

Jurisdiction: Brazil

2015 IMN Survey of National Progress in the Implementation of G20/FSB Recommendations

- I. <u>Hedge funds</u>
- II. <u>Securitisation</u>
- III. <u>Enhancing supervision</u>
- IV. Building and implementing macroprudential frameworks and tools

- V. Improving oversight of credit rating agencies (CRAs)
- VI. Enhancing and aligning accounting standards
- VII. <u>Enhancing risk management</u>
- VIII. Strengthening deposit insurance
- IX. Safeguarding the integrity and efficiency of financial markets
- X. Enhancing financial consumer protection
- XI. <u>Reference to source of recommendations</u>
- XII. List of Abbreviations



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
I.	Hedge funds				
1 (2)	Registration, appropriate disclosures and oversight of hedge funds	We also firmly recommitted to work in an internationally consistent and non- discriminatory manner to strengthen regulation and supervision on hedge	Jurisdictions should indicate the progress made in implementing the high level principles contained in IOSCO's <u>Report</u> <u>on Hedge Fund Oversight (Jun 2009)</u> .	 Not applicable Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment Implementation ongoing: 	If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation:
		funds. (Seoul) Hedge funds or their managers will be registered and will be required to disclose appropriate information on an ongoing basis to supervisors or regulators, including on their leverage, necessary for assessment of the systemic risks they pose individually or collectively. Where appropriate registration should be subject to a minimum size. They will be subject to oversight to ensure that they have adequate risk management. (London)	 In particular, jurisdictions should specify whether: Hedge Funds (HFs) and/or HF managers are subject to mandatory registration Registered HF managers are subject to appropriate ongoing requirements regarding: Organisational and operational standards; Conflicts of interest and other conduct of business rules; Disclosure to investors; and Prudential regulation. 	 ☐ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress : ☐ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: ☐ Draft published as of: ☐ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ☐ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2004 Issue is being addressed through : ☐ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Assessment routines have been embedded in the CVM's Risk Based Supervision framework. Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: All investment funds in Brazil are subject to the same ground rules of Instruction CVM 409 of 2004, which establishes the basic rules for specific types of 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: CVM has launched a task force with ANBIMA (Brazilian Association of Open Market Institutions) to analyse the effectiveness of current regulation on funds' leverage and to propose new rules if necessary. The first meeting of the task force took place in April 2015 and its outcomes are expected by December 2015 for inclusion in CVM's 2016 regulatory priorities. Web-links to relevant documents:



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				structured funds. Any fund intending to	
				act as a hedge fund will have to comply	
				with rules related to portfolio	
				composition (including limits on	
				concentration by issuer and by asset	
				type), information disclosure etc. Rules	
				include the requirement of a monthly	
				report to CVM on the detailed	
				composition of the portfolio held by the	
				fund (information is also made available	
				to the public with a maximum delay of	
				90 days), risk management measures	
				(such as VaR, duration, stress test results	
				and identification of main	
				counterparties). In particular, a 2012	
				amendment to Instruction CVM 409	
				clarified and increased the duties of fund	
				operators with regard to liquidity risk	
				management.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Supervisory action has been taken in	
				order to check that compliance with rules	
				and assessment routines have been	
				embedded in the CVM's Risk Based	
				Supervision framework.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				Instruction CVM	
				409:http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				cvm/subportal_ingles/menu/investors/ane	
				xos/CVM-Instruction-409.pdf	
				Instruction CVM 555 will enter into	
				force on 1st October 2015 and replace	
				Instruction CVM 409. An English	
				version of Instruction CVM 555 is not	
				available yet. The point mentioned above	
				will not be affected.	
				Additional questions:	
				1. Please indicate whether Hedge Funds (HFs) are domiciled locally and, if available, the size of the industry in terms of Assets under Management and number of HFs.	
				All funds traded in Brazil are required by	
				law to be locally domiciled. Given the	
				specific features of Brazilian regulation,	
				no domestic fund category fits entirely	
				the Hedge Fund description provided by	
				IOSCO. Therefore, no specific	
				assessment is made on the size of Hedge	
				Funds because such categorization is	
				irrelevant for supervisory purposes as all	
				funds are subject to the same rules.	
				2. Please specify the main criteria and numerical thresholds (if applicable) for subjecting HFs and/or HF managers to mandatory registration.	
				All funds and fund managers are subject	
				to mandatory registration at CVM.	



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				3. Please specify whether registered HF managers are subject to ongoing requirements regarding organisational and operational standards; conflicts of interest and other conduct of business rules; disclosure to investors; and prudential regulation. If any of these requirements are not applicable, please explain.	
				Fund managers are subject to all	
				requirements listed above except	
				prudential regulation.	
				4. Please describe the main challenges (where relevant) and any lessons learned in implementing this reform.	
				5. Are you monitoring the effects of this reform in your jurisdiction? If yes, please share the main findings and any related policy initiatives in response to those findings.	



(3) ⁱ i	Establishment of international	We ask the FSB to develop mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing	Jurisdictions should indicate the progress	□ Not applicable	If this recommendation has not yet
	information sharing framework	between relevant authorities in order to ensure effective oversight is maintained when a fund is located in a different jurisdiction from the manager. We will, cooperating through the FSB, develop measures that implement these principles by the end of 2009. (London)	 made in implementing the high level principles in IOSCO's <u>Report on Hedge</u> <u>Fund Oversight (Jun 2009)</u> on sharing information to facilitate the oversight of globally active fund managers. In addition, jurisdictions should state whether they are: Signatory to the IOSCO MMoU Signatory to bilateral agreements for supervisory cooperation that cover hedge funds and are aligned to the 2010 IOSCO <u>Principles Regarding Cross-border Supervisory</u> <u>Cooperation.</u> 	 ❑ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ❑ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: ❑ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: ❑ Draft published as of: ❑ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ❑ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2013 Issue is being addressed through : ❑ Primary / Secondary legislation ❑ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Establishment of bilateral Supervisory Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Short description of the content of the legislation / regulation/guideline: Legislation grants CVM sufficient powers to enter into international 	been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation: Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:



NoDescriptionG20/FSB RecommendationsRemarksProgress to dateNext stepsAuthority (FINRA) and with the
European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA).Authority (FINRA) and with the
European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA).Highlight main developments since last
year's survey:Highlight main developments since last
year's survey:



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3 (4)	Enhancing counterparty risk management	Supervisors should require that institutions which have hedge funds as their counterparties have effective risk management, including mechanisms to monitor the funds' leverage and set limits for single counterparty exposures. (London) Supervisors will strengthen their existing guidance on the management of exposures to leveraged counterparties. (Rec. II.17, FSF 2008)	 Jurisdictions should indicate specific policy measures taken for enhancing counterparty risk management and strengthening their existing guidance on the management of exposure to leveraged counterparties. In particular, jurisdictions should indicate whether they have implemented principle 2.iii of IOSCO <i>Report on Hedge Fund Oversight (Jun 2009)</i>. Jurisdictions should also indicate the steps they are taking to implement the new standards on equity exposures (<i>Capital requirements for banks' equity investments in funds, Dec 2013</i>) by 1 January 2017. For further reference, see also the following documents : BCBS <i>Sound Practices for Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions (Jan 1999)</i> BCBS <i>Banks' Interactions with Highly Leveraged Institutions (Jan 1999)</i> 	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ☑ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ☑ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : 2013 □ Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation □ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: Principle 2.iii of the IOSCO Report is not applicable in Brazil because funds are not allowed to take loans. CVM analyses data received from funds, from the Stock Exchange (BM&F-Bovespa) and from the trade repository CETIP on OTC transactions, in order to perform a continuous assessment of funds' leverage levels. Derivatives are the most relevant 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: The new standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposure (SA-CCR) for capital requirement purposes, published by the Basel Committee in April 2014, is expected to be implemented by end-2015 and come into force in 2016. Web-links to relevant documents:



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				source of leverage for hedge funds, and	
				most transactions are traded in an	
				exchange environment, with margin	
				requirements calculated by an	
				independent third party (the exchange	
				itself) and adjusted on a daily basis.	
				Circular BCB 3,644 of 2013 established	
				the Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA)	
				treatment for OTC derivatives, according	
				to Basel III recommendations. A risk	
				weight was also established for	
				exposures to Central Counterparties	
				(CCPs) in line with Basel III.	
				Standardized treatment of banks' credit	
				exposures to funds is compliant with	
				Basel recommendations issued in	
				December 2013. The advanced approach	
				for banks' credit exposures to funds is	
				also compliant with Basel	
				recommendations issued in December	
				2013, according to Circular BCB 3,648	
				of 2013 (translation not yet available).	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				CVM has enhanced supervision on	
				liquidity management practices of funds,	
				including a review of the adequacy of	
				stress tests conducted and actions on	
				mark-to-market practices. CVM has	
				-	
				initiated a Task Force to review	



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				regulation on funds' leverage and ways	
				of proper supervision.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/norms/brpr udential/Circular3644.pdf	



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II. Securitisatio				
4 Strengthening of (6) regulatory and car framework for monolines	Insurance supervisors should strengthen	 Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken for strengthening the regulatory and capital framework for monolines. See, for reference, the following principles issued by IAIS: ICP 13 – Reinsurance and Other Forms of Risk Transfer; ICP 15 – Investments; and ICP 17 – Capital Adequacy. Jurisdictions may also refer to: IAIS <u>Guidance paper on enterprise risk management for capital adequacy and solvency purposes (Oct 2008).</u> Joint Forum document on <u>Mortgage insurance: market structure, underwriting cycle and policy implications (Aug2013).</u> 	☑ Not applicable Currently, there are no ongoing regulation proposals or efforts' concerning monoline insurers as this type of institution does not exist in Brazil. □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment □ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : □ Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation □ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Highlight main developments since last year's survey: Web-links to relevant documents:	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:



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5 (7)	Strengthening of supervisory requirements or best practices for investment in structured products	Regulators of institutional investors should strengthen the requirements or best practices for firms' processes for investment in structured products. (Rec II.18, FSF 2008)	Jurisdictions should indicate the due diligence policies, procedures and practices applicable for investment managers when investing in structured finance instruments and other policy measures taken for strengthening best practices for investment in structured finance product. Jurisdictions may reference IOSCO's report on <u>Good Practices in Relation to</u> <u>Investment Managers' Due Diligence</u> <u>When Investing in Structured Finance</u> <u>Instruments (Jul 2009).</u> Jurisdictions may also refer to the Joint Forum report on <u>Credit Risk Transfer- Developments from 2005-2007 (Jul 2008).</u>	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment □ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2010 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation / regulation/guideline: Applicable regulation imposes the overarching duty on investment managers to act in the best interests of their clients (Instruction CVM 306 of 1999, article 14). Specific provisions can also be found in funds regulation (Instruction CVM 409 of 2004, article 65-A, included this rule in 2007, reinforcing the obligation of due diligence). CVM Investment 	If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation: Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:



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				Management Department frequently	
				issues guidance regarding the best	
				practices for compliance with the	
				mentioned rules. A point always stressed	
				in these guidance letters is the necessity	
				of having adequate expertise and access	
				to information in order to assess the	
				characteristics of the products invested.	
				This is the case of Guidance Letters 2 of	
				2010 and 6 of 2014. Circular letter 2 of	
				2010 prescribes some diligence steps with	
				regard to some assets. Resolution CMN	
				4,263 of 2013, which regulates the	
				conditions for the issuance of Structured	
				Operations Certificates (COE), presents a	
				series of provisions designed to ensure	
				the adequacy of the product to its target	
				audience and its broad understanding by	
				investors. Not only the issuer, but also	
				institutions taking part in the process of	
				distribution or negotiation of COE must	
				implement policies and procedures to	
				ensure the adequacy of the product to the	
				investors' profile, observing their needs,	
				interests and goals. In addition, it is	
				important to mention that these	
				certificates must be issued and traded	
				through CSD (Central Securities	
				Depositories), allowing transactions to be	
				monitored and processed in a transparent,	



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				safe and efficient environment.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				In December 2014, CVM has published	
				extensive guidance on best practices for	
				investing in non-sovereign debt assets.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				CVM Guidance Letter 6 of 2014 (Due dilligence in the acquisition of non- sovereign debt assets) http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/circ/sin /oc-sin-0614.html CVM Guidance Letter 2 of 2010 (Due diligence in the acquisition of credit bonds with bank counterparts "CCBs") http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/circ/sin /oc-sin-0210.html Resolution CMN 4,263 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2013/pdf/res_4263_v1_O.pdf Instruction CVM 306 http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/anexos /inst/300/inst306consolid.pdf Instruction CVM 409 http://www.cvm.gov.br/legislacao/anexos /inst/400/inst409consolid.pdf	



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6	Enhanced disclosure of	Securities market regulators should work	Jurisdictions should indicate the policy	□ Not applicable	If this recommendation has not yet
(8)	securitised products	with market participants to expand information on securitised products and	measures taken for enhancing disclosure of securitised products.	□ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment	been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation:
(8)			e	 at the moment Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : Implementation completed as of: 2012 Issue is being addressed through : Primary / Secondary legislation Regulation /Guidelines 	reasons for delayed implementation: Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:
				 □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Instruction CVM 520 of 2012 enhanced the disclosure requirements imposed by Instruction CVM 480 of 2009 on securities originators. Disclosure requirements include quarterly information on aspects such as the duration of receivables portfolio, presence of collateral, loan-to-value ratios, maturities, defaults, etc. 	



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				Instruction CVM 520 of 2012 also	
				introduced new requirements for the	
				originators' financial statements.	
				Instructions CVM 484 of 2010 and 489 of	
				2011 also enhanced disclosure	
				requirements applicable to asset-backed	
				securities funds. New requirements	
				included a quarterly report with	
				information on any facts that may have an	
				impact on the expected payment flow and	
				aspects such as the procedures taken for	
				verification of coverage of the securities	
				and results obtained. Instruction CVM	
				504 of 2011 establishes that receivables	
				funds must report to the BCB Credit	
				Bureau on receivables pools acquired.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				Instruction CVM 504 (In Portuguese) http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/l egislacao/anexos/inst/500/inst504consoli d.pdf Instruction CVM 356 on receivables funds, including amendments inserted by Instructions 484 and 489 http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/l egislacao/anexos/inst/300/inst356consoli d.pdf Instruction CVM 480 on securities originators, including amendments of Instruction CVM 520 http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/l egislacao/anexos/inst/400/inst480consoli d.pdf	





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III.	Enhancing supervision	l		•	
III. 7 (9)	Enhancing supervision Consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of SIFIs	All firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards. (Pittsburgh)	Jurisdictions should indicate: (1) whether they have identified domestic SIFIs and, if so, in which sectors; (2) whether the names of the identified SIFIs have been publicly disclosed; and (3) the types of policy measures taken for implementing consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation of the identified SIFIs. See, for reference, the following documents: BCBS: • <u>Framework for G-SIBs (Jul 2013)</u> • <u>Framework for D-SIBs (Oct 2012)</u> • <u>BCP 12 (Sep 2012)</u> IAIS: • <u>Global Systemically Important Insurers: Policy Measures (Jul 2013)</u> • <u>ICP 23– Group wide supervision</u> FSB: • <u>Framework for addressing SIFIs (Nov 2011)</u>	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ☑ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ☑ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : March, 2015 (G-SIBs) □ Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: Circular BCB 3,751 of 2015 prescribes the annual assessment of G-SIB nature by Brazilian banks. Currently, no institution headquartered in Brazil is deemed a G-SIB. Draft regulation on methodology for 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: A BCB workgroup is developing a methodology to identify and classify systemically important domestic banks (D-SIBS) based on the BCBS methodology. Regulation is expected to come into force on January 2016. Web-links to relevant documents:
				identification of D-SIBs and applicable capital charges is in preparation and expected to be published by August 2015.	



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				On financial conglomerates that could	
				pose risk to financial stability in case of	
				their failure, BCB carries out a	
				continuous and comprehensive Risk and	
				Control assessment. Its conclusions are	
				annually homologated by a committee	
				composed by senior staff of the Banking	
				Supervision Department. Off-site	
				supervisory team provides reports, red	
				flag alerts and analysis tools to be used	
				by the on-site supervisory team. BCB	
				receives information on a daily basis,	
				such as: all financial instruments issued	
				or held by financial institutions registered	
				in clearing houses or trade repositories;	
				all securities and derivatives transactions	
				registered and traded at clearing houses;	
				all securities transactions settled through	
				the Brazilian Payments System, operated	
				by BCB; all loans informed to the BCB	
				Credit Bureau; and all FX operations and	
				credit lines registered online at the BCB.	
				In terms of regulation, Resolution CMN	
				3,988 of 2011 prescribes the	
				implementation of an Internal Capital	
				Adequacy Assessment Process (Icaap) for	
				institutions with total assets exceeding	
				R\$100 billion, in order to assess risks not	
				covered by Pillar 1 requirements and the	
				need for an extra capital allocation. A	



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				guiding principle of the Brazilian	
				regulatory framework is that financial	
				institutions must implement risk	
				management structures according to the	
				complexity and nature of their operations.	
				Therefore, the regulation is more	
				demanding for larger conglomerates or	
				those whose operations are complex,	
				usual yardsticks for systemic importance.	
				Besides, BCB carries out annually a	
				comprehensive Risk and Control	
				assessment of the financial conglomerates	
				whose failure could pose risks to	
				financial stability. BCB has a broad	
				authority to conduct consolidated	
				supervision. It is empowered to supervise	
				banks on a solo and consolidated basis,	
				including all offices or entities within the	
				group, irrespective of their location or	
				legal structure. The regulatory basis and	
				the practices and procedures allow the	
				Supervisory Area in BCB to have a	
				comprehensive understanding of the	
				structure and main activities of banking	
				conglomerates. This scope includes	
				knowledge of non-financial activities and	
				supervision of affiliates of Brazilian	
				banks abroad. Any exposure of the	
				financial institution to risks involved in	
				business activities over which the BCB	



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				has no legal competence to supervise is	
				treated as a contagion risk and is included	
				in the dynamic Risk and Control	
				assessment.	
				BCB acts in coordination and exchanges	
				information with domestic and foreign	
				supervisors to attain a full view of risks	
				incurred by financial institutions. BCB	
				has entered into agreements for	
				information exchange with other	
				Brazilian regulators, such as the National	
				Superintendence of Complementary	
				Social Security (PREVIC), the Securities	
				Commission (CVM), the Internal	
				Revenue Service (RFB), and the	
				Superintendence of Private Insurance	
				(SUSEP). On home-host supervisory	
				coordination and information sharing,	
				BCB supervision has developed strategies	
				of closer communication and frequent	
				interaction with foreign supervisors	
				responsible for banks with branches that	
				have a significant presence in Brazil or in	
				jurisdictions that host significant	
				subsidiaries of Brazilian banks abroad, in	
				order to exchange information for	
				supervisory purposes. Financial	
				institutions must prepare their financial	
				statements in the form of a Prudential	
				Conglomerate, including mutual funds in	



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				which they retain substantial risks and	
				benefits, as well as securitization	
				companies over which they have direct or	
				indirect control, as a way to bring entities	
				that are in the shadow banking system to	
				the scope of financial statement	
				consolidation and BCB supervision. All	
				prudential regulation applies on a	
				consolidated basis to Prudential	
				Conglomerates.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Specific regulation on the annual	
				assessment of G-SIB condition was	
				issued on March 2015; Final regulation	
				on D-SIB condition is expected to be	
				published by August 2015 and come into	
				force on January 2016.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	



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No 8 (10)	Description Establishing supervisory colleges and conducting risk assessments	G20/FSB Recommendations To establish the remaining supervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms by June 2009. (London) We agreed to conduct rigorous risk assessment on these firms [G-SIFIs] through international supervisory colleges. (Seoul)	RemarksReporting in this area should beundertaken solely by home jurisdictionsof G-SIBs and G-SIIs.Please indicate the progress made inestablishing and strengthening thefunctioning of supervisory colleges for G-SIBs and G-SIIs using, as reference, thefollowing documents:BCBS:Principle 13 of the BCBS CorePrinciples for Effective BankingSupervision (Sep 2012)Principles for effective supervisorycolleges (Jun 2014)IAIS :ICP 25 and Guidance 25.1.1 – 25.1.6on establishment of supervisorycollegesGuidance 25.6.20 and 25.8.16 on riskassessments by supervisory collegesApplication paper on supervisorycolleges (Oct 2014)	Progress to date Ø Not applicable Brazil is not home jurisdiction of any G-SIB or G-SII. Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment Implementation ongoing: Status of progress : Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : Primary / Secondary legislation Regulation /Guidelines Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	Next steps If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation: Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:
			 on establishment of supervisory colleges Guidance 25.6.20 and 25.8.16 on risk assessments by supervisory colleges <u>Application paper on supervisory</u> 	 Regulation /Guidelines Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Highlight main developments since last 	



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				 explain. 2. Please indicate the structure of the supervisory colleges for G-SIBs/G-SIIs in your jurisdiction (core, universal, other) and the reasons why it may differ across firms. 3. Please indicate the frequency of meetings over the past year of the supervisory colleges (core, universal, other) for G-SIBs/G-SIIs in your jurisdiction. 4. Please describe the main objectives of supervisory colleges for G-SIBs/G-SIIs in your jurisdiction and the types of issues that have been discussed over the past year. (e.g. specific area(s) of risk, coordinated risk assessments, joint supervisory work, coordinated supervisory plans). In your response, please indicate briefly some of the main challenges in conducting joint risk assessments and steps taken to address them. 5. Please describe the main challenges in the functioning of supervisory colleges for G-SIBs/G-SIIs in your jurisdiction and steps taken to address them. 	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
9 (11)	Supervisory exchange of information and coordination	To quicken supervisory responsiveness to developments that have a common effect across a number of institutions,	Jurisdictions should include any feedback received from recent FSAPs/ROSC assessments on the <u>September 2012</u> BCP	 Not applicable Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date:
		supervisory exchange of information and coordination in the development of best practice benchmarks should be improved at both national and international levels. (Rec V.7, FSF 2008)	3 (Cooperation and collaboration) and BCP 14 (Home-host relationships). Jurisdictions should also indicate any steps taken since the last assessment in this area, particularly in response to relevant FSAP/ROSC recommendations.	 Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : 	Web-links to relevant documents:
		Enhance the effectiveness of core supervisory colleges. (FSB 2012)	Jurisdictions should describe any recent or planned regulatory, supervisory or legislative changes that contribute to the sharing of supervisory information (e.g. within supervisory colleges or via bilateral or multilateral MoUs).	 ✓ Implementation completed as of: 2012 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation □ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Establishment of several agreements and MoUs with domestic and foreign 	
				 Moos with domestic and foreign supervisory authorities. Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Since 1997, under provisions of Complementary Law 105 of 2001, BCB has established several agreements with other Brazilian authorities, as well as with foreign supervisors. On the domestic 	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				scope, a committee comprised of	
				Brazilian financial authorities	
				(COREMEC) was established in 2006 in	
				order to coordinate regulatory and	
				supervisory actions of BCB and the	
				federal agencies responsible for the	
				following areas: insurance, pension	
				funds, securities and exchange. BCB has	
				entered into agreements with other	
				Brazilian authorities in order to exchange	
				information and coordinate actions. To	
				date, BCB has also entered into 21	
				bilateral agreements ("memoranda of	
				understanding" – MoUs) with 26 foreign	
				supervisory authorities for exchange of	
				information. These agreements not only	
				follow the guidelines established by the	
				Basel Committee but also allow on-site	
				examinations of subsidiaries of Brazilian	
				banks abroad, as well as on-site	
				examinations performed by foreign	
				Supervisors in subsidiaries of foreign	
				institutions operating in Brazil. The	
				MoUs set out the conditions under which	
				cooperation between the signatory	
				authorities takes place, comprising in	
				general, the exchange of information	
				about supervisory issues of mutual	
				interest, on-site examinations in cross-	
				border establishments and provisions on	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				information confidentiality. Additionally	
				the BCB also participates in the core	
				colleges and Crisis Management Group	
				(CMG) of HSBC and Santander, with	
				Banco de España and Bank of England,	
				respectively, having signed a specific	
				MoU with these authorities establishing	
				policies for information sharing related to	
				resolution strategies. Brazil was deemed	
				fully compliant with BCP 25 (Home-Host	
				Relationships) in the last FSAP/ROSC	
				assessments (report published in July	
				2012).	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				Brazil: Detailed Assessment of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2 012/cr12207.pdf	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
10	Strengthening resources	We agreed that supervisors should have	No information on this recommendation		
(12)	and effective	strong and unambiguous mandates,	will be collected in the current IMN		
(12)	supervision	sufficient independence to act,	survey due to the recent publication of the		
		appropriate resources, and a full suite of	FSB thematic peer review report on		
		tools and powers to proactively identify	supervisory frameworks and approaches		
		and address risks, including regular stress	to SIBs.		
		testing and early intervention. (Seoul)			
		Supervisors should see that they have the			
		requisite resources and expertise to			
		oversee the risks associated with financial			
		innovation and to ensure that firms they			
		supervise have the capacity to understand			
		and manage the risks. (FSF 2008)			
		Supervisory authorities should			
		continually re-assess their resource needs;			
		for example, interacting with and			
		assessing Boards require particular skills,			
		experience and adequate level of			
		seniority. (Rec. 3, FSB 2012)			



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps				
IV.	IV. Building and implementing macroprudential frameworks and tools								
11 (13)	Establishing regulatory framework for macro-	Amend our regulatory systems to ensure authorities are able to identify and take	Please describe major changes in the institutional arrangements for	□ Not applicable	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date:				
(15)	prudential oversight	account of macro-prudential risks across	macroprudential policy (structures,	□ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment					
		the financial system including in the case	mandates, powers, reporting etc.) that	□ Implementation ongoing:	Web-links to relevant documents:				
		of regulated banks, shadow banks ¹ and	have taken place since the financial crisis,	Status of progress :					
		private pools of capital to limit the build up of systemic risk. (London)	including over the past year.	Draft in preparation, expected publication by:					
				□ Draft published as of:					
		Ensure that national regulators possess the powers for gathering relevant	Please indicate whether an assessment has been conducted with respect to the	☐ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on:					
		information on all material financial institutions, markets and instruments in	adequacy of powers to collect and share relevant information among different	□ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since:					
		order to assess the potential for failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic	authorities on financial institutions, markets and instruments to assess the	✓ Implementation completed as of: 2013					
		risk. This will be done in close	potential for systemic risk. If so, please	Issue is being addressed through :					
		coordination at international level in	describe identified gaps in the powers to	□ Primary / Secondary legislation					
		order to achieve as much consistency as	collect information, and whether any	☑ Regulation /Guidelines					
		possible across jurisdictions. (London)	follow-up actions have been taken.	Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify:					
				Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline:					
				A Financial Stability Committee (Comef)					
				responsible for assessing systemic risks					
				and proposing risk mitigation policies					
				was established within BCB in 2011.					

¹ The recommendation as applicable to shadow banks will be retained until the monitoring framework for shadow banking, which is one of the designated priority areas under the CFIM, is established.



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				Law 4,595 of 1964 and Complementary	
				Law 105 of 2001 assign BCB the power	
				to request any information from financial	
				institutions. Legal provisions also allow	
				BCB to enter into agreements with other	
				financial authorities, in Brazil and abroad,	
				in order to exchange information and to	
				coordinate joint supervisory actions. No	
				gap in the power of BCB to collect	
				information from financial institutions	
				has been identified. BCB receives a wide	
				array of information on a timely basis:	
				financial instruments issued or held by	
				financial institutions registered in	
				clearing houses or trade repositories;	
				securities and derivative transactions	
				registered and traded at clearing houses;	
				security transactions settled through the	
				Brazilian Payments System, which is	
				operated by BCB; all loans informed to	
				the credit bureau within BCB, in which	
				every operation above R\$1.000,00 must	
				be registered; and all FX operations and	
				credit lines registered online at BCB.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				Additional questions:	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				1. Please describe the institutional arrangements for financial stability and macroprudential policy in your jurisdiction, including whether a macroprudential authority has been explicitly identified and the respective roles and responsibilities of the central bank and other authorities.	
				Dank and other authorities. The institutional arrangement for financial stability ascribes responsibilities in financial stability coordination both to Comef, within BCB, and Coremec, where coordination with other financial regulators is obtained. National Monetary Council (CMN) is the authority responsible for issuing regulation involving financial stability issues. CMN is composed of the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and Budget and the Governor of BCB. BCB is the authority responsible for supervision and regulation of financial institutions and financial conglomerates, with no legal distinction between	
				 microprudential and macroprudential aspects of those activities. 2. If a macroprudential authority has been explicitly identified in your jurisdiction, please describe its legal basis, mandate, composition, powers (warnings, recommendations, prudential tools, powers of direction, other) and accountability 	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
	-			arrangements. Who provides the resources and analytical support for the authority's activities?	
				No authority has been given an explicit	
				and exclusive macroprudential mandate	
				in Brazil.	
				3. Is there an inter-agency body on financial stability or macroprudential matters – distinct from the designated macroprudential authority – in your jurisdiction? If so, please describe its legal basis, mandate, composition, powers and accountability arrangements. Who provides the resources and analytical support for its activities?	
				An inter-agency body, the Monetary	
				National Council (CMN), is in place	
				whose regulatory powers include	
				macroprudential matters. CMN is	
				composed of the Minister of Finance, the	
				Governor of BCB and the Planning and	
				Budget Minister. BCB acts as	
				commissioner of CMN, providing the	
				material resources and analytical support	
				for its activities. The legal basis of CMN is Law 4,595 of 1964, which assigns the	
				council ample regulatory powers over	
				financial matters. BCB also acts as	
				commissioner of another inter-agency	
				body, the Committee of Regulation and	
				Supervision of Financial Markets,	
				Securities, Insurance, and	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				Complementary Pension (Coremec), a	
				consultative forum established in 2006	
				and composed of the governor and one of	
				the deputy governors of the BCB, the	
				heads of the Securities Commission	
				(CVM) and of the Insurance (Susep) and	
				Complementary Pension (Previc)	
				authorities. Coremec does not issue	
				regulation and its mandate is limited to	
				coordinate policies and to share	
				information among financial regulators	
				and supervisors.	
				4. Please describe the extent to which the macroprudential authority (or other relevant body) is able to collect information on material financial institutions, markets and instruments in order to assess potential systemic risks. In your response, please indicate whether the authorities involved in systemic risk monitoring have specific legal powers to collect information from financial institutions (whether regulated or not) for financial stability purposes, and whether there exist dedicated information gateways (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding) to share such information among relevant authorities.	
				In addition to supervising the banking	
				sector, BCB operates the Brazilian	
				Payments System. Therefore, it is in a	
				privileged position to collect information	
				relevant to financial stability. Besides,	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				Law 4,595 of 1964 and Complementary	
				Law 105 of 2001 assign BCB the power	
				to request any information from financial	
				institutions. As for market information,	
				virtually every financial instrument is	
				registered in Brazil, and BCB is able to	
				access transactional information for each	
				and every bank with a one day lag.	
				Supervisory systems can also monitor	
				individual transactions and reconstruct	
				various bank positions such as liquidity	
				and market risk exposures, as well as	
				information provided by funds. For other	
				types of risk, information is collected in	
				monthly basis. BCB has renewed an	
				agreement with the Securities	
				Commission (CVM) in 2014, allowing	
				parties to share information, including	
				information under legal bank secrecy.	
				BCB also has access to all information	
				registered in trade repositories. Therefore,	
				no gap has so far been identified in the	
				power of BCB to collect information	
				from financial institutions.	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
12 (14)	Enhancing system-wide monitoring and the use of macro-prudential instruments	Authorities should use quantitative indicators and/or constraints on leverage and margins as macro-prudential tools for supervisory purposes. Authorities should use quantitative indicators of leverage as guides for policy, both at the institution- specific and at the macro-prudential (system-wide) level(Rec. 3.1, FSF 2009) We are developing macro-prudential policy frameworks and tools to limit the build-up of risks in the financial sector, building on the ongoing work of the FSB- BIS-IMF on this subject. (Cannes) Authorities should monitor substantial changes in asset prices and their implications for the macro economy and the financial system. (Washington)	 Please describe at a high level (including by making reference to financial stability or other reports, where available) the types of methodologies, indicators and tools used to assess systemic risks. Please indicate the use of macroprudential tools in the past year, including the objective for their use and the process used to select, calibrate, and apply them. See, for reference, the following documents: CGFS report on <i>Operationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments (Dec 2012)</i> FSB-IMF-BIS progress report to the G20 on <i>Macroprudential policy tools and frameworks (Oct 2011)</i> IMF staff papers on <i>Macroprudential policy tools and Staff Guidance on Macroprudential Policy (Jun 2013)</i>, and <i>Staff Guidance on Macroprudential Policy (Dec 2014)</i> 	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment □ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress : □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since: ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2013 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Establishment of a methodology to monitor the national financial system from a macroprudential perspective and feed into the regulatory decision process Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: Monitoring of the national financial system through a macroprudential perspective is continuous. The off-site supervisory team prepare reports, red flags and other tools of analysis to be 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: BCB is undertaking research on indicators and impact of the countercyclical buffer (triggers for turning it on and off, buffer size, impacts on credit growth; length of time series considered for emerging markets, etc.). BCB is also developing an analytical framework to support decisions on the size of the countercyclical capital buffer. Draft guidelines are in preparation. BCB develops as well continuous improvements in metodologies for non-financial corporations foreign exchange exposures and forberance. Web-links to relevant documents:



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				used by the on-site supervisory team and	
				to be addressed at the Financial Stability	
				Committee's (Comef) quarterly meetings.	
				Stress tests are also conducted on a	
				regular basis, gauging the possible effects	
				of changes in the prices of certain market	
				parameters (e.g. loans, interest rates,	
				exchange rates) in the solvency of the	
				financial system as a whole. As examples	
				of recent initiatives in this regard, BCB	
				has developed a methodology for	
				monitoring nationwide changes in real	
				estate prices and has introduced the Basel	
				3 non-risk-based leverage measure based	
				on total exposures to be disclosed by	
				banks. As for the use of macroprudential	
				instruments in 2014, BCB has set the	
				value of the Basel 3 countercyclical	
				capital buffer to zero and has reverted the	
				increase in capital requirements for	
				consumer loan exposures involving	
				longer maturities and higher loan-to-	
				value ratios that were used for	
				macroprudential purposes until August	
				2014.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				BCB has set the value of the Basel 3	
				countercyclical capital buffer to zero and	
				has reverted increase in capital	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				requirements for consumer loan	
				exposures involving longer maturities and	
				higher loan-to-value ratios.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				http://www.bcb.gov.br/?BRPRUDENTIA LFINREG	
				Additional questions:	
				1. Please describe, at a high level, the types of methodologies, indicators and reports used in your jurisdiction to identify, analyse, communicate and address systemic risks.	
				The off-site supervisory team prepares	
				reports, red flags and tools of analysis to	
				be used by the on-site supervisory team	
				and to be addressed at the Financial	
				Stability Committee's (Comef) quarterly	
				meetings. Stress test are also conducted	
				on a regular basis, gauging the possible	
				effects of changes in the prices of certain	
				market parameters (e.g. loans, interest	
				rates, exchange rates) in the solvency of	
				the financial system as a whole. As	
				examples of recent initiatives in this	
				regard, BCB has developed a	
				methodology for monitoring nationwide	
				changes in real estate prices and has	
				introduced a non-risk-based leverage	
				measure based on total exposures to be disclosed by banks.	
				uiscioseu by ballks.	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				2. Please describe the range of policy tools (prudential and other) currently available to the authorities for macroprudential purposes. ²	
				BCB has a wide list of policy tools for	
				macroprudential purposes. As Brazilian	
				banks adopt a simplified non-ratings-	
				based approach of Basel II to address	
				credit risk, BCB has ample latitude to	
				assign specific risk-weights (RW) to	
				those segments identified as sources of	
				systemic risks. For instance, in 2013,	
				BCB increased the RW for consumer	
				loan exposures involving longer	
				maturities and higher loan-to-value ratios,	
				a high-risk segment that had outgrown its	
				economic fundaments. BCB also has a	
				vast experience with administering	
				reserve requirements as a	
				macroprudential tool to deal with	
				liquidity issues. As for the Basel 3	
				framework, BCB has implemented a	
				countercyclical capital buffer.	
				3. Please indicate which tools have been deployed for macroprudential purposes over the past year, including the objective for	

² An indicative list of such tools can be found in "Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks – Progress Report to the G20" by the FSB, IMF and BIS (October 2011, <u>http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r 111027b.pdf</u>); "Staff Guidance on Macroprudential Policy" (December 2014, <u>http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/110614.pdf</u>) by IMF staff; and "Operationalising the selection and application of macroprudential instruments" (December 2012, <u>http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs48.pdf</u>) by the CGFS.



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				their use and the process used to select, calibrate, and apply them.	
				No specific macroprudential tool has	
				been used in the past year.	
				4. Please describe whether and, if so, how the relevant authorities assess the <i>ex ante</i> cost and benefits of macroprudential policies and their <i>ex</i> <i>post</i> effectiveness.	
				BCB's research team has been working	
				closely with both the prudential	
				regulation and the financial monitoring	
				teams on how to assess ex ante the costs	
				and benefits of macroprudential policies	
				and their ex post effectiveness. The	
				following papers are a result of this work:	
				1- an estimated DSGE to gauge the	
				macroeconomic impact of	
				macroprudential policies	
				(http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps	
				387.pdf), 2- a bayesian analysis of a wide range of credit-based early-warning	
				indicators	
				(http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps	
				384.pdf), and 3- an ex-post evaluation of	
				the macroprudential policies adopted to	
				curb excessive growth in the segment of	
				auto loans	
				(http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps	
				380.pdf)	



13 Enhancing regulation (16) and supervision of CRAs r r r and supervision of r	credit rating agencies (CRAs)All CRAs whose ratings are used forregulatory purposes should be subject to aregulatory oversight regime that includesregistration. The regulatory oversightregime should be established by end 2009and should be consistent with the IOSCOCode of Conduct Fundamentals.	Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures undertaken for enhancing regulation and supervision of CRAs including registration, oversight and sharing of information between national authorities. They should also indicate	 Not applicable Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment Implementation ongoing: 	If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation:
(16) and supervision of r CRAs r r r r	regulatory purposes should be subject to a regulatory oversight regime that includes registration. The regulatory oversight regime should be established by end 2009 and should be consistent with the IOSCO	measures undertaken for enhancing regulation and supervision of CRAs including registration, oversight and sharing of information between national	 Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment Implementation ongoing: 	been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation:
	regime should be established by end 2009 and should be consistent with the IOSCO	sharing of information between national		
	(London)	their consistency with the following IOSCO document:	 Status of progress: Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or logislation enproved 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:
	National authorities will enforce compliance and require changes to a rating agency's practices and procedures for managing conflicts of interest and assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process. CRAs should differentiate ratings for structured products and provide full disclosure of their ratings track record and the information and assumptions that underpin the ratings process. The oversight framework should be consistent across jurisdictions with appropriate sharing of information between national authorities, including through IOSCO. (London) Regulators should work together towards appropriate, globally compatible solutions (to conflicting compliance	 <u>Code of Conduct Fundamentals for</u> <u>Credit Rating Agencies (Mar 2015)</u> Jurisdictions may also refer to the following IOSCO documents: Principle 22 of <u>Principles and</u> <u>Objectives of Securities Regulation</u> (Jun 2010) which calls for registration and oversight programs for CRAs <u>Statement of Principles Regarding the</u> <u>Activities of Credit Rating Agencies</u> (Sep 2003) <u>Final Report on Supervisory Colleges</u> for Credit Rating Agencies (Jul 2013) 	 □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2012 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: In 2015, credit ratings are included in the regular on-site examinations schedule of the CVM's Inspections and Examinations Division. Inspection of the 3 largest CRAs is expected to take place by end-2016. Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Instruction CVM 521 of 2012 regulates 	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
		in 2010. (FSB 2009) We encourage further steps to enhance transparency and competition among credit rating agencies. (St Petersburg)		credit rating agencies in accordance with the IOSCO Code of Conduct and with Principle 22. Highlight main developments since last year's survey: Web-links to relevant documents:	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
14 (17)	Reducing the reliance on ratings	We also endorsed the FSB's principles on reducing reliance on external credit ratings. Standard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks should not rely mechanistically on external credit ratings. (Seoul) Authorities should check that the roles that they have assigned to ratings in regulations and supervisory rules are consistent with the objectives of having investors make independent judgment of risks and perform their own due diligence, and that they do not induce uncritical reliance on credit ratings as a substitute for that independent evaluation. (Rec IV. 8, FSF 2008) We reaffirm our commitment to reduce authorities' and financial institutions' reliance on external credit ratings, and call on standard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks to implement the agreed FSB principles and end practices that rely mechanistically on these ratings. (Cannes) We call for accelerated progress by national authorities and standard setting bodies in ending the mechanistic reliance on credit ratings and encourage steps that	Jurisdictions should indicate the steps they are taking to address the recommendations of the May 2014 FSB thematic peer review report on the implementation of the FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings, including by implementing their agreed action plans. Jurisdictions may refer to the following documents: • FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Oct 2010) • FSB Roadmap for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (Nov 2012) • BCBS Consultative Document Revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk (Dec 2014)	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ☑ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: ☑ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: 2016 □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : □ Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: CVM makes no use of ratings issued by credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes. The only mention to ratings in current regulation is found in regulation of receivables funds, requiring that funds hire an agency to supply ratings to funds' investors. CVM has repeatedly issued guidance to fund operators making it clear that a mechanistic reliance on 	 Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Brazilian regulation on the short-term liquidity requirement (LCR) follows standards set out by the Basel Committee, contemplating the use of external ratings in the definition of assets eligible to comprise the stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and to determine certain cash outflows that compose the denominator of the indicator. The Basel Committee's recommendations on the long-term liquidity requirement (NSFR) also refer to the use of external ratings in determining the required stable funding (RSF) for certain assets. Brazilian regulation on NSFR will also prescribe the use of external ratings for this purpose. Regulation on credit risk mitigation Web-links to relevant documents:



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
		would enhance transparency of and		external ratings would be considered as	
		competition among credit rating agencies.		non-compliant with their fiduciary duties.	
		(Los Cabos)		Regulation enacted by CVM still	
				prescribes the use of external credit	
		We call on national authorities and		ratings for the issuance of certain	
		standard setting bodies to accelerate		securitization products. However, the	
		progress in reducing reliance on credit		new regulation on asset management	
		rating agencies, in accordance with the		establishes that asset managers must carry	
		FSB roadmap. (St Petersburg)		out their own risk analysis and must have	
				the proper structure to perform such	
				procedure. Moreover, CVM intends to	
				launch a public consultation on	
				"Certificados de Recebíveis Imobiliários	
				- CRI" (Mortgage Backed Securities in	
				Brazil) in 2016. In such instance, CVM	
				may be able to withdraw the mention to	
				credit ratings with regard to this	
				securitization products as well as other	
				ones. BCB regulation on the standardized	
				approach of capital requirement for credit	
				risk prescribes the use of external ratings	
				in assigning a risk factor to sovereigns.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				In December 2014, the Investment	
				Management Division published	
				extensive guidance on best practices	
				related to the acquisition of non-	
				sovereign credit assets (CVM Circular	
				Letter 6 of 2014). Additionally,	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				Instruction CVM 558 of 2015, which will	
				be effective from January 2016, requires	
				all asset managers to have a risk	
				management sector, and appoint a	
				director whose responsibilities include	
				credit risk management.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				CVM Circular Letter 6 of 2014 (Acquisition of Private Credit Assets – in Portuguese) http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/l egislacao/circ/sin/anexos/oc-sin-0614.pdf Circular BCB 3,644 of 2013: http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/norms/brpr udential/Circular3644.pdf	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
VI.	Enhancing and alignin	g accounting standards			
15 (18)	Consistent application of high-quality accounting standards	Regulators, supervisors, and accounting standard setters, as appropriate, should work with each other and the private sector on an ongoing basis to ensure consistent application and enforcement of high-quality accounting standards. (Washington)	Jurisdictions should indicate the accounting standards that they follow and whether (and on what basis) they are deemed to be equivalent to IFRSs as published by the IASB or are otherwise of a high and internationally acceptable quality, and provide accurate and relevant information on financial performance. They should also explain the system they have for enforcement of consistent application of those standards. Jurisdictions may want to refer to their jurisdictional profile prepared by the IFRS Foundation, which can be accessed at: http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the- world/Pages/Analysis-of-the-G20-IFRS- profiles.aspx.	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment □ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2009 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: According to Law 4,595 of 1964, BCB regulates, supervises and sets accounting standards for financial institutions. Financial institutions have applied IFRS accounting principles on a consolidated basis since 2010. 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res/2009/pdf/res_3786_v1_O.pdf	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
16 (19)	Appropriate application of Fair Value Accounting	Accounting standard setters and prudential supervisors should examine the use of valuation reserves or adjustments for fair valued financial instruments when data or modelling needed to support their valuation is weak. (Rec. 3.4, FSF 2009) Accounting standard setters and prudential supervisors should examine possible changes to relevant standards to dampen adverse dynamics potentially associated with fair value accounting. Possible ways to reduce this potential impact include the following: (1) Enhancing the accounting model so that the use of fair value accounting is carefully examined for financial instruments of credit intermediaries; (ii) Transfers between financial asset categories; (iii) Simplifying hedge accounting requirements. (Rec 3.5, FSF 2009)	Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken for appropriate application of fair value accounting. Although not an application of fair value accounting, jurisdictions should additionally be mindful of implementation issues arising from the new accounting requirements for expected loan loss provisioning for impaired loans that are being introduced by the IASB and the FASB, and, for those jurisdictions where specific action is needed to foster transparent and consistent implementation, set out any steps they intend to take. See, for reference, the following BCBS documents: • <u>Basel 2.5 standards on prudent</u> valuation (Jul 2009) • <u>Supervisory guidance for assessing</u> <u>banks' financial instrument fair</u> value practices (Apr 2009)	 Not applicable Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : Implementation completed as of: 2001 Issue is being addressed through : Primary / Secondary legislation M Regulation /Guidelines Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: BCB regulation states that financial institutions are responsible for evaluating properly fair value, which must be based on consistent criteria and available for auditing, with data collected independently Highlight main developments since last year's survey: 	If this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, please provide reasons for delayed implementation: Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/cir c/2001/pdf/circ_3068_v4_P.pdf http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/cir c/2002/pdf/circ_3082_v4_P.pdf	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
VII.	Enhancing risk manag	gement			
17 (20)	Enhancing guidance to strengthen banks' risk management practices, including on liquidity and foreign currency funding risks	Regulators should develop enhanced guidance to strengthen banks' risk management practices, in line with international best practices, and should encourage financial firms to re-examine their internal controls and implement strengthened policies for sound risk management. (Washington) National supervisors should closely check banks' implementation of the updated guidance on the management and supervision of liquidity as part of their regular supervision. If banks' implementation of the guidance is inadequate, supervisors will take more prescriptive action to improve practices. (Rec. II.10, FSF 2008) Regulators and supervisors in emerging markets ³ will enhance their supervision of banks' operation in foreign currency funding markets. (FSB 2009) We commit to conduct robust, transparent stress tests as needed. (Pittsburgh)	Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken to enhance guidance to strengthen banks' risk management practices. Jurisdictions may also refer to FSB's <u>thematic peer review report on risk</u> <u>governance (Feb 2013)</u> and the BCBS <u>Peer review of supervisory authorities'</u> <u>implementation of stress testing</u> <u>principles (Apr 2012) and Principles for</u> <u>sound stress testing practices and</u> <u>supervision (May 2009).</u>	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ☑ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ☑ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : Jan.2013 (Sound Principles on Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision) □ Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: A corporate project at BCB was established to improve Supervision and Monitoring capabilities on: 1) supervisory stress test; and 2) Assessment of banks' programmes on 	 Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: BCB launched a corporate project in May 2015 on stress testing, including supervision, regulation and monitoring areas at BCB. Its main objectives are: a) improve the assessment capabilities of the financial sector under stressed conditions; b) enhance the contribution of stress testing performed by the monitoring area to the on-site supervision activities and vice-versa. The project will also assess the necessity of improvement in stress testing regulation. The monitoring area at BCB plans to integrate some monitoring tools: stress testing, contagion risk assessment and probability of default models. Web-links to relevant documents:

 $^{^{3}}$ Only the emerging market jurisdictions that are members of the FSB may respond to this recommendation.



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				stress testing. The Financial System	
				monitoring team at BCB performs stress	
				tests covering the National Financial	
				System using data reported to BCB by	
				financial institutions. The resilience of	
				the financial system to different shocks is	
				analysed and the main risks and	
				economic variables that may affect the	
				financial system or a particular institution	
				are identified.	
				Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline:	
				Resolution CMN 4,090 of 2012 provides	
				for the implementation of a liquidity risk	
				management framework. Resolution	
				CMN 4,401 of 2015 provides the	
				minimum limits for the Liquidity	
				Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the conditions	
				for compliance with the indicator.	
				Circular BCB 3,749 of 2015 establishes	
				the calculation methodology of LCR and	
				prescribes the disclosure of related	
				information.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Last year, the reform was considered	
				effective, considering only capital	
				planning and stress testing. This year, the	
				progress status was changed from reform	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				effective to final rule (for part of the	
				reform) in force since January 2013	
				(Sound Principles on Liquidity Risk	
				Management and Supervision)	
				Introduction of the short-term liquidity	
				requirement (LCR), effective from	
				October 2015, according to a schedule	
				that sets the initial minimum at 60% of	
				the calculated value and a yearly increase	
				of 10% until reaching 100% on January	
				2019.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				Regulation available in English: http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/norms/brpr udential/Circular3644.pdf (regulation for credit risk management); http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/norms/brpr udential/Resolution3464.pdf (regulation for market risk management); http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/norms/brpr udential/Resolution4090.pdf; (regulation for liquidity risk management).	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
18 (22)	Enhanced risk disclosures by financial institutions	Financial institutions should provide enhanced risk disclosures in their reporting and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, consistent with international best practice, as appropriate. (Washington) We encourage further efforts by the public and private sector to enhance financial institutions' disclosures of the risks they face, including the ongoing work of the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force. (St. Petersburg)	Jurisdictions should indicate the status of implementation of the disclosures requirements of IFRSs (in particular IFRS7 and 13) or equivalent. Jurisdictions may also use as reference the recommendations of the October 2012 report by the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force on <u>Enhancing the Risk Disclosures</u> of Banks and <u>Implementation Progress</u> <u>Report by the EDTF (Aug 2013)</u> , and set out any steps they have taken to foster adoption of the EDTF Principles and Recommendations.	 Not applicable Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ✓ Implementation ongoing: <i>Status of progress:</i> Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ✓ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : 30Jun2014, for Pillar3 Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : Primary / Secondary legislation ✓ Regulation /Guidelines ✓ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Supervisory actions to assess compliance with provisions of Circular BCB 3,678 of 2013. Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: Circular BCB 3,678 of 2013 prescribes the disclosure of information relative to the management of risks, to the calculation of Regulatory Capital, in compliance with 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Regulation based on the "Revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements" is expected to be issued by August 2016. Web-links to relevant documents:



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				the BCBS document "Composition of	
				capital disclosure requirements" of June	
				2012 and with Basel 2.5	
				recommendations. Regulation of the	
				short-term liquidity requirement (LCR)	
				prescribes the disclosure of related	
				information from April 2016.	
				Highlight main developments since last	
				year's survey:	
				Circular BCB 3,678 entered into force in	
				June 30, 2014. Regulation of the short-	
				term liquidity requirement (LCR)	
				prescribes the disclosure of related	
				information from April 2016.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				http://www.bcb.gov.br/ingles/norms/brpr udential/Circular3678.pdf	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
VIII.	Strengthening deposit	insurance	·		
	^		Jurisdictions should describe any revisions made to national deposit insurance system, including steps taken to address the following recommendations of the FSB's February 2012 <u>thematic</u> peer review report on deposit insurance systems: • Adoption of an explicit deposit insurance system (for those jurisdictions that do not have one) • Addressing the weaknesses and gaps to full implementation of the <u>Core</u> <u>Principles for Effective Deposit</u> <u>Insurance Systems</u> issued by IADI in November 2014	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment ☑ Implementation ongoing: <i>Status of progress:</i> □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: ☑ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : 2012 □ Implementation completed as of: Issue is being addressed through : ☑ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: Resolution CMN 4,222/2013 consolidates the statute and regulation of the Brazilian deposit insurance for financial institutions (Fundo Garantidor de Créditos – FGC). This resolution replaced Resolution CMN 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: After analysis by the BCB legal experts, the draft bill of law on the new resolution framework will be submitted to the National Congress. Web-links to relevant documents:
				4,115/2012. Resolution CMN 4,284/2013 consolidates the statute and regulation of Brazilian deposit insurance	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				for credit unions (Fundo Garantidor do	
				Cooperativismo de Crédito – FGCoop).	
				Resolution CMN 4,312/2014 presents	
				adjustments to both Resolution CMN	
				4,222/2013 and Resolution CMN	
				4,284/2013. Deposit insurance issues are	
				being addressed in drafts of new	
				legislation (bill of law on the new	
				resolution regime) and new regulation,	
				expanding the scope of deposit insurance	
				to non-banking institutions, enhancing	
				data to be collected by deposit insurance	
				funds, etc.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				The draft bill of law on the new	
				resolution framework and the draft	
				regulation on deposit insurance funds are	
				under analysis by the BCB legal experts.	
				Regulation on information to be collected	
				and on the scope of deposit insurance	
				fund is being drafted.	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
IX.	Safeguarding the integ	rity and efficiency of financial markets	8		
	-			 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment □ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2007 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation □ Regulation /Guidelines ☑ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Development of a new version of the market surveillance system. Short description of the content of the legislation/regulation/guideline: Brazil is compliant with all five IOSCO recommendations on market integrity and efficiency. Recommendation 1: according 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Web-links to relevant documents:
				efficiency. Recommendation 1: according to Instruction CVM 461 of 2007, trading venues must observe non-discriminatory	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				principles when setting requirements for	
				access. Access Rules are subjected to	
				CVM before entering into force.	
				Recommendation 2: control procedures	
				for trading include auctions, circuit	
				breakers and trading halts set by	
				exchange rules and Instruction CVM 168	
				of 1991. Recommendation 3: All DMA	
				and HFT orders are subject to pre-trade	
				controls set by the exchange	
				(BM&FBOVESPA). Recommendations 4	
				and 5: Operation of dark pools is not	
				permitted in Brazil. Besides, CVM is	
				currently improving its market	
				surveillance system, which is in operation	
				since December 2011. The new version	
				with new functionalities is expected to go	
				live in the 4th quarter of 2015. As for	
				recommendations to address risks posed	
				by changes in market structure, Brazil has	
				only one venue to trade equities and ETF,	
				making the Brazilian market a not	
				fragmented one. Nevertheless, CVM is	
				ready to comply with all	
				recommendations if needed, given that	
				the principles are already set in	
				Instruction CVM 461 of 2007.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				CVM 461 of 2007 (free translation into English) http://www.cvm.gov.br/export/sites/cvm/ subportal_ingles/menu/investors/anexos/ CVM-Instruction-461.pdf	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
No 21 (25)	Description Regulation and supervision of commodity markets	We need to ensure enhanced market transparency, both on cash and financial commodity markets, including OTC, and achieve appropriate regulation and supervision of participants in these markets. Market regulators and authorities should be granted effective intervention powers to address disorderly markets and prevent market abuses. In particular, market regulators should have, and use formal position management	Jurisdictions should indicate whether commodity markets of any type exist in their national markets. Jurisdictions should indicate the policy measures taken to implement the principles found in IOSCO's report on <u>Principles for the Regulation and</u> <u>Supervision of Commodity Derivatives</u> <u>Markets (Sep 2011)</u> . Jurisdictions, in responding to this	 Not applicable Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: Draft in preparation, expected publication by: Draft published as of: Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: Final rule (for part of the reform) in 	Next stepsPlanned actions (if any) and expected commencement date:Web-links to relevant documents:
		powers, including the power to set ex- ante position limits, particularly in the delivery month where appropriate, among other powers of intervention. We call on IOSCO to report on the implementation of its recommendations by the end of 2012. (Cannes)	recommendation, may also make use of the responses contained in the <u>update to</u> <u>the survey</u> published by IOSCO in September 2014 on the principles for the regulation and supervision of commodity derivatives markets.	force since : Implementation completed as of: 2007	
		we also can on Finance ministers to monitor on a regular basis the proper implementation of IOSCO's principles for the regulation and supervision on commodity derivatives markets and encourage broader publishing and unrestricted access to aggregated open interest data. (St. Petersburg)		Current regulatory framework ensures full compliance with IOSCO recommendations regarding enhanced market transparency in commodity markets. Since the 1990s all derivatives (both exchange-traded and OTC) must be registered, and Law 10,303 of 2001 brought all derivatives contracts under CVM jurisdiction. Law 12,543 of 2011	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				expressly states that unregistered	
				contracts are non-enforceable.	
				Instruction CVM 461 of 2007 grants	
				CVM powers to cancel trades that might	
				be regarded as a breach of law or a	
				violation of rules in the organized market.	
				CVM only approves commodity	
				derivatives contracts whose price-	
				reporting process of underlying assets	
				follows a robust and verifiable	
				methodology. Spot reference prices for	
				settlement purposes are published daily	
				by the Exchange (BM&FBovespa), and	
				the price reporting methodology has	
				received ISO 9001:2008 certification in	
				2011.	
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
22	Reform of financial	We support the establishment of the	Collection of information on this		
(26)	benchmarks	FSB's Official Sector Steering Group to	recommendation will continue to be		
(20)		coordinate work on the necessary reforms	deferred given the forthcoming FSB		
		of financial benchmarks. We endorse	progress report on implementation of the		
		IOSCO's Principles for Financial	FSB recommendations in this area, and		
		Benchmarks and look forward to reform	ongoing IOSCO work to review the		
		as necessary of the benchmarks used	implementation of the IOSCO Principles		
		internationally in the banking industry	for Financial Benchmarks.		
		and financial markets, consistent with the			
		IOSCO Principles. (St. Petersburg)			



No	Description G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps			
X.	X. Enhancing financial consumer protection						
X. 23 (27)	Enhancing financial consumer protection Enhancing financial consumer protection We agree that integration of financial consumer protection policies into regulatory and supervisory frameworks contributes to strengthening financial stability, endorse the FSB report on consumer finance protection and the high level principles on financial consumer protection prepared by the OECD together with the FSB. We will pursue the full application of these principles in our jurisdictions. (Cannes)	Jurisdictions should describe progress toward implementation of the OECD's <u>G-20 high-level principles on financial</u> consumer protection (Oct 2011). Jurisdictions may also refer to OECD's <u>September 2013 and September 2014</u> reports on effective approaches to support the implementation of the High-level Principles.	 □ Not applicable □ Applicable but no action envisaged at the moment □ Implementation ongoing: Status of progress: □ Draft in preparation, expected publication by: □ Draft published as of: □ Final rule or legislation approved and will come into force on: □ Final rule (for part of the reform) in force since : ☑ Implementation completed as of: 2010 Issue is being addressed through : □ Primary / Secondary legislation ☑ Regulation /Guidelines □ Other actions (such as supervisory actions), please specify: Short description of the content of the legislation/ regulation/guideline: Brazilian financial consumer protection framework is aligned with the G20 highlevel principles on financial consumer protection. In the past few years, CMN and BCB have issued several regulations 	Planned actions (if any) and expected commencement date: Currently, some studies are underway to review and improve the set of rules related to financial institutions' conduct of business in their relationship with clients, following the most recent international trends related to that theme. The National Congress is examining several proposals of changes to the Consumers Protection Code in Law 8,078 of 1990, in order to prevent undesirable over-indebtedness and to update rules of conduct in credit operations, in particular disclosure and transparency standards, responsible conducts and incentives to financial education, among other topics. Web-links to relevant documents:			



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				institutions when providing services to	
				their clients, including rules to the	
				following topics: I - adequacy of offered	
				products and services to their clients'	
				needs, interests and objectives	
				("suitability"); II - integrity, reliability	
				and confidentiality of all transactions, as	
				well as authenticity of all operations	
				agreed and services provided; III -	
				provision of all information necessary for	
				each client's decision-making process; IV	
				- full availability of contracts and	
				documents related to all operations	
				agreed and services provided; V - use of	
				clear, straightforward and adequate	
				language in contracts and other	
				documents made available to the public	
				with regard to the type and complexity of	
				the corresponding operation or service;	
				VI – clients' right to portability, including	
				procedures for transfer of wage	
				payments, client data, as well as credit	
				and leasing operations to other financial	
				institutions; VII - standardization of fees'	
				terms and descriptions associated to the	
				services most demanded by financial	
				consumers; VIII - provision of pre-	
				contractual information to financial	
				consumers, including: a) Total Effective	
				Cost (Custo Efetivo Total - "CET") in	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				credit and leasing operations, consisting	
				of a single annual percentage rate of	
				charge that takes into consideration the	
				interest rate, fees, taxes, insurance and	
				other expenses associated with the	
				operation; b) Total Effective Value	
				(Valor Efetivo Total - "VET") in foreign	
				exchange operations, defined in local	
				currency, which takes into consideration	
				the exchange rate, taxes and all fees	
				charged; c) standardized account balance	
				featuring the most relevant information	
				related to checking or payment accounts;	
				IX - transparency in credit contracts,	
				including the obligation of disclosing all	
				charges expected along the regular course	
				of the operation; X – disclosure,	
				physically in all branches and in the	
				internet homepage, of information related	
				to services and associated fees, free-of-	
				charge services, services bundles, as well	
				as credit card benefits and reward	
				programs; XI - transparency of credit	
				card statements, including the obligation	
				to disclose a list of key information; XII -	
				establishment of an ombudsman	
				component in each financial institution,	
				in order to act as a communication	
				channel with clients and to mediate	
				conflicts.	



No	Description	G20/FSB Recommendations	Remarks	Progress to date	Next steps
				Highlight main developments since last year's survey:	
				Web-links to relevant documents:	
				 web-links to relevant documents: suitability: Resolution 3.694, of 26.3.2009: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2009/pdf/res_3694_v3_P.pdf - standardization of fees: Resolution 3.919, of 25.11.2010: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2010/pdf/res_3919_v4_P.pdf - ombudsman service: Resolution 3.849, of 25.3.2010: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2010/pdf/res_3849_v1_O.pdf - credit and leasing operations portability, as well as client data portability: Resolution 3.401, of 6.9.2006, and Resolution 4.292, of 20.12.2013: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2006/pdf/res_3401_v3_P.pdf http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2006/pdf/res_4292_v1_O.pdf - wage payment portability: Resolution 3.402, of 6.9.2006: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2013/pdf/res_4292_v1_O.pdf - Total Effective Cost (CET): Resolution 3.517, of 6.12.2007: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2007/pdf/res_3517_v2_P.pdf - Total Effective Value (VET): Resolution 4.198, of 15.3.2013: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2007/pdf/res_4198_v1_O.pdf - Total Effective Value (VET): Resolution 4.198, of 15.3.2013: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2013/pdf/res_4198_v1_O.pdf - Total Effective Value (VET): Resolution 4.198, of 15.3.2013: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2013/pdf/res_4198_v1_O.pdf - Total Effective Value (VET): Resolution 4.198, of 15.3.2013: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/res /2013/pdf/res_4198_v1_O.pdf - Transparency of credit operation's contracts: Circular 2.905, of 30.6.1999: http://www.bcb.gov.br/pre/normativos/cir c/1999/pdf/circ 2905 v4 P.pdf 	





Brazil

XI. Source of recommendations:

Brisbane: G20 Leaders' Communique (15-16 November 2014)St Petersburg: The G20 Leaders' Declaration (5-6 September 2013)Los Cabos: The G20 Leaders' Declaration (18-19 June 2012)Cannes: The Cannes Summit Final Declaration (3-4 November 2011)Seoul: The Seoul Summit Document (11-12 November 2010)Toronto: The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration (26-27 June 2010)Pittsburgh: Leaders' Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit (25 September 2009)London: The London Summit Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (2 April 2009)Washington: The Washington Summit Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform (15 November 2008)FSF 2009: The FSF Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (7 April 2008)FSF 2009: The FSF Report on Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System (2 April 2009)FSB 2009: The FSB Report on Improving Financial Regulation (25 September 2009)FSB 2012: The FSB Report on Increasing the Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision (1 November 2012)

XII. List of Abbreviations used:

BCB: Central Bank of Brazil CMN: National Monetary Council Comef: Financial Stability Committee Copom: Monetary Policy Committee Coremec: Committee for Regulation and Supervision of Financial, Capital, Insurance, Pension Funds and Capitalization Markets CVM: Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil SFN: National Financial System