main developments since last year’s survey

Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date

**IDD**: Transposition into national law: 1 July 2018. All Member States, except one, have notified full transposition. Application of national provision from 1 October 2018, at the latest. The Commission has adopted and published the level 2 measures. EIOPA provides ongoing implementation support by means of guidelines and Q&As.

**MCD**: Adopted in 2014. All Member States have now transposed the Directive. A contract for the review of the Directive was awarded on 30 July 2019.

**MiFID II**: The Commission has adopted and published the level 2 measures. ESMA provides ongoing implementation support by means of guidelines and Q&As, including measures adopted with regard to product intervention.

**PAD**: was adopted in 2014. Deadline for transposition by Member States was 18 September 2016. As of July 2019, PAD has been transposed by all Member States. The European Commission has adopted and published regulatory technical standards and implementing technical standards regarding the standardised terminology of services and common format and symbol of the fee information document (FID) and statement of fees (SOF). A

Relevant web-links

**Web-links to relevant documents**

- **MCD**: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/mortgage-credit-directive-2014-17-eu_en
- **PRIIPs Commission’s Delegated Regulation**
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<th>VIII</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>X</th>
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</thead>
</table>

List of abbreviations used
Sources of recommendations

- Buenos Aires: G20 Leaders’ Communique (27 November 2018)
- Hamburg: G20 Leaders’ Communique (7-8 July 2017)
- Hangzhou: G20 Leaders’ Communique (4-5 September 2016)
- Antalya: G20 Leaders’ Communique (15-16 November 2015)
- Brisbane: G20 Leaders’ Communique (15-16 November 2014)
- St Petersburg: The G20 Leaders’ Declaration (5-6 September 2013)
- Los Cabos: The G20 Leaders’ Declaration (18-19 June 2012)
- Cannes: The Cannes Summit Final Declaration (3-4 November 2011)
- Seoul: The Seoul Summit Document (11-12 November 2010)
- Toronto: The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration (26-27 June 2010)
- Pittsburgh: Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit (25 September 2009)
- London: The London Summit Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (2 April 2009)
- FSB 2012: The FSB Report on Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision (1 November 2012)