#				DEADLINE	PROGRESS TO DATE	PLANNED NEXT STEPS
					Explanatory notes:	Explanatory notes:
# in brackets are #					In addition to information on progress to date, specifying steps taken, please address the follow- ing questions:	Timeline, main steps to be taken and key mileposts (Do the planned next steps require legislation?)
from the 2010 template		G20/FSE	B RECOMMENDATIONS		1. Have there been any material differences from relevant international principles, guidelines or recommendations in the steps that have been taken so far in your jurisdiction?	Are there any material differences from relevant international principles, guide- lines or recommendations that are planned in the next steps?
					2. Have the measures implemented in your juris- diction achieved, or are they likely to achieve, their intended results?	What are the key challenges that your jurisdiction faces in implementing the recommendations?
					Also, please provide links to the relevant docu- ments that are published.	
I. Improvir	ng bank	capital and liquid	dity standards			
1	(Pitts)	Basel II Adoption	commit to have adopted the Basel II Capital Framework by 2011.	By 2011	Germany has adopted Basel II as of 1.1.2007.	The EU is scheduled to implement a fully harmonised framework as of 1.1.2013 ("CRD IV" contains among others Basel III).
2		Basel II trading book revision	Significantly higher capital re- quirements for risks in banks' trading books will be imple- mented, with average capital requirements for the largest banks' trading books at least doubling by end-2010. We welcomed the BCBS agree-	By end-2011	The German Finance Ministry has published for consultation changes to the relevant na- tional regulation (Solvency Ordinance, "Solva- bilitätsverordnung", SolvV) concerning banks. The consultation period for the Solvency Ordi- nance ended in Feb 2010. The draft regulation is fully consistent with the draft EU directive 2010/76/EU (which trans- poses the Basel Committee's "Revisions to the	Finalisation of the national regulation in autumn 2011 and effective by end 2011
			ment on a coordinated start date not later than 31 December 2011 for all elements of the revised trading book rules.		Basel II market risk framework" and "Guide- lines for computing incremental risk in the trad- ing book" into EU regulations).	
3 (5, 6, 8)	(Seoul)	international rules to improve bank capital and liquid- ity standards	implement fully these standards (Basel III) within the agreed time- frame that is consistent with	and fully phased	It is planned that the rules necessary to apply Basel III will be in place by 1 January 2013. The process of national implementation is strongly determined by the respective EU process ("CRD IV"). The EU Commission's draft proposal has been published in July 2011. The publication of the final EU legisla-	

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
ir		and regulations, and will be im-		ion is expected in August 2012.	
tio	ios	plemented starting on January 1,	(Currently the EU is aiming at splitting the CRD	
		2013 and fully phased in by		n a regulation and a directive part. The regula-	
		January 1, 2019.		ion part which will most likely encompass all	
()	Note) Please	balladiy 1, 2010.		billar 1 as well as the respective pillar 3 re-	
	,				
	explain develop-			quirements will be directly applicable, i.e. will	
	nents in i) capital			require no national transposition. The directive	
	tandards, ii) li-		R	part will be subject to the usual transposition	
q	uidity standards		r	process.	
a	ind iii) leverage		Ē		
	atios respec-		١	With a view of entering into force on 1 January	
	ively.			2013 and subject to the finalization of the CRD	
a a	ivery.			V the first drafts of the national implementa-	
				tion measures are expected to be available by	
				end 2011. Following a public consultation with	
				he banking industry they will be finalised and	
			a	agreed by the German government before	
			k	being transferred into the parliamentary proc-	
				ess. Publication of the final rules is expected in	
				Q4/2012.	
				Leverage Ratio:	
				Germany participates in the Quantitative Im-	
			R	pact Studies of the Basel Committee of Bank-	
			i	ng Supervision for monitoring the impact and	
			t	he appropriateness of design and calibration	
				of the leverage ratio until 2017.	
			1	Undertaking further steps regarding the lever-	
				age ratio is pending because this will be gov-	
				erned by the CRD IV which is currently negoti-	
				ated between the EU commission and the EU	
				Member States and will then be negotiated	
			V	with the EU Parliament.	
				As an interim measure for already receiving	
				nformation about leverage of German institu-	
				tions, Germany has implemented in the Ger-	
				man Banking Act [§ 24(1) point 16 and (1a)	
				point 5] a requirement to report yearly the fol-	
				owing ratio and quarterly any change of at	
				east 5 percent of this ratio:	
				Numerator: total accounting capital;	
				Denominator: sum of balance sheet total,	
			L	Sononinator. Sum of Bulance Sheet total,	

					off-balance sheet liabilities and replacement costs for claims resulting from off-balance sheet transactions.	
4 (4, 7, 9, 48)		Strengthening supervision and guidelines on banks' risk man- agement prac- tices	Regulators should develop en- hanced guidance to strengthen banks' risk management prac- tices, in line with international best practices, and should en- courage financial firms to re- examine their internal controls and implement strengthened policies for sound risk manage- ment.	Ongoing	I.4. Germany has transposed the FSB and BCBS recommendations in the Minimum Require- ments for Risk Management ("Mindestanfor- derungen an das Risikomanagement", MaRisk; revised version for the banking sector published on 15 December 2010, circular 11/2010 (BA)) for financial institutions, requir- ing financial institutions to have sound stress testing practices in place. Stress test results must be taken into account as part of the insti-	Ongoing bank specific review
	(FSF 2009)		1.4 Supervisors should use the BCBS enhanced stress testing practices as a critical part of the Pillar 2 supervisory review proc- ess to validate the adequacy of banks' capital buffers above the minimum regulatory capital re- quirement.		tutions' internal capital adequacy assessment process. Accordingly, banks' stress testing practices form part of Federal Financial Su- pervisory Authority (BaFin)'s Supervisory Re- view and Evaluation Process. An amendment of the German Banking Act authorizes banking supervisors, inter alia, to determine an individual add-on above the minimum capital requirements when an institu-	
	(FSF 2008)		II.10 National supervisors should closely check banks' implemen- tation of the updated guidance on the management and super- vision of liquidity as part of their regular supervision. If banks' implementation of the guidance is inadequate, supervisors will take more prescriptive action to improve practices.		 III.10 The updated guidance is implemented in the Minimum Requirements for Risk Management and is subject to on-site inspections. It is also part of the guidance for the regular compilation of the risk profile of an institution and taken into account when judging an insti- 	Part of ongoing supervision.
	(FSB 2009)		Regulators and supervisors in emerging markets will enhance their supervision of banks' opera- tion in foreign currency funding markets.		tution's liquidity management. In case of in- adequate implementation banks are required to take remedial action. The implementation is then closely supervised.	

			ant financial institutions (SIFIs)			
5 (19)	()	Consistent, con- solidated super- vision and regula- tion of SIFIs	All firms whose failure could pose a risk to financial stability must be subject to consistent, consolidated supervision and regulation with high standards.	Ongoing	 Banking institutions of systemic importance, financial conglomerates and insurance groups were already under close scrutiny before the financial crisis. Banking sector Accordingly, pursuant to the Ongoing Monitoring Guideline ("Aufsichtsrichtlinie", Article 6) of February 2008, supervision of banking institutions of systemic importance is more rigorous, with a particular emphasis on detailed analyses of the risks and their possible repercussions on the institution's risk-bearing capacity. In addition, cooperation between BaFin and the Deutsche Bundesbank, as the institutions sharing supervisory functions, has been intensified. Prudential supervision is carried out with respect to banking and financial holding groups with regard to the group's solvency, its compliance with large exposure limits and its investments outside the financial sector (German Banking Act, Sections 10, 13b, 12). The scope of consolidation encompasses all institutions, asset management firms, financial institutions, ancillary services undertakings, e-money-institutions and payment services institutions belonging to the group as well as where applicable the superordinated financial holding company. (German Banking Act, Section 10a). In addition, all these groups have to report on risk concentrations and intra-group transactions (German Banking Act, Sections 13b, 13c and 13d). Furthermore, the provisions in the Minimum Requirements for Risk Management are also addressing consolidated risk management for all material risks and their coverage at the group level for banking and financial 	Insurance sector At the EU level Solvency II will provid for improved supervision of insurance groups.

6 (44)	(Pitts)	Mandatory inter-	Systemically important financial	End-2010 (for	 holding groups as well as financial conglomerates (MaRisk, Section AT 4.5¹) A supplementary supervision applies to financial conglomerates. <i>Insurance sector</i> Mirroring the banking regulations insurance groups as well have to regularly submit to BaFin the calculation of the group solvency margin and a report about important intragroup transactions. In addition, since September 2009 the groups have to quarterly report on important risk concentrations concerning counterparts outside the group (German Insurance Supervision Act, Sections 104e, 104g and 104i). Moreover, the Minimum Requirements for Risk Management (Insurance Companies), Section 2 no. 1 explicitly addresses group risks.) Within the relevant scope, systemically impor- 	Discussions within crisis management
0 (++)	· ,	national recovery	firms should develop internation-	setting up crisis management	tant financial firms have been asked to provide	
		planning for G-	tingency and resolution plans.	groups)	plan in early 2010. The results were already	-
			Our authorities should establish			Additional provisions for cross-border
			crisis management groups for the major cross-border firms and			crisis resolution are subject to ongoing work at the EU level (see section 7).
			a legal framework for crisis inter-		On January 1, 2011 the "Bank Restructuring	
			vention as well as improve in-		Act") came into effect.	
			formation sharing in times of stress.		It introduces two <u>voluntary</u> proceedings that may be initiated and managed by the troubled	
			01000.		bank's management, i.e.,	
	(Seoul)		We agreed that G-SIFIs should	Ongoing	A recovery proceeding ; and	
			be subject to a sustained proc-		A reorganisation proceeding	
			ess of mandatory international recovery and resolution planning.		A recovery proceeding may be initiated by the	
			We agreed to conduct rigorous		management of a troubled bank at an early	
			risk assessment on G-SIFIs		stage of a crisis and notified to the supervisory	
			through international supervisory		authority. The notification must include a re-	
			colleges and negotiate institu-		covery plan, which may include all measures	
			tion-specific crisis cooperation		appropriate for a restructuring of the bank. A	

¹ <u>http://www.bafin.de/cln 110/nn 724304/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Service/Rundschreiben/2010/rs 1011 ba marisk.html</u>

	1					
			agreements within crisis man-		general principle of the measures imple-	
			agement groups.		mented under the recovery plan is that they	
					may not impair any rights of any creditor with-	
					out its prior consent.	
					In case the recovery proceeding seems insuf-	
					ficient for a bank's restructuring the bank's	
					management may apply for the opening of a	
					reorganization proceeding. Such application	
					has to include a <i>reorganization plan</i> , which	
					needs to stipulate, <i>inter alia</i> , the individual re-	
					structuring actions to be adopted by the credi-	
					tors. The restructuring plan can directly impair	
					the rights of creditors as well as the rights of	
					shareholders of the bank.	
7 (45)	(Seoul)	Implementation	We reaffirmed our Toronto com-	Ongoing	The German Banking Act (Sections 45 pp) and	
		of BCBS recom-	mitment to national-level imple-		the German Insurance Supervision Act (Sec-	tation of "Technical Details of a possi-
		mendations on	mentation of the BCBS's cross-		tions 81b pp, 104h and 104t pp) already con-	ble EU framework for bank recovery
		the cross-border	border resolution recommenda-		tain a number of resolution tools. These rules	and resolution" (06 January – 03
		bank resolution	tions.		apply at solo as well as at group level, includ-	March 2011) the EU Commission is
					ing financial holding companies. They focus -	currently working on concrete propos-
	(Tor)		We endorsed and have commit-		in line with the competences of the German	als for a European directive on these
			ted to implement our domestic		legislator - on a resolution at national level.	issues.
			resolution powers and tools in a			
			manner that preserves financial		The German Bank Restructuring Act ² which	This will be transposed into German
			stability and are committed to		came fully into effect on 01 January 2011 en-	law.
			implement the ten key recom-		compasses	
			mendations on cross-border		• Rules and mechanisms for the reorganisa-	
			bank resolution issued by the		tion of banks	
			BCBS in March 2010.		Introduction of instruments to resolve cri-	
					ses at systemically important banks, in-	
	(WAP)		National and regional authorities		cluding the possibility for the supervisory	
			should review resolution regimes		authority to transfer the systemically rele-	
			and bankruptcy laws in light of		vant parts of the bank to a bridge bank	
			recent experience to ensure that		and subsequent liquidation of the remain-	
			they permit an orderly wind-down		ing "bad bank assets".	
			of large complex cross-border		 Establishment of a restructuring fund 	
			financial institutions.		(funded by the private financial institution	
					through an obligatory levy	
	(FSF		VI.6 Domestically, authorities		 Extension of the limitation periods for 	
	、 -	ļ	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,			

² <u>http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&bk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//*%5B@attr_id=%27bgbl110s1900.pdf%27%5D</u>

	2008)		need to review and, where needed, strengthen legal powers and clarify the division of re- sponsibilities of different national authorities for dealing with weak and failing banks.		management and supervisory board members' liability towards listed stock cor- porations and banks.	
8 (43)	(Lon)	Implementation of FSF principles for cross-border crisis manage- ment	To implement the FSF principles for cross-border crisis manage- ment immediately. Home authori- ties of each major financial insti- tution should ensure that the group of authorities with a com- mon interest in that financial in- stitution meets at least annually.		Supervisory core colleges are considered to serve as the basis for Crisis Management Groups, to discuss specific cross-border crisis management issues and develop principles and processes for cross-border crisis man- agement cooperation. On the establishment of supervisory colleges see also section 9.	The colleges meet on a regular basis, at least annually, while core colleges are expected to meet even more of- ten.
9 (41)	(Lon)	Supervisory col- leges	To establish the remaining su- pervisory colleges for significant cross-border firms by June 2009.	June 2009	Supervisory colleges for those German large and complex cross-border banks and insur- ance undertakings identified by the FSB have been established and college meetings have taken place. EU law (CRD II) requires the establishment of supervisory colleges by the end of 2010 for cross-border banking groups with at least one subsidiary or two significant branches within the European Economic Area (EEA). The re- spective banking groups have been identified and the process for setting-up these colleges has been completed.	EU-law (Solvency II) will require the establishment of supervisory colleges for all cross-border insurance groups. In addition, the revised Financial Con- glomerates Directive (FCD/FiCOD) will require cross-sectoral cooperation via the Supervisory Colleges for all conglomerates.
10 (42)	(FSF 2008)	change of infor- mation and coor- dination	V.7 To quicken supervisory re- sponsiveness to developments that have a common effect across a number of institutions, supervisory exchange of infor- mation and coordination in the development of best practice benchmarks should be improved at both national and international levels.	Ongoing	Within BaFin each Directorate has set up a risk-committee (see section 27). Information between these three risk-committees is trans- ferred by representatives joining all risk- committees. Cross-sectoral risks are dealt within BaFin's executive board. In the Banking Supervision Directorate the risk-committee and a task force deal with the effects of the financial crisis. Both bodies are specifically charged with collecting and analys- ing information and undertaking best practice studies. Several other bodies exist to facilitate	Insurance Sector: Currently various reporting templates for risk monitoring/identification among insurers on group and solo level are under development by EIOPA. The templates are also sup- posed to be aligned with work on cross-sectoral templates and Sol- vency II reporting. After the develop- ment phase templates need to be ap- proved by the EIOPA Board of Super- visors (probably in Q1 of 2012). Key challenges are alignment of reporting

11 (46)	(FSF	Review of na-	VI.9 National deposit insurance	Ongoing	 co-ordination with Deutsche Bundesbank (a working group on risk-oriented supervision) and the Ministry of Finance ("Domestic Standing Committee"). In the Insurance Supervision Directorate the duties of the task force are carried out by a special section dealing with the risk orientation of insurance supervision. Furthermore, the information and coordination between supervision of different sectors benefits from the fact of BaFin being an integrated supervisor. At the international level, exchange of information and coordination regarding specific institutions take place mainly through colleges, while overarching issues are addressed through many multilateral fora, including the new European Supervisory Authorities (e.g. EBA), the BCBS, FSB-working groups and more." The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) Crisis Management update in August 2011. a. Completion and Update of the High Level Crisis Contact List; b. Maintenance of Crisis Contact Lists by Colleges; and c. Testing of Colleges Emergency Plans BaFin participated in the EIOPA "Colleges Emergency Infrastructure Test" which tested the reachability, responsiveness of EEA Colleges and information exchange between them in an emergency situation. 	
	(F3F 2008)	tional deposit insurance ar- rangements	arrangements should be re- viewed against the agreed inter- national principles, and authori- ties should strengthen arrange- ments where needed.		on Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compen- sation ("Einlagensicherungs- und Anleger- entschädigungsgesetz" ³) which entered into force in December 2010. Current national de- posit insurance arrangements shall be compli-	

³ <u>http://www.bafin.de/cln 171/nn 721176/SharedDocs/Aufsichtsrecht/EN/Gesetze/eaeg en.html? nnn=true</u>

12 (New)	(Seoul)	More effective oversight and supervision	We agreed that supervisors should have strong and unambi- guous mandates, sufficient inde- pendence to act, appropriate resources, and a full suite of tools and powers to proactively identify and address risks, in- cluding regular stress testing and early intervention.	Ongoing	ant with the agreed set of international 18 Core Principles by IADI/BCBS (June 2009). According to the Act on Deposit Guarantee and Investor Compensation supervision of DGS by BaFin is mandatory. BaFin is empowered to counteract irregulari- ties which may impair the proper handling of the compensation or jeopardise the assets accumulated for paying compensation. BaFin also monitors whether national regula- tion complies with international principles. To this end, BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank regularly receive broad information on the na- tional DGSs (such as: on risk oriented contri- bution systems, monitoring procedures within the guarantee schemes, financial statements, stresses and strains of the funds).	EU-law (Solvency II) will further strengthen oversight and supervision.
		regulatory perime	eter to entities/activities that pos	e risks to the		
financial s	-	Deview of the		Ongoing	Monitoring of structured developments in the	Ongoing
	(Lon)	Review of the boundaries of the regulatory framework	the boundaries of the regulatory framework to keep pace with developments in the financial system and promote good prac- tices and consistent approaches at an international level.	Ongoing	Monitoring of structural developments in the financial system is an integral part of macro- prudential analyses and is conducted by rele- vant authorities in Germany. It also encom- passes reviewing the adequacy of the respec- tive scope of regulation.	Ongoing.
14 (30)		Supervisory re- sources and ex- pertise to over- see the risks of financial innova- tion	V.1 Supervisors should see that they have the requisite resources and expertise to oversee the risks associated with financial innovation and to ensure that firms they supervise have the capacity to understand and	Ongoing	BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank have in place personnel policies allowing the recruit- ment of highly qualified supervisors. They pro- vide and permanently develop training pro- grams. BaFin and Bundesbank have, for example,	Ongoing.

		1			isitistadia 0000 a European udda taili	
			manage the risks.		initiated in 2009 a European-wide training	
					network called the "European Supervisor Edu-	
					cation Initiative".	
					With regard to institutions, German supervi-	
					sors require firms to have adequately trained	
					and experienced staff with regard to their	
					competencies and responsibilities within the	
					firm. This requirement is part of the Supervi-	
					sory Review and Evaluation Process assess-	
					ment.	
					The existent supervisory standards provide for	
					measures to ensure that firms only invest in	
					products if they have the capacity to under-	
					stand and manage the associated risks.	
Hedge fun						
15 (33)	(Seoul)	Regulation (in-	We also firmly recommitted to	End-2009		The AIFM Directive has to and will be
		cluding registra-	work in an internationally consis-		for hedge funds. This framework sets out regu-	
		tion) of hedge	tent and non-discriminatory		lation for managers of hedge funds as well as	2013 at the latest.
		funds	manner to strengthen regulation		for hedge funds themselves. According to this	
			and supervision on hedge funds,		regulation, for example, both managers and	
					funds are subject to an approval process.	
	(Lon)		Hedge funds or their managers		BaFin started using the IOSCO (Task Force	
	· /		will be registered and will be re-		on Unregulated Entities) template for gathering	
			quired to disclose appropriate		systemically relevant information about hedge	
			information on an ongoing basis		funds on an ongoing basis in September 2010.	
			to supervisors or regulators, in-		BaFin gathers information from all supervised	
			cluding on their leverage, neces-		hedge funds irrespective of size.	
			sary for assessment of the sys-		In July 2011, the Directive on Alternative In-	
			temic risks they pose individually		vestment Fund Managers (AIFMD) entered	
			or collectively. Where appropri-		into force. According to the AIFMD the man-	
			ate registration should be subject		agers of alternative investment funds, includ-	
			to a minimum size. They will be		ing managers of hedge funds, will require an	
			subject to oversight to ensure		authorisation before taking up their activities	
			that they have adequate risk		as AIFM and be supervised on an ongoing	
			management.		basis. The manager must, inter alia, ensure	
					that capital requirements are fulfilled and pro-	
					vide for adequate risk management and liquid-	
					ity management. Furthermore, managers will	
					be required to disclose information to investors	
					and supervisors whereas managers of hedge	

16 (34)	(Lon)	sight of cross- border funds	We ask the FSB to develop mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing between relevant authorities in order to ensure effective oversight is maintained when a fund is lo- cated in a different jurisdiction from the manager. We will, co- operating through the FSB, de- velop measures that implement these principles by the end of 2009.	End-2009	funds have additional disclosure obligations as regards leverage. The national supervisor shall use the information for the purposes of identifying the extent to which the use of lev- erage contributes to the build-up of systemic risk. BaFin cooperates and shares information with authorities on the basis of relevant IOSCO and CESR MMoUs.	BaFin is preparing to share informa-
17 (35)		Effective man- agement of counter-party risk associated with hedge funds	Supervisors should require that institutions which have hedge funds as their counterparties have effective risk management, including mechanisms to monitor the funds' leverage and set limits for single counterparty expo- sures.	Ongoing	German regulations require financial institu- tions to have an effective risk management in place, which covers all counterparties. This includes counterparty limits and monitoring mechanisms for hedge funds. In addition to these general requirements, the revised Minimum Requirements for Risk Man- agement (Banks) requires explicitly that institu- tions have to implement an internal policy re- garding credit deals with hedge funds or pri- vate equity firms, where applicable. Amongst other things, this comprises a policy regarding gathering financial and non-financial informa- tion about their counterparties and an analysis of the structure and the purpose of the trans- action financed. The investment of insurance undertakings in hedge funds is regulated in BaFin circular 7/2004 ⁴ For example direct insurers are allowed to in- vest a maximum of 5 % of their tied assets in hedge funds.	Insurance Sector For the insurance sector the Solvency II Directive requires improved risk management systems for insurance undertakings. Currently the EU- Commission is drafting more specific implementing measures in this re- spect. The Solvency II Directive has to be transposed into German law by end-October 2012 [this date might be postponed by the OMNIBUS II Direc- tive].

⁴ <u>http://www.bafin.de/cln 179/nn 721228/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Service/Circulars/rs 0407 en va.html? nnn=true</u>

18 (36)	2008)	Guidance on the management of exposures to lev- eraged counter- parties	II.17 Supervisors will strengthen their existing guidance on the management of exposures to leveraged counterparties	Ongoing	German regulations require financial institu- tions to consider every relevant risk which they are exposed to. This includes also the specific risks of exposures to leveraged counterparties. See also section 17.	
Securitisa	ation					
19 (50)	2009)	Implementation of BCBS/IOSCO measures for se- curitisation	 regulators will: implement the measures decided by the Basel Com- mittee to strengthen the capital requirement of secu- ritisation and establish clear rules for banks' manage- ment and disclosure; implement IOSCO's pro- posals to strengthen prac- tices in securitisation mar- kets. 	During 2010	BCBS recommendations to strengthen the capital requirements for securitisation posi- tions have been transposed into EU Directives (CRD II and CRD III). They have been imple- mented into German law by amendments to existing laws (German Banking Act, Solvency Ordinance) without any material differences. See also sections 21 and 42.	The IOSCO recommendation to re- quire originators and/or sponsors to retain a long-term economic exposure to the securitisation has been imple- mented in Europe via the inclusion of a new Article 122a in the CRD in May 2009. The relevant amendments to the EU-CRD have been transposed into German law. See also section 42. Forthcoming further IOSCO recom- mendations are envisaged to be im- plemented.
20 (51)		Improvement in the risk man- agement of secu- ritisation	The BCBS and authorities should take forward work on im- proving incentives for risk man- agement of securitisation, includ- ing considering due diligence and quantitative retention re- quirements by 2010.	By 2010	Banking Sector The revised Minimum Requirements for Risk Management include requirements for stress testing for all relevant risk areas which also covers securitizations. Furthermore, banks must not rely solely on external ratings. They are rather obliged to assess the quality of se- curitization positions on their own. Enhanced risk management practices for se- curitization portfolios and retention require- ment for originators/sponsors of securitizations is required by EU-law (CRD II) since end 2010. EU-legislation has been transposed into German law by amendments to existing laws (German Banking Act) and the applicable regulations. See also section 21 and 42.	Insurance Sector The new EU-Solvency II framework will establish an enhanced risk man- agement. With respect to quantitative retention it is planned to adopt the same quality criteria for investments in securitisa- tion in the insurance sector as applied in the CRD in the banking sector. Transposition in national law by Sol- vency II Directive.
21 (52)	, ,	Retainment of a part of the risk of the underlying	Securitization sponsors or origi- nators should retain a part of the risk of the underlying assets,	Ongoing	Relevant regulation is contained in the CRD II (Directive 2009/111/EC, Art.122a, stipulates, in particular, that investors may assume expo-	

		assets by secu- ritisation spon- sors or origina- tors	thus encouraging them to act prudently.		sures to securitisation risk only if the originator or sponsor (or original lender) has confirmed that it will retain at least 5% of the risk.) EU-legislation has been transposed into Ger- man law.	
22 (10)		regulatory and capital framework for monolines	II.8 Insurance supervisors should strengthen the regulatory and capital framework for monoline insurers in relation to structured credit.	Ongoing	No monoline insurers operate in Germany.	
23 (54)		supervisory re- quirements or	II.18 Regulators of institutional investors should strengthen the requirements or best practices for firms' processes for invest- ment in structured products.	Ongoing	For financial institutions (esp. banks) the re- quirements in Germany for risk management, including the new product process, have been enhanced. Financial institutions must have a clear understanding of the products and the risk profile of all investments. The respective enhancements of EU legisla- tion (CRD) are transposed into German law, e.g. the strengthened management require- ments for structured investment products and	Detailed aspects on valuation and the relevant internal processes are cov- ered in a circular on which consulta- tion has just ended.
					further due diligence requirements especially for re-securitisations.	
24 (14)		sure of secu- ritised products	III.10-III.13 Securities market regulators should work with mar- ket participants to expand infor- mation on securitised products and their underlying assets.	Ongoing	BaFin currently requests specific data from and interviews with senior management of banks, insurance companies, and asset man- agement companies, to better assess the risk exposure of their securitised products.	BaFin requests quarterly specific data on securitized products of systemi- cally relevant banks. Other banks, insurance companies, and asset management companies are queried on a case-by-case basis where nec- essary. Interviews with senior man- agement at banks and insurance companies with significant risks.
-		C derivatives mark				
25 (17)	(Lon)	action plan on the standardisation of	We will promote the standardiza- tion and resilience of credit de- rivatives markets, in particular through the establishment of	Autumn 2009	In July 2009, first European CCPs for CDS went operational at EU level. One of them is Eurex Credit Clear, a business unit of Eurex Clearing, which is located in Frankfurt and su-	Negotiations are taking place on the EU Commission's legislative proposal. The EU regulation is supposed to be adopted in late 2011, but it is uncer-

		(e.g. CCP)	central clearing counterparties			tain implementation can take place
			subject to effective regulation			before the end of 2012, the G20's
			and supervision. We call on the		The European Commission together with the	deadline.
			industry to develop an action		industry and regulators monitors adherence to	
			plan on standardisation by au-		the self commitment.	The topic of trading of OTC deriva-
			tumn 2009.		EU-Regulation on OTC derivatives, Central	tives will be covered by the review of
						the EU MiFID (Markets in Financial
					der negotiation. The EU Commission has	Instruments Directive). The
						EU Commission started a first public
						consultation ⁷ of issues of the MiFID-
					Repositories on 15 September 2010^5 .	Review from 8 th of December 2010 to
						2 nd of February 2011. This consulta-
					(or via EUR-Lex ⁶)	tion shall provide guidance for a for-
						mal Commission's proposal with de-
						tailed amendments to MiFID is fore-
						seen for October 2011; final rules -
					ity (ESMA), in certain cases in consultation	subject to agreement by the European
						Parliament and the Council - are ex-
					with the European Systemic Risk Board	pected in 2012.
						pected in 2012.
					OTC products, in order to facilitate CCP Clear-	
					ing. For eligible products CCP Clearing will	
					become mandatory.	
					Additionally DoFin and Doutacho Bundoohank	
					Additionally BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank	
					are members of relevant international groups	
					such as OTC Derivatives Regulators Forum	
					and OTC Derivatives Supervisors Groups that	
					work with market participants to further im-	
					prove the OTC derivatives markets e.g. by	
					securing commitments regarding CCP clearing	
					etc., cooperation frameworks etc.	
26 (19)	(Seeul)	Reforming OTC	We endorsed the FSB's recom-	By end-2012 at	See section 25.	See section 25.
26 (18)	(Seoul)					See Section 25.
			mendations for implementing our previous commitments in an in-	IIIC Idlesl		
			•			
			ternationally consistent manner,			
		standardized	recognizing the importance of a			
			level playing field.			
		on exchanges,				
	(Pitts)	clearing and	All standardized OTC derivative			

 ⁵ <u>http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/derivatives/index_en.htm</u>
 ⁶ <u>http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010PC0484:EN:NOT</u>
 ⁷ <u>http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mifid/consultation_paper_en.pdf</u>

		trade repository reporting.	contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative con- tracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be sub- ject to higher capital require- ments.			
-	(Lon)	cro-prudential fra Amendment of regulatory sys- tems to take ac- count of macro- prudential risks	Amend our regulatory systems to ensure authorities are able to identify and take account of macro-prudential risks across the financial system including in the case of regulated banks, shadow banks and private pools of capi- tal to limit the build up of sys- temic risk.		Macro-prudential analysis units have been established in the Bundesbank. Ongoing financial stability analysis and bank- ing supervision carried out by the Deutsche Bundesbank greatly benefits from synergies to other central bank functions by combining macro-prudential aspects to micro-prudential supervision. Bundesbank and BaFin are members of the European Systemic Risk Board. National measures to flank the European structures have also been implemented by BaFin and Bundesbank with the formation of a joint Risk Committee in December 2009 to link macro- prudential and micro-prudential supervision.	Ongoing: Macro-prudential analysis will be further enhanced – also taking account of discussions in international fora. The joint risk committee continues its structured dialogue in its quarterly meetings. The German coalition government in December announced its plan to ex- pand macroprudential supervision at the Bundesbank. Respective legisla- tion is underway.
28 (26)		Powers for gath- ering relevant information by national regula- tors	Ensure that national regulators possess the powers for gathering relevant information on all mate- rial financial institutions, markets and instruments in order to as- sess the potential for failure or severe stress to contribute to systemic risk. This will be done in close coordination at interna- tional level in order to achieve as much consistency as possible across jurisdictions.	Ongoing	BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank obtain the necessary information from institutions regu- larly through regulatory reporting. If needed, BaFin and Bundesbank have the right to request further information according to the German Banking Act (Sections 44, 44a and 44b).	
	\ -	Use of macro- prudential tools		End-2009 and ongoing	A leverage ratio reporting requirement was introduced into German supervisory law as an	Expected EU legislation on the lever- age ratio will be transposed into Ger-

			straints on leverage and margins as macro-prudential tools for su- pervisory purposes. Authorities		indicator under Pillar 2 (see section 5)	man law. European Directive CRD IV will intro-
			should use quantitative indica- tors of leverage as guides for policy, both at the institution- specific and at the macro- prudential (system-wide) level.			duce a Countercyclical Capital Buffer (which is part of the Basel III package) as a first formal macroprudential in- strument.
			On leverage ratios for banks, work by the BCBS to supplement the risk based capital require- ment with a simple, non-risk based leverage measure is wel- come. Authorities should review enforcing minimum initial mar- gins and haircuts for OTC deriva- tives and securities financing transactions.			BaFin is not empowered to impose any particular minimum initial margins or haircuts for OTC derivatives and securities financing transactions. However, based on the information provided in particular by Deutsche Bundesbank BaFin seeks to ensure that firms have the financial means to support the risks that they take.
30 (29)	(WAP)	set price changes	Authorities should monitor sub- stantial changes in asset prices and their implications for the macro economy and the financial system.		Monitoring capital market and asset prices and assessing their implications for the financial system and the macroeconomy at large is part of financial macro-prudential analyses in rele- vant German authorities, in particular BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank. The joint BaFin- Bundesbank Risk Committee (see section 27) monitors their implications for the institutions.	
31 (32)		eration between supervisors and central banks	V.8 Supervisors and central banks should improve coopera- tion and the exchange of infor- mation including in the assess- ment of financial stability risks. The exchange of information should be rapid during periods of market strain.		Deutsche Bundesbank and BaFin have fora at different levels to exchange information includ- ing on financial stability (including the joint BaFin-Bundesbank Risk Committee). Meet- ings at executive level take place quarterly.	Ongoing.
VI. Streng	thening	accounting stand	lards			
27 (11)	(WAP)	cation of high- quality account- ing standards	Regulators, supervisors, and accounting standard setters, as appropriate, should work with each other and the private sector on an ongoing basis to ensure	Ongoing		Ongoing monitoring

	1		annalatant ann lla - than an dia			r
			consistent application and en-			
			forcement of high-quality ac- counting standards.			
			counting standards.			
28 (New)	(Seoul)	Convergence of	We re-emphasized the impor-	End-2011		Ongoing monitoring
· · /	· · · ·		tance we place on achieving a			5 5 5
		dards	single set of improved high qual-			
			ity global accounting standards			
			and called on the International			
			Accounting Standards Board and			
			the Financial Accounting Stan-			
			dards Board to complete their			
			convergence project.			
29 (12)	(FSF		J	End-2009		Ongoing monitoring
	2009)	tion reserves or	and prudential supervisors			
		adjustments by	should examine the use of valua-			
			tion reserves or adjustments for			
			fair valued financial instruments			
		supervisors	when data or modelling needed			
			to support their valuation is weak.			
30 (13)	(FSF	Dampening of		End-2009		Ongoing monitoring
50 (15)			and prudential supervisors			
	2000)	ated with FVA.	should examine possible			
			changes to relevant standards to			
			dampen adverse dynamics po-			
			tentially associated with fair			
			value accounting. Possible ways			
			to reduce this potential impact			
			include the following: (1) En-			
			hancing the accounting model so			
			that the use of fair value ac-			
			counting is carefully examined			
			for financial instruments of credit			
			intermediaries; (ii) Transfers be-			
			tween financial asset categories;			
			(iii) Simplifying hedge accounting			
			requirements.	•		
	gthening	g adherence to int	ernational supervisory and regu	latory stan-		
dards.	1					
31 (21)	(Lon)	Adherence to		Ongoing	Prudential area: Germany adheres to the in-	Prudential area: An FSAP-Update
		international pru-	here to the international stan-		ternational standards in the prudential area.	was finalised in summer 2011 (see

				
		dards in prudential, tax and	Compliance was assessed in an initial FSAP	also section 33); a FSB country peer
		AML/CFT areas.	in 2003. Germany is committed to regularly	review will follow within the timeframe
	standards		undergoing FSAPs/FSAP-Updates and FSB	agreed in the FSB (see also section
		We are committed to strength-	Peer reviews to assess its adherence to inter-	32). Germany is committed to imple-
		ened adherence to international	national financial standards and policies	menting recommendations resulting
		prudential regulatory and super-	agreed within the FSB and to publish results.	from the FSAP/FSAP-Updates and
		visory standards.	Germany participated in all past FSB thematic	the peer reviews. Implementation of
			peer reviews and is currently participating in	recommendations may require legisla-
			ongoing thematic peer reviews. See also sec-	tive steps.
			tions 32 and 33.	
				AML/CFT area:
			Tax area: Germany acknowledges and has	The Government is currently examin-
			implemented the OECD Standard on Tax In-	ing appropriate measures to further
			formation exchange. On 10 July 2009, Ger-	strengthen the AML/CFT regime.
			many has adopted a law providing powers for	
			defensive measures against uncooperative	
			jurisdictions (Law on Combating Tax Evasion,	
			"Steuerhinterziehungsbekämpfungsgesetz");	
			the decree implementing these defensive	
			measures was approved by the Federal Coun-	
			cil of Germany (<i>Bundesrat</i>) on 18 September	
			2009.	
			AML/CFT area: Essentially, Germany adheres	
			to the international standards in the AML/CFT	
			area. It has implemented the 40 + 9 Recom-	
			mendations of the Financial Action Task Force	
			(FATF) and the 3 rd EC-Anti-Money Laundering	
			Directive (2005/60/EC) mainly by the Act Sup-	
			plementing the Act to Fight Money Laundering	
			and Terrorist Financing ("Geldwäschebekämp-	
			fungsergänzungsgesetz") which entered into	
			force on 21 August 2008.	
			Germany was subject to a detailed AML/CFT-	
			assessment by the IMF in the context of the	
			3 rd round of FATF's mutual evaluations (adop-	
			tion and publication of the report by the FATF	
			in February 2010 ⁸ , and has to report back to	
			the FATF in February 2012.	
			The report revealed some deficiencies which	

32 (22)	(WAP)	Periodic peer reviews Undertaking of FSAP	FSB members commit to pursue the maintenance of financial sta- bility, enhance the openness and transparency of the financial sec- tor, implement international fi- nancial standards, and agree to undergo periodic peer reviews, using among other evidence IMF / World Bank FSAP reports. All G20 members commit to un- dertake a Financial Sector As- sessment Program (FSAP) re- port and support the transparent assessment of countries' na- tional regulatory systems.	Ongoing	mainly concern areas outside the financial sector (such as the supervision in the field of the "designated non financial businesses and professions – DNFBPs"). In order to remedy minor deficiencies in the financial sector, Germany adopted in March 2011 a bill ("Gesetz zur Umsetzung der zweiten E-Geld-Richtlinie") which contains further preventive measures regarding the fi- nancial sector by amending the German Bank- ing Act, the German Insurance Supervision Germany honours its commitments under the FSB charter, including to regularly undergoing FSB thematic and country peer reviews. Ger- many participated in the past FSB thematic peer reviews and is currently participating in ongoing thematic peer reviews. (See also sec- tion 31) Germany undertook an FSAP update (includ- ing AML/CFT-ROSC) in 2011. Relevant detailed assessment grades of the initial FSAP were shared with the FSB for pub- lication. A stand-alone AML/CFT-ROSC- Update was finalised in March 2010; results have been published ⁹ . (see also section 31)	Germany is committed to participating in future thematic peer reviews; a country peer review will follow within the timeframe agreed in the FSB. (See also section 31)
Reforming	g compe	ensation practices	s to support financial stability		FSAP update were published ¹⁰ .	
34 (15)	(Lon)	Implementation of FSB/FSF compensation principles		End-2010	Germany has implemented the FSB Principles and Standards as well as the CRD III require- ments on EU-level. Legislative amendments that entered into force in July 2010 incorporate the new re- guirements for remuneration systems of banks	Monitoring of financial institutions is ongoing. The new CRD IV may require some amendments in the respective na- tional regulations of the EU member states. Nevertheless. CRD IV will not

 ⁹ <u>http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=23740.0</u>
 ¹⁰ <u>http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=25219.0</u>

	(Pitts)		We fully endorse the implemen-		and insurers into substantive law. Details	have any negative effect on the trans-
	(11113)		tation standards of the FSB		within the law are regulated by two ordi-	position of the FSB compensation
					nances, one for the banking, and the other for	requirements.
			aimed at aligning compensation with long-term value creation, not		the insurance sector. Both came into force in	requirements.
			excessive risk-taking. Supervi-		October 2010.	
			sors should have the responsibil-		The new law – amongst others – implements	
			ity to review firms' compensation		FSB-Standard 3 which allows the supervisory	
			policies and structures with insti-		authority to limit variable compensation when it	
			tutional and systemic risk in mind		is inconsistent with the maintenance of a	
			and, if necessary to offset addi-		sound capital base.	
			tional risks, apply corrective		Germany participated in the second thematic	
			measures, such as higher capital		FSB peer review in 2011. In addition, Ger-	
			requirements, to those firms that		many conducted a national implementation	
			fail to implement sound compen-		study in the first half of 2011 in order to moni-	
			sation policies and practices.		tor banks' progress with regard to improve-	
			Supervisors should have the		ments in their remuneration schemes.	
			ability to modify compensation			
			structures in the case of firms			
			that fail or require extraordinary			
			public intervention. We call on			
			firms to implement these sound			
			compensation practices immedi-			
			ately.			
	(Tor)		We encouraged all countries and			
	(-)		financial institutions to fully im-			
			plement the FSB principles and			
			standards by year-end. We call			
			on the FSB to undertake ongoing			
			monitoring in this area and con-			
			duct a second thorough peer			
			review in the second quarter of			
			2011.			
35 (16)	(Pitts)	Supervisory re-	Supervisors should have the re-	Ongoing	Banking sector:	Monitoring of institutions is ongoing
		view of firms'	sponsibility to review firms' com-		The German Banking Act enables the banking	
		compensation	pensation policies and structures		supervisor to review compensation policies	Ongoing review of compensation poli-
		policies etc.	with institutional and systemic		and structures in the banking sector as to	cies, focussing on groups with a bal-
			risk in mind and, if necessary to		whether they are in line with the new govern-	ance sheet total larger than 45 billion
			offset additional risks, apply cor-		mental regulations (see section 34). The Ger-	Euros.
			rective measures, such as higher		man Banking Act (KWG) enables BaFin to ban	
			capital requirements, to those		or limit the pay out of variable remuneration by	
			firms that fail to implement sound		institutions and to impose capital add-ons. If a	
			compensation policies and prac-		firm requires extraordinary public intervention	
			tices. Supervisors should have		the German Financial Markets Stabilization	

			the ability to modify compensa- tion structures in the case of firms that fail or require extraor- dinary public intervention.	Fund ("Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfonds", SoFFin) may limit compensations. <i>Insurance sector:</i> The German Insurance Supervision Act en- ables the insurance supervisor to review com- pensation policies in the insurance sector as to whether they are in line with the new govern- mental regulations (see section 15) German Insurance Supervision Act, §81b subs 1a al- lows BaFin to limit or prohibit the payment of variable compensation elements under certain circumstances.	
VIII. Othe	r issues				
Credit rat	ing age	ncies			
36 (37)	(Lon)	Registration of CRAs etc.	All CRAs whose ratings are used for regulatory purposes should be subject to a regulatory over- sight regime that includes regis- tration. The regulatory oversight regime should be established by end 2009 and should be consis- tent with the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals.	 2009. A German statute necessary to execute the provisions of the EU Regulation in practice has also entered into force on 19 June 2010. The new Regulation (CRA II) entered into force on 31 May 2011. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has the power of direct oversight and regulation of Credit Rating Agencies as of 01 July 2011. 	A draft for further regulation (CRA III) is announced by the European Com- mission (EU-COM) for end of Novem- ber 2011.
37 (38)	(Lon)	CRA practices and procedures etc.	National authorities will enforce compliance and require changes to a rating agency's practices and procedures for managing conflicts of interest and assuring the transparency and quality of the rating process. CRAs should differentiate ratings for structured products and provide full disclo- sure of their ratings track record and the information and assump- tions that underpin the ratings process. The oversight frame- work should be consistent across jurisdictions with appropriate sharing of information between national authorities, including	See section 36.	

			through IOSCO.			
38 (39)	2009)	Globally com- patible solutions to conflicting compliance obli- gations for CRAs	Regulators should work together	As early as pos- sible in 2010	IOSCO is coordinating international supervi- sors' work on CRAs (BaFin is a member).	Ongoing.
39 (40)	· · ·	Reducing the reliance on rat- ings	We also endorsed the FSB's principles on reducing reliance on external credit ratings. Stan- dard setters, market participants, supervisors and central banks should not rely mechanistically on external credit ratings. IV. 8 Authorities should check that the roles that they have as- signed to ratings in regulations and supervisory rules are consis- tent with the objectives of having investors make independent judgment of risks and perform their own due diligence, and that they do not induce uncritical reli- ance on credit ratings as a sub- stitute for that independent evaluation.	Ongoing	According to the minimum requirements on risk management external ratings do not re- lease institutions from their obligation to form their own judgment on credit risk and thereby incorporate own expertise, findings and infor- mation when taking credit decisions. This ap- plies also for counterparty risk in the trading business.	In the EU, the FSB principles will be reflected in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), with details of im- plementation still under discussion. In the EU, discussions are on-going in the context of Solvency II.
Risk mana	agement	t				
40 (48)		parent stress test	We commit to conduct robust, transparent stress tests as needed.	Ongoing	Banking sector Robust stress testing by institutions is required by the Minimum requirements for risk man- agement. In addition, supervisory stress tests are con- ducted on a regular basis. Germany participates in the EU stress tests conducted by EBA. <i>Insurance sector</i> Based on the German Insurance Supervision Act (circulars R 4/2011 (VA) and 1/2004 (VA)) the insurance undertakings have to conduct a stress test at least quarterly and to submit the stress test annually. BaFin predefines the	Ongoing, incl. ongoing further refine- ments of supervisory stress test methodology (especially with respect to cover financial conglomerates).

41 (49)		Efforts to deal with impaired assets and raise additional capital	Our efforts to deal with impaired assets and to encourage the raising of additional capital must continue, where needed.	Ongoing	stress test model and the scenarios in the an- nual stress tests. Quarterly stress tests have to meet appropriate criteria. Germany partici- pates in the EU stress test of EIOPA. The programmes for asset relief and recapi- talisation administered by the German Finan- cial Markets Stabilization Fund have been taken up by banks and have stabilised these banks. The Deutsche Bundesbank in its Financial Stability Report (Nov 2009) underlined the need to build capital buffers; Bundesbank Board members continue to apply moral sua- sion in publicly encouraging the strengthening of capital.	The programmes for asset relief, re- capitalization and liquidity support expired on 31 December. 2010. Only already existing asset relief agencies can still be used and rescue invest- ments can still be supported to a lim- ited extent. Since 1 January a new law has been enacted and provides measures to restructure banks if these are sys- temically important (cf. section 6).
42 (53)	, ,	Enhanced risk disclosures by financial institu- tions	Financial institutions should pro- vide enhanced risk disclosures in their reporting and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, con- sistent with international best practice, as appropriate.	Ongoing	German supervisory authorities have strongly advised the relevant international banks and insurance companies to adhere to this rec- ommendation and informed industry about upcoming requirements at an early stage. In- formation from the main financial institutions shows that important banks have significantly improved their respective disclosure practices.	Ongoing. (Germany participated in the FSB thematic peer review on risk dis- closure.)
Others			·			
43 (55)		cooperative and coordinated exit strategies	We need to develop a transpar- ent and credible process for withdrawing our extraordinary fiscal, monetary and financial sector support, to be imple- mented when recovery becomes fully secured. We task our Fi- nance Ministers, working with input from the IMF and FSB, to continue developing cooperative and coordinated exit strategies recognizing that the scale, timing and sequencing of this process will vary across countries or re- gions and across the type of pol- icy measures.	Ongoing	implemented the required consolidation meas-	<i>Financial sector support</i> Within the existing frameworks, Ger- many established a committee of ex- perts on exit strategies that has re- viewed the existing recapitalisation measures. The programmes for asset relief, re- capitalization and liquidity support ex- pired on 31 December.2010. Only al- ready existing asset relief agencies can still be used and rescue invest- ments can still be supported to a lim- ited extent. Since 1 January 2011 a new law has been enacted and provides measures to restructure banks if these are sys- temically important. (cf. section 6)

			Federal Ministry of Finance: Bundestag approves 2011 budget: (http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_1 03442/EN/Topics/Fiscal-	<i>Fiscal exit:</i> Germany will continue with the credible implementation of its fiscal exit strategy: The consolidation measures included in the federal government's fiscal plan until 2015 will contribute to meet the recommendations at the European and G20 level.
--	--	--	--	---

Origin of recommendations:

Seoul: The Seoul Summit Document (11-12 November 2010) Pitts: Leaders' Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit (25 September 2009) Lon: The London Summit Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (2 April 2009) Tor: The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration (26-27 June 2010) WAP: The Washington Summit Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform (15 November 2008) FSF 2008: The FSF Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (7 April 2008) FSF 2009: The FSF Report on Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System (2 April 2009) FSB 2009: The FSB Report on Improving Financial Regulation (25 September 2009)